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DALIA

v.
UNITED STATES

Federal/Criminal

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petitioner attacks his conviction for

transporting, receiving, and possessing stolen goods on the
ground that the

g~ rnment

had not obtained a separate

authorization to install a court-approved bugging device.

The

issue is the same as that presented last Term in Vigorito v.
United States, No. 77-1002, in which cert was denied.

He also

attacks his sentence as too harsh, although within legal limits.

2.

{

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

The government originally

obtained court approval for a wiretap on petitioner's phone in
March 1973.

In April it obtained another order, authorizing the

FBI to:
Intercept oral communications o[ Larry Dalia, and
others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described
.offenses at the business office of Larry Dalia,
consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen
(15) by eighteen (18) feet in dimension . . . .
The order was extended later that month.

The government first

installed, and upon grant of the extension serviced, the bug by
means of a night entry into the office.

The government never

--

told the court expressly that it would gain entry into the office

At trial the presiding judge, who earlier had issued the
orders, ruled that permission for the surreptitious entries were
implicit in his approval of the bug and refused to suppress the
conversations obtained thereby.

On the basis of this evidence as

well as the telephone conversations obtained by the approved
wiretaps, petitioner was convicted of acting as a "finder" for
buyers of a consignment of stolen fabric.

The district court

sentenced him to two concurrent five-year terms.

The defendant

who had pled guilty to the actual receipt of the goods received a
three-year probationary sentence.
The Third Circuit noted that the Fourth and D.C.
Circuits have announced a requirement of separate authorization
for the installation of listening devices and indicated its own
preference for that practice.

But where, as here, the same judge

3.

~~
who authorized the

surveillance later ruled that installation was
/\
·---------~-within the scope of his order, the court felt constrained to rule
- ---------·---··
the evidence admissible. It noted in a footnote that the
--~

sentence was within legal limits and therefore unreviewable.
CONTENTIONS:

Petitioner contends the conflict among the

circuits that exists on the separate authorization question makes
the issue certworthy.

He also argues that the Third Circuit's

summary approach to the sentencing issue conflicts with the
review for abuse of discretion exercised in the Second and Eighth
Circuits.

The government responds that the conflict on separate

authorization is not as direct as petitioner makes out and that
in any event Justice now has a policy of seeking separate
permission for installation, thereby reducing the significance of
this issue.

As for sentencing, the government notes that

petitioner did not allege the indicia of bias and prejudice which
triggered a review of sentencing in other cases.
DISCUSSION:

There is nothing here that was not

presented in Vigorito.

Especially where the same judge that

issued the order construed its scope, the result below seems
manifestly correct.
~

-

How does one qet into a private office to
~

--

install a bug except by surreptitious entry?

-

The government also

is right in depreciating the conflict among the circuits.

The

Fourth and D.C. Circuit cases arose in different contexts from
Vigorito and this case, and a denial of cert here, coming hard on
the heels of the denial in Vigorito, should provide at least some
guidance.

4.

Appellate review of sentencing as a general topic poses
interesting and difficult questions.

This case, however,

provides no basis for appellate review, even if a limited power
to reexamine sentences were recognized.

Petitioner makes no

allegations of bias or the taking of improper considerations into
account by the trial judge;
was long.

his only complaint is the sentence

Absent some claim of unconstitutionally

disproportionate punishment, which is not made here, it is
difficult to see how a convicted criminal ever could attack his
sentence solely on the ground of its length.
There is a response.

8/2/78

Stephan

opns in petn

September 25, 1978
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 .. .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No.77-1722

DALIA
vs.

UNITED STATES

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
D

G

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ../
Brennan, J ..................... / . ... .
Stewart, J ..................... ;:, ... .
White, J ............................ .
Marshall, J ..................../... ... .

.../

Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J ............. .

'""' ) '
•

•

0

••

0.

0

0.

I.

../

...
0

••

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'lc
N

POST

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
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Eric

DATE:

1-8-79

RE:

Dalia v. United States, No. 77-1722

I. OVERVIEW
This case presents the question whether evidence
obtained by means of an electronic eavesdropping device placed in
petr's business premises pursuant to court oroer should be
supressed because the bug was installed covertly.

~,~

...

,('

,,,

Petr contends

2.
that the trespass necessary to install and remove the device was
per se unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that it was unlawful
because not statutorily authorized or specifically included
within the court's order approving the surveillance.

This memo

will not discuss the facts, as they are uncomplicated and
adequately set out in the briefs.
helpful, petitioner's much less so.

The SG's brief is quite
My recommendation is that

the iudqment below be affirmed.

II. DOES THE CONSTITUTION CATEGORICALLY FORBID THE
COVERT INSTALLATION OF ELECTRONIC BUGS?
An implicit, and perhaos t"hreshold question, not
emphasizen by the parties, is whether a judicial order
authorizing the use of a wiretap or electronic eavesdroppinq
device is categorically distinct from a search warrant.

Judge

Hufstedler, unsurprisingly, wrote that it is in her opinion for
the Ninth Circuit in united · states v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 462
n.6 (197R).

Upon this distinction, she was able to avoid many of

the persuasive arquments made by the SG in this case.

As long as

that argument is being made, I believe it . would be helpful to put
it to rest in the opinion in this case.
Since Ka.tz v. united · states, 389

u.s.

347 (1967),

established that the use of a bug to overhear a telephone

~~W~·,_,-

conversation was subject to the Fourth Amendment, the courts, as LJ'
~

far as I am aware, consistently have treated wiretaps as within
the broader category of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.

~

~

-

~----------------------------------------------

They also seem to have considered orders authorizing such

~
/f fi.A'
•
~

3.

surveillance
correct.

as A: quivalen ~~nts.

I believe this is

Although electronic eavesdropping, because of the

serious nature of its intrusions and its capacity for abuse,
properly is subject to stricter legislative and iudicial scrutiny
than are other kinds of Fourth Amendment activities

(e~q~,

"administrative warrants"), there is no sound reason to divorce
it altogether from the principles governing more traditional
kinds of investigative techniques.
Petitioner argues that covert entries to install
electronic eavesdropping devices is so unreasonable that it
should be declared per se illeqal under the Fourth Amendment.

He

claims that such surveillance can be accomplished in many ways
not requiring a physical trespass, and that the nature of the
intrusion is so severe that it should not be tolerated.
This is ?etr's weakest argument.

Although the SG

concedes that the Court has never passed directly upon the facial
validity of Title III (the federal wiretap and electronic
eavesdropping statute), he notes that it frequently has approved
of the admission of evidence obtained by such means.

Analogizi~~

to conventional searches and seizures, the SG points out that
these often ar:-::: cuted with; ut notice to the adversely
parties.

affecte~~

The Fourth Amendment is Peculiarly ill-suited to the

development of per se rules.

~~

~;'~

~~

Nothing in petr's brief is

•\.

persuasive that the concept of reasonableness should not be
applied flexibly to the problem of covert entries to install and
remove admittedly lawful means of surveillance.

4.
III. IS THERE STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR WARRANTS
AUTHORIZING COVERT TRESPASSES TO INSTALL BUGS?
Petr argues from the legislative history of Title III
that Congress did not intend in that statute to authorize covert
breakings and enterings, but merely eavesdropping that can be
accomplished without that intrusion.

The best the SG can do with

the legislative history is demonstrate that Congress was aware
that convert entries frequently are necessary in order to use
------------~----------·

··---------------------

eavesdropping devices (as opposed to wiretaps) successfully.

-------------

Considering the care with which Congress wrote the rest of the
statute, authorization for entries is indeed conspicuous by its

~~

absence.

~~-<:L·~·"'-'

The SG' s explanation for this is that Congress simply
was not addressing this question in Title III.

The SG says

6-c·e-T. P1/
~

thi ~

is because Congress believed the statutory authorization already
existed in Rule 41 of the Fed. R. Crim. P., which refers to the
execution of warrants in general.

The relevant parts of that

Rule are reproduced in the front of the SG's brief.

Although the

language doesn't read much like an authorization for covert
entries, it apparently has been treated that way by the federal
courts, including this one.

In footnote 16 of

~'

the

Cou~t, ~~~

referring to Rule 41, states that prior notice of the execut1on
of a warrant is not an invariable

requirement~

Instead, the

Court has oermitted the police to dispense with notice, when a
search is otherwise authorized, if such notice would "provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence."
Whether the requisite statutory authority is found in

..

5.
Rule 41, by implication from Title III itself, or in some other
statute, the SG must be correct that Congress thought it existed.
---------------------------------~--------------------~

It is just too much to assert, as Judge Hufstedler does in

Santora, supra, that Congress explicitly authorized the use of
electronic eavesdropping under carefully controlled conditions,
but withheld from the police and the courts the necessary
authority to make the covert entries normally necessary to put
the devices in operation.

If I were writing the opinion in this

case, I would be confident that I knew the source of the
undoubted authority for tresspassory entries in the execution of
search warrants generally, then conclude that reasonable entries
to install electronic bugs are covered by this authority.
Special restrictions applicable to entries of the kind made in
this case might be necessary in order to deter abuse, but an
entirely distinct source of authority should not be required.

IV. IS EXPLICIT JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION
FOR THE 1 ENTRY REQUIRED?
Petr argues that even if statutory and constitutional

'S

~~~ ~uthority

----

for covert entries exist, they cannot be exercised

~

without a separate and specific iudicial authorization, in

{Y'v

addition to that granted for the eavesdropping itself.

This is

petr's strongest point: it has been adopted by several of the
circuits.

Petr points out that a distinct invasion occurs when a

trespassory breaking and entering is made, and he contends that
the same constitutional and statutory Principles that require
iudicial authority for the underlvinq search also apply to this

6.

distinct invasion of privacy.
The SG responds that when conventional search warrants
are obtained, the police are not required to obtain preclearance
of the manner in which they plan to execute the warrant.
Instead, they execute it in the manner that appears best at the
time.

~he

SG stresses that the method of execution is not immune

from Fourth Amendment scrutiny: unreasonable execution of a
warrant is unlawful under that Amendment and may result in the
exclusion of evidence.

But judicial review is not applied until

after the search has taken place.

The text of the Warrant Clause

of the Fourth Amendment simply does not require the government to
explain in advance the methods it Plans to use.
As a practical matter, this point is not important to
the SG because the Justice Department now seeks seParate
authorization for necessary covert entries whenever it applies
for eavesdropping warrants.

Rut the question is squarely

presented in this case.
As petr and the cases qoing his way point out, entries
for the installation of bugs differ from that necessary for the
execution of other search warrants because they are remote in
time from the underlying search and seizure itself.
entries are in every instance surreptitious.

Also, such

By contrast, the

general rule for conventional search warrants is to "knock
announce," and to execute the search and seizure at once.
Grantinq this, and acknowledging that a seParate intrusion

~

and ~

~~
~~

---

is ~

entailed by the entry, I nevertheless believe that the qeneral
rule should govern.

Unless the judge restricts the manner

~

~1-0

~~

/

'

7.
which the warrant may be executed, and (perhaps) unless it is not
obvious that a trespassory entry will be needed, a valid wiretap
warrant, like any other warrant, should be read to grant implicit
authority to take the steps reasonably necessary to execute it
successfully.

__

Since
(if petr does not prevail on the arguments
__,

discussed above) the iudge has authority to allow the entry, he
should be presumed to have done so. Otherwise, his carefully
~-----------------------------~
considered eavesdrop order would usually be meaningless.

V. CONCLUSION
I would affirm the judgment below.

In doing so, I would

accept the SG's implicit invitation in the last few pages of his
brief to rule narrowly, guided by the facts of this case:
apparently were only two entries

~nother

--~ne

there

to install the device,

to remove it; nothing was seized while the police were on

the premises on these occasions; eavesdropping could not
reasonably have been accomplished by any other means; it was
fairly clear to the judge issuing the eavesdrop authorization
that surreotitous entry would be required.

If any of these facts

were otherwise, the case could be a different one under the
Fourth Amendment.

The Court should reserve those questions for

the proper cases, then hope they never arise because the
government behaves itself.
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COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1722

I

Lawrence Dalia, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to th(l
v.
United States Court of ApUnited State
peals for the Third Circuit.
[March - , 1979]

MR.

JusTICE BowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 18 tr. S.C.§§ 2510-2520 (Title III),
permits courts to authorize electrohic surveillance 1 by Government officers in specified situations. W c took this case
by writ of certiorari to resolve two questions concerning the
l All typ<'s of eh•rtronir ~urvr1llance have the samr purpo~e and effect:
the sreret interct>ption of communication<". As the Court. ~Pt forth in
Bel'ger v. New Yol'k. 8RR U.S. 41, 45-47 (i967), however, thi:; :;urveillance
is performt>d in two quite diffefeilt way:;. Soine surveillance is perfonned
by "wiretapping," whirh iH eonfinPd 1o thr interception of communication
by telephone and teiPgra ph aiid generally 111:1~· 'be JX'l'fomlt>d from outside
the prrmises to be monitored. For a detailrd de:;criptiou, see Note,
Minimization of Wire Ini rrcrptior'r: PrrHea rch Cuidelines and Post search
Hemerlirs, 26 St<Ul. L. H.rv. Hli, 1414 1i. 18 (19'74). At, i:,;:;uc in the
prrsrnt ca::;r i,· the form of di.ri'vrilla11C't' comhloi1 l.'· known as "bugging;''
wl])(•h indud.Ps the int•Pn'Pption of all on~ communication in a given
location . Fnlike win•tapping, thi:,; intrrcrption typically i::; accornpliHhed
by inO<tallatwn of a ,.:mall microphone in the room to bt- bugged and
tr::msmi,;sion to :-;omr nearby rrrt>ivrr. See iVIcNamara., The Problem of
Surrrpt.itiou:-; Entr~· to EffPctuHte Electronic Eavr,.;drop::;: How Do You
Proceed after the Court Say:-; 'Yrs ' ?, 15 Am . Crim. L. Hrv. 1, 2 (1977);
Rlnkey, AspP('tS of the Evrdrn(·p Gatlwring Proce~;:; .in Organized Crime
Ca~P:;: A Preliminary AnalyBi:::, rPprinted in the Pre,.;idcnt's Comm is:sion 011
Law Enforc·enwnt, and Admini~tration of Ju:;tice. Ta;;k Forcr Report:
OrganizPd Crimr, App. C, at. 92, 97 (1967). Both wiretapping and
bugging are regul<Jted undrr Title III. See 18 U.S. C. § 2510 (I) tuld (2),
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implementation of 1"'i tlr TTT survrilla.ncc orcl0rs. First, may
courts authorize <'l<'et•·onie 'surveillance that requirrs covert
entry 2 into wivate pn•mis<'s for installation of thr necessary
equipment? ~kcond. must authorization for such smveillance
include a sp0cifir statcmen t by the court that it approves . of
the covert entry? 8

I
On March 14. 1073 . .Justice Department officials applied to
the Fnited Rtat<'s District Court for tJw District of New
Jers<'y, S<'<'king authorization under 18 r. S. C'. ~ 2518 to intercept t<'lcphone ronvf'rsations on two t<-lf'phoncs in pC'titioner's
busin<'ss offie<'. Aftf'r <·xamining the affidavits submitted in
support of tlw Gove•·•mwnt's I'<'QUPst. tlw District Court authorizf'd tlw 'vir<'tap for a p<'rio<l of 20 days or until the
purpos<• of thr in tNc<•ptiOJI was achi<'ved, wh ichcv<'r eame first.
The court found prohahk caus<' to belirv<' that petition<'r was
a m<'ml)('r of a conspiracy th<' purposr of which was to steal
goods h<'ing shippPd in interstat<· commerc<• in violation of 18
U. S. ('. ~ 6.10. Mor('(Wf'r. Lhe court found reason to believe
that ]Wtiti01wr's husin<'sS tPlrphones were !wing us<'d to further
this conspiracy and thaL nwan s of investigating the conspiracy
othPr than PlPctronie sur veillanc<• would be uHlik<'ly to succeed
<•l('cf ronic ~lli'Vf'iii:IIH'< ' llN'<·~~:II'il~· if< '· row•rt " in tlw srn~r tha.t
he "hi<ld<•n : ~(·(·l'!'l : di"l!:lli,:f'cl'' to lw efTPdi,·e. Weh,.ctrr',.; New
IntPI'll:llional nietion : u ·~ · til:.! (:.!.d Ed. HJ~~). A~ ll~Pd here, " rovPrt l'lltry "
rd<•rs to thr phy~ i!';d <·ntr ·~· h~ · a Ia\\' Pnforc·f'tn!'nt oiTiN•r into privatr
pn•rni~ r~ \\'it ho11 t t h<• mmPr\ p< • rmi~"ion or kno\\')P(lg<' in onkr to in,.ci<!Jl
hugging <'qnipment. ( h·rwrnll~· ~ll('h nn c•JII r~· \\'ill n·quin• n lm•a king nnd
rnt(•l'lltg. Rf'(' di"cu .-~i o n i11_fm. :II - .
" TIH' F< •dpral ('ourt~ of App<•al" h:l\·<' gin·n <·onflil'ling till"\\' ('['~ to
thr~fl qur~tion :-'. 8<'<' C11it ed .".lote8 ,._ Finazzo. 5~:{ F. 2d S:{7 ((:-Ao
107~) : C~tited .Stoll'S \'. 8r111/ora. 5~:{ F. 2d ~.'):{ (('A!l 197X) : United
States v . 8mjidi . .':iti ~ F. :.!.d fl:l;l (('A:.!. l!l77). <·<'rt. <l<•rJi<·ll, -tlfi l'. ~. 9o;{
(197~) : l'1,ited Stal e~< , .. F(ml. - l ' . 1'. App . D. C'. , .').~:~ F. :!d 1-W
(HJ77) ; ['11iterl .'lta/ e8 , .. A yl' /1811, ;)~J F . 2d GOO (('A~ 1H7fi) , <·<·rt. dcnird,.
429
10-15 ( Wi7 J•
'!

it

EvPr~·

mu~t.

r.,.
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and would be dangerous. The wiretap order carefully enumerated the telephones to be affected and the types of conversations to be intercepted. Finally, the court ordered the
officials in charge of the ill terceptions to take all reasonable
precautions "to miHimize the interception of communications
not otherwis<' subject to interception,'' and required the officials to make periodic progrPss reports.
At the end of the 20-clay period covered by the March 14
court order, the Government requested all extension of the
wiretap authorization. ln addition, the Government for the
first time asked the court to allow it to intercept all oral
conversations taking plac<> in pc•titioner's office, including those
not involving the telephone. On April 5, 1973, the court
granted th<' Government's second request. Its order concerning the wiretap of petitioner's telephones closely tracked the
March 14 order. Fin(ling reasonable cause to believe that
petitioner's office was being used by petitioner and others in
connection with the alleged conspiracy. the court also authorized, for a maximum period of 20 days, the interception of all
oral communications ccmcerning the conspiracy "at the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room,
approximately fifteen ( 15) by eighteeH ( 18) feet in dimension,
and situated i11 the 11ortlnvesterly comer of a otH•-story buildjng housiHg Wrap-0-Matic Machillery Company, Ltd .. and
Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George
Avenue, Linden, NC'w JNsey.'' The order included protective
provisions similar to thosE' in the March 14th wiretapping
ordE'r. 1 The electronic surveillance order of April was extended by court order on April27, 1973.
In relrvant part , 1he T1tlt> Ill. order of AprilS provided :
". . . t ht· C'omt. find~
" (a) Tlwre i~ probahl<' ralii'P to brli!'v<· that. LHJT~ · Dalia and others as
yet unknown, havP c·ommittc•d and arr romrmt ring offL·ll~E'~ involving theft
from inter~tate ~hipnwnt;;, rn viola1ion of Title 11', {lnitrcl State~ Code,
Sect.ion 659 ; ~alr or rrel'ip1 of ~tol<·n good,;, in violation of Title· 18, United
States C'ode, Srctron :Z;H5; and intt>rf('n•nc·<' with commer<·r 1>.,. t hrt>a l<' or
violcn<·e, in violat tOll ol' Titk 18, t'rritt>d Stntcs (A)d<', Sc<'livn 1951 ; and
1

77-1722-0PINION
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On November 6, 1975. petitioner was indicted in a fivecount indictment, charging that he had been involved in a
are conspiring to commit ' urh offrn~r" in violation of Section 371 of Title
18, United Statrs Code.
"(b) Tlwrc 1s probable enH:>f' to belwvr that. particular wirr and oral
communicntion:s roneerning the:;r offen~e,; will br obtainro through the:;e
intercrption:-:, authorization for which i~ herewith applied. In particular,
these wirr and oral communication~ will concrrn the theft or robbery of
good:; moving in mterstatr commerrP, and the transportation, salP, rr<•eipt,
storagP, or di~tribution of thP~e stolPn goodR, and the participant" in the
commi~"ion of Hmd offrn:<r1'.
" (r) Normal IIIVP:<tigahve proeE'dun•s rea~onitbly appear to be unlikE'ly
to :<ucc~·rd and arr too dangrrou:< to lw u~ed .
''(e) ThPre i~ probable can:<P to lwlievE' that tlw bu:sin<'s~ oflice of
Lnrry Dalla, eomn,.:ting of an enclosed room. approximatcl~· fifteen (15) by
eighteen (lR) fppt. Ill dunpn:;ion, and situated in tlw northwE'sterly cornPr
of a on('-~(ory building housing Wrap-0-Matic -:Yiachinery Compan~·, Ltd.,
and Preci~P Parka~J:ing, aml locatrd <ll 1105 We~t St. GeorgP AvPnue,
Linclrn, NPw .fersry, hm; beeu usrd, and is being u~ed by Larry Dalia. and
other~ u~ )''('( unknown in eonnt>ction with the eommi:>8ion of the abovedPSrrib<·d offPU~PS
'WHEREFORE, it I>' lwreb~· onlPrl'd tlmt :
•· Sppeial AgPnt~ of tlw Frderal Burt'au of Inve~tigation, UnitPd States
DepartmPilt of .)u,.;tJeP, are authorized . . to :

•· (b) lnten·<>pt oral eommumcatwn~ of Larry Dalia, and otlwrs a:; yet
unknown, <'OIH'<'I'Illll!J: thP abow-dr~eribrd offPn~P>< at thr busine~,.; oflice of'
Larry Dalia, ron;;i~tin~J: of an cnrlospd room, approximate!~· fifteen (15)
uy Pightel'll (18) fret ITl dimrll~!On, and ~ituated in the northwestrrly
corner of a. on<·-~tor~· building hou~ing Wrap-0-Matir MachinPry Company , Ltd., and PrPci~e Packaging, and .lo<'ated at 1105 West. St. Georg<•
Avcnul', Lind<•n, NPw Jer:iPy.
" ( r) ~ucb intrrreption, ;;hall uot. automat 1call~· terminate whPJl the type
oi commuuiratJOJl dP~rribrd ahoVP in paragraph::< (a) and (b) have first
brrn obtamrd, but shall contmuP until rommtmications arE' mterrep!Pd
wlueh n•veal the mannPr in which Larr~· Dalia and otlwr:; a;; yet unknown
particip;~te in tlwft from mtN~tatP "hipmPnt"; ,.;ale or rPeript of :;toleu
goocb; and intprfen·IH'P with ronmwrer b~· thrPat,.; or viol<•nrl' ; and which
r('vral tlw idE'nt itwt-i of ln~ C'on fedNa tr,.;, their place~ of operation, and the·
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-conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric. 5 At
trial, the Government iHtroduced evidence showing that petitioner had been approached in March of 1973 and asked to
store in his New Jersey warehouse "a load of merchandise."
Although petitioner declined the request, he directed the
requesting party to Higgins, an associate, with whom he
agreed to share the $1,500 storage fee that was offered. The
merchandise stored under this contract proved to be a tractortrailer full of fabric worth $250.000 that three men stole on
April 3, 1973, and transported to Higgins' warehouse. Two
days after the theft, FBI agents arrested Higgins and the
individuals involved iu the robbery.
The Government introduced into evidence at petitioner's
trial various conversations intercepted pursuant to the court
orders of March 14, April 5, ami April 27, 1973. Intercepted
telephone conversations showed that petitioner had arranged
n<tture of tlw conspirar~· involvPc1 !herrin, or for a period of twenty (20)
day~ from the date of lhJH Order, wl1ichever i::; earlier.
" PROVIDING THAT, thi:; authorizaf,ion to intercept oral and wire
eommu11ications ;;hall be. rxccntrd as ~oon a;; practicablP after signing of
thi~ Ordrr and :<hall be romln<:trd in such a way a~ to minimize the
interception of eommnnication;; not otherwii:ic ;;ubjcct to intercrption under
Chapter 119 of TitJr IX of thr Unitrd State::; Code, and mu;;t terminate
upon att.aiumpnt of thr authorized objective, or in any event, at the end
of twent~r (20) day~ from the date of this Order.
" PROVIDING ALSO, thaL Special Attorney .Tames M. Deichert shall
provide the Court with a report on thP fifth, tenth, and fifteenth day
following the date of this Order ;;howing what progress has been made
i,oward the achievement of the authorizrd objective and the need for
continued interception ."
~ Count one charged pet1tioner and other~ with conspiring to transport,
receive, m: d posse~ ~tolrn good::; in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2, 2314,
2115, and 659 . Count two charged petitioner and others with conspiring
to ob;;tuct int.e rstatr commerce in vwlation of 18 U. S. C . § 1951 (b) (1) .
Count three eharged 1hat petitwner had transported Hi olen goods; count
four charged that he had r<'Ceivrd ::;tolrn goods ; and count five charged
petitwner wit.h pO:>SPssion of ~tol en goods.
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for the storage at Higgins' warehouse and had helped negotiate the terms for that storage. One telephone conversation
that took place after Higgins' arrest made clear that petitioner
had given advice to others involved in the robbery to "sit
tight" and not to use the telephone. Finally. the Government
introduced transcripts of conversations intercepted from petitiouer's office under the April 5th bugging order. In these
conversatio11s, petitioner had discussed with various participants in the robbery how best to proceed after their confederates had bPcn arrestee!. The unmistakable inference to
be drawn from 1wtitioner's statements in these conversations
is that he was an active participant in the scheme to steal the
truckload of fabric.
Before trial. petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained
through the interceptiotJ of conversations by means of the
device installed in his office. The District Court denied the
suppressiou motion. without prejudic(' to its being renewed
following trial. After petitioner was convicted on two counts,r.
he renewed his motion and the court held an evidentiary
hearing conceming thE' method by which the electronic device
had been installed. At this hearing it was shown that. although the April 5 court order did not C'xplicitly authorize
entry of petitioner's business. the FBI agents assigned the
task of implemeuting the order had entered petitioner's office
secretly at midnight on April 5 and had spent three hours in
the building installing an electronic bug in the ceiling. All
electronic surveillance of petitioner ended on May 16. 1973. at
which time the agents re-entered !Jetitioner's office and
removed the bug.
In deiJying a second tune petitioner's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the bug. the trial court ruled that
under Title III a covert entry to install electronic eavesdrop ..
6

l'etJtimwr was <'Ollvirted of r<'<.l<'iving ,;;tolt•n good::; and eoni:ipiring tq
and po~~·e~" ~tolrn good~ . See Jl. 5, S!f]ll'!l·,

(ran~port , f<' C'(' IV<' ,
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ping equipment is not uulawful merely because the court
approving the surveillance did not affirmatively authorize
such an entry. 426 F. Supp. 862 (1977). Indeed, in the
court's view, "irnplicit in the court's order [authorizing electronic surveillance I is concomitant authorization for agents
to covertly enter the premises i11 question and install the
necessary equipment." 1d., at 866. As the court concluded
that, the FBI agents who had installed the electronic device
were executing a lawful warrant issued by the court. the sole
que11tion was wh0th0r the method thE'y chose for execution
was reasonable. rnd0r the circumstances, the court found
the covert eJJtry of petitioner's office to have been "the safest
a11d most successful method of accomplishing the installation."
1bid. Iudeed. noting that petitioner himself had indicated
that such a device could only have be0n installed through
such an entry. the court observed that" [ i In most cases the only
form of installing such dPvices is through breaking a11d entering. The nature of thE' act is such that entry must be surreptitious and must not arouse suspicion, and the installation
must be done without the knowledge of the residents or
occupants." Ib id.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 575 F . 2d 1344 ( 1978). Agreeing with
the District Court, it rejcct0cl petitioner's contention that
separate court authorization was necessary for the covert entry
of petitioner's office, although it noted that "the more prudent
or preferable approach for govermnent agents would be to
include a statemeut regarding the need of a surreptitious entry
in a request for the interception of oral communications when
a break-in is contem platc•cl.' ' 1d., at 1346- 1347.

u
Petition er first contends that thr Fourth Anwndment prohibits covert entry of private premises in all casrs, itTrspective
of the .reasonahlrncss of the entry or the a1)proval oJ a court.
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He contends that Title III is unconstitutional insofar as it
enables courts to authorize covert entries for the installation
9f electronic bugging devices.
In several cases this Court has implied that in some cirpumstances covert entry to install electronic bugging devices
would be constitutioually acceptable if done pursuant to a
search warrant. Thus, for e:xample; in Irvine v. Californ·ia,
347 U. S. 128 (1954), the Court ruled that in conducting
electronic surveillance, state police officers had violatect the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. it emphasized that
the bugging equipment was installed through a covert entry
of the defendant's home
;,ttiitiwut a sea.rch
warrant or other
......,
''
process.':, I d,., at ~32 ( ei_t;phasis. .a9ded). Simil.arly, in
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 5015, 511-512 (1961), we
noted thfl.t, ~'[t]his Co~rt has never held that a federal officer
may without warrant and without consent physically entrench
into a man's office, o.r home, there secret,ly, ,observe or listen;
and relate at ·the man's subsequent priminf1l trial what wa~
seen or heard." (Emphasis added.) J.mp1icit in decisions
such as Silverman and Irv:iJ~e -has been -t~e Court's view that
covert entries are 'constitutional in ·some circumstances, at
least if they are made pursuant to warrant;
Moreover, we find: no "' basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all ·covert el1trie~. It is >well 'established that law
officers constitutionally 1hay break · 'and enter to execute a
search warrant where such entry is ·the only means by which
the warrant effectively may be executed. See, e. g., Pay·ne v.
United States, 508· F. ~2d [l3911 1394 (CA5 ' 1975); cf. Ker v.
Calijo1:nia, 374 U. R. 23, 28, 38 (1963); •18 U. S. C. § 3109.
Petitioner nonetheless argues that ,covert entries are unconstitutioual for their lac)cM notice. Tl1is argument is frivolous,
as was iudicaterl in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355
n. 16 ( 1967), where the Court stated that "officers need not
anhot:lllce their purpose before conducting au otherwise [duly]
authorized search if such ah announcement would provoke the
-. I

.·

'

'

t

. '.

I.

"'\

·~

'

~
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escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." 7
In United States v. Donovan, 429 U. S. 413, 429 n. 19 (1977),
we held that Title III provided a constitutionally adequate
substitute for advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must
cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.
See 18 U.S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). There is no reason why the
same notice is not equally sufficient with respect to electronic
surveillances requiring covert entry. We make explicit, therefore, what has long been implicit in our decisions dealing with
this subject: The Fourth Amendment does uot prohibit per se
a covert elltry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.8

111
Petitioner's second contentiou 1s that Congress has not
1

One

authorit~'

has :said that the <'Oll;;titntional validity of covert. entries
''is plainly the con~equrnce of [t1H'] rea;;oning" of Katz v.
V nited States, ai:'H U. S. 347 ( 1967) . T . Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 114 (196~)) .
8 Petitioner argue~ that., rvPn if a eovert entry would be con~titutional
in Rome ca;.;p~, it. wa;; not i11 the prP~ent rai'ie, as t1u•re was no m•rd for suc1J
entr~r. The Distnct Court , howrver, ~prcifically found tl1at the ":-iafe:;t
and mo:st ~mcr;-;sful m!'thod of ar·<·ompli~hiug t1H• ini'ita11at ion of tlw wiretapping devicf' wa~ through IJrPaking and rntering Lthf' officP.]" 426 F.
Supp. 866 (1977) . \Jon•over , i11 i~suing t.ltP TitlP III ordPr, the court
found t.hat ''I n]ormal iuve~tigatiw proerthtrr::; rea~onably appear to be
unli~rly io sm·<·PPd or an· too dangerou~ to br u::;cd." And in hi,; opinion
denying petitionrr'~ ::;uh,:eqnrnt ~uppre~~iou motion, the ~amr judge stil-ted :
"The affidavit<; which :-;11pportPd the application for tlw warrant in question indicatrd that n•iiort. to rlectronic ::;mwillance, to overh<>ar meetings
at Dalia '~ office and t·onversation,.; on Dalia '8 trlrphone:<, was rrqnired to
identify the ('10\lrces of Dalia 's Htolrn good~, tho~<' working with him to
tran~port. and storr ~tol<-n JH'OJ>Prt~·, aud thr i'iCOp<' of t.lw con<ipiracy. Oral
evidem·e of this crimuwl Pnterprt~e was only available in:side Dalia!s
bu;;inr~;.. prrmisr;: " Ibid .
The Di:striet. Court, tlwrrfore, eoneluded that. thr eircum:stancP::< rrquired
the approach usrcl by the offircr:s , and not.hing in the record bring:s this
coneJm;ion into que.·t·lOJl
to in;;tall

bug~
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given the courts statutory authority to approve covert entries
for the purpose of iustalling electronic surveillance equipment,
even if constitutionally it could have done so. Petitioner
emphasizes that although Title III sets forth with meticulous
care the circumstances in which electronic surveillance is
permitted, there is no comparable indication in the statute
that covert entry ever may be ordered. Accord, United States
v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 4.53, 457-458 (CA9 1978).
Title III does not refer explicitly to covert entry. The
language, structure, and history of the statute. however, demonstrate that Congress meant to authorize courts-in certain
specified circumstances--to approve electronic surveillance
without limitation on the uwans necessary to its accomplishmell t, so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances.
Title III provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation
of electronic surveillance, prohibitiug all secret interception of
communications except as authorized by certain state and
federal judges in response to api)lications from specified federal and state law enforcement officials. See 18 U. S. C.
§§ 2511, 2515, and 2518; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,301-302 (1972). Although Congress
was fully aware of the distinction between bugging and wiretapping, seeS. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (1967),
Title IlT by its terms deals with each form of surveillance in
esseutially the same manner. See 18 U.S. C. § 2510 (1) and
(2); n. 1, supra. Orders authorizing interceptions of either
wire or oral communications may be entered only after the
court has made specific determinations concerning the likelihood that the interception will disclose evidence of criminal
conduct. See 18 lT. S.C. § 2518 (3). Moreover, with respect
to both wiretapping and bugging, an authorizing court must
specify the exact scope of the surveillance undertaken, enumerating the parties whose communications are to be overheard (if they are known ). the place to be monitored, and
the agency that will do the monitoring. See 18 U. S. C~
~2518 (4).
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The plain effect of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to
guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there
is a genuine need for it and only to the exteut that it is
needed. 11 Once this need has been demonstrated in accord
with the requirements of ~ 2518, the courts have broad authority to "approvle] interception of wire or oral communications." 18 U. S. C. ~ 2516 (1). (2). subject of course to constitutional limitations. See Part II, supra. 10 Nowhere in Title
III is there any indication that the authority of courts under
~ 2518 is to be limited to approving those methods of interception that do not require covert entry for installation of the
intercepting equipment. 11
The legislative history of Title III underscores Congress'
understanding that courts would authorize electronic surveillance iu situations where covert entry of private premises was
necessary. Indeed , a close examination of that history reveals
0 It i:; clear that. Title III S('!'Ves a ~ub~t.antial public interrst.
Sec n. 13,
infra. C011gre~~ and this Co11rt haY<' recognized, howrver, that. rlectronic

:;urveillance ran lw a thrfat to the " rheri:-;hed privacy of law abiding
citizens" unle:-;,.; it i,.; ~ubjed('d to the careful ~uprrvi~ion prescribed by
Title III. See United States v United States Di~trict Court, 407 U. S.

297, :312 (1972) .

1 ° Congret<:s Pxphcitly confirmed the breadth of the power it had conferred ou court~ acting under Titlt> III wlwn it amended the Act in 1970.
Pub. L. 91-:35R, Title II, § 211 (b), .1uly 29, 1970, 84 Stctt. 654. Section
2518 (4) now cmpower;,; :L court authorizing rlectronic surveillance to
" direct that a . . landlord, cu::;todian or othrr rwr::;on ::;hall fumi""h the
applicant forthwith all information, facilitir,;, and trehnical al:'si,.;tance
neceRsary to accompll,;h thr int.ererptiOn unobtrllliively . . . ." (Empha~is
added.) Thu~, it appear::; that Congm,;~ anticipatrd that landlords and
custodian,; tna? be mli,;trd to tl id law enforcement. officJHl:s covertly to
ellter and place thr nN·es:-;ary f()llJpment Jn privat.r areal'.
11 The only IimitatiOu Title Ill placr" on tlw manrwr m which the::;e
court arden; are to be exerutrd is in it,; requiremrnt~ that no order extend
beyond ;10 da~'t<, aud that ('V('ry Ofdl'!' lllll~f im·lude Jli'Ovi:;ion;,: that it is to
he executed :ts soon a:- prart ieahll' and in a manner that will minimizr the
interception of commullicatJOns not within thr purview of the order. SeC'

1

u s. ('

§2.518 (5 ).
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that Congress did not explicitly address the question of covert
entries in the Act only because it did not perceive surveillance
requiring such entries to differ in any important way from
that performed without entry. Testimony before subcommittees considering Title III and related bills indicated that
covert entries were a necessary part of most electronic bugging
operations. See, e. g., Anti-Crime Program: Hearings on H.
5037, etc. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, !JOth Cong .. 1st Sess., 1031 (1967). Moreover, throughout the Senate report on Title JII indiscriminate
reference is made to the types of surveillance this Court
reviewed in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and
Katz v. United States, 3-89 F. S. 347 (1967). See, e. g., S;
Rep. No. f097, supra, at 74- 75, 97, 101-102, 105. Apparently
committee members did not find it siguificant that Berger
involved a covert entry, whereas Katz did not. Compare
Berger v. New Yor~k, supra, at 45, with Katz v. United States,
:-,-upra, at 348. 12
Jt is understandable, therefore, that by the time Title III
was discussed on the floor of Congress, those Members who
referred to covert entries indicated their understanding that
such entries would necessarily be a part of bugging authorized
under Title III. Thus. for example, in voicing his support
for Title III Senator Tydings emphasized the difficulties
attendant upon installing necessary equipment:
u • • • surveillance is very difficult to use.
Tape [sic]
must be installed on telephones, and wires strung. Bugs

are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious
entry ·is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is
1
~ lndeed, the naturt• of 'e lectronic ::;urveilhmrr involvrd in Berger v. New
York, :388 11. S. 41 (Hlfi7), wa:s mentiorwd on t.hr floor of the Senatf', whf'n

Sena,t or Long- obHervrd that under thr i\ew York law , polic·e could " obtain
judicial warrant8 authorizing tlwm to hide bug~ in the premise ~ of eriminal
~ o~prrts ." Jl4 Con~ . H<'e. 14708 (19!i8) .
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In the face of this record. one simply cannot assume that
Congress, aware that most bugging requires covert entry,
nonetheless wished to except surveillance requiring such entries from the broad authorization of Title III. and that it
resolved to do so by remaining silent on the subject. On the
contrary, the language and history of Title III convey quite
a differeut explanation for Congress' failure to tlistinguish
between surveillance that requires covert entry and that
which does not: 'Those consiclering the surveillance legislation
understood that. by authorizing electronic interception of oral
communications in additio·n to wire communications, they
were necessarily authorizing surreptitious entries.
Finally. Congress' purpose in enacting the statute would be
largely thwarted if we were to accept petitioner's invitation
to read into Title III a limitation on the courts' authority
under ~ 2518. Congress permitted limited electronic surveillance under 'l'itle Ill because it concluded that both wiretapping and bugging were necessary to e11able law enforcement
authorities to combat successfully certain forms of crime. 1 'l
13 18 lT. S. C. § :251() ~T>t'eifi!·~ fhnt. autlwrizatioTJ fur ('lre1runil' ;;urveillance may lw :oought oni~· with rc~p<'rl to cert;tilJ l'tlllmrrat.Pd crimes.
These• inrhtdf' f',.;pionage, ~abotH!!;<'. trea;;on , kidnapping, robhrry, C'Xtortion, murdrr, vnrio1t~ corrupt pradil'e::>, and cuuntrrfeiting. According to
the Senatr Heport. conrt•ming TitiP Ill, "I e]ach offense ha:< becu chosen
eithc·r lweau,.;(> it. i~ intrin~icall~· Heriou:-: or lweau,.:p it i,.; cbaractt>ri;;tic of
the OJ1€'ration;; of organized <'rime." S. Hep. Ko. 1097, ~upm. n. 7, a.t 97.
The nt.-ed for u~e of t•lrct ronie ~urvcillanec again::;t organized crime had
been thorough]~· (•onsidned and documentrcl ~hortl~· before Congre~::< bcga.n
considc·ring Title III b.'· a ~Jweial organizt'd-erime task foree of a Prr::;idPntial Commi~sion chargPd with consic!Pring crime i11 the Fnit{'cl StHle~. The
Pre:-:ident 'R Commission on Law Enforcf'ment and Administration of Justice>, Tm;k ForeP HPport : Organizf'd Crime 91-104 (1967); see Uuited
States v. Cnited 8tate~ Di,stril't Court, supra. a.t :no n. H. A sumrnar~· of
the Ta.~ k Forcp'::; eoneln,.;ion>' appran'd in thf' C'ommi""IOJI's n·port, which
wa~ repC'atediy rf'ff'nwl to durin.g COII>'idf'ra1iOJJ o.f Title Ul. See 'l'hl.'
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Absent covert e11try. however. almost all electronic bugging
would be impossible. See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp.
879, 882 (DC 1976). a.f f'cl.- U.S. App. D. C.-. 553 F. 2d
146 (1977); Mc'Xamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry
to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed
After the Court Says "Yes''?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1977).
As recently as 1976 a congressional commissiou established to
study and evaluate the effectiveness o{ Title III concluded
that in most cases electronic surveillance ca11not be performed
without covert entry into the premises being monitored. See
U. S. National Commission for Rcvirw of Federal and State
Laws Relating to Wiretapping a]}(l Electronic Surveillance,
Electronic Surveillance 15. 43. and n. 19, 86 (1976). · The
same conclusion was reached by the Arnerican Bar Association
committee charged with formulating sta11dards governing use
of electronic surveillance. See ABA Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance 65 n.
175, 149 (1971) ,[.1
Prc,.,idrnt''R CommiH~ion on Lnw Enforcement. and Admlni:;trnt.ion of
Justice, 1'hf1 ChaliPnge of Crime in a Free Soeiety 200-20:3 (1967). In
Congrl'Ss, proponent::; of Title l~I. after hearing numcrou::; witnE's>'e~< le::;tify
conceming the importance of E'leetronic ::;urveillanN· in fighting organized
crime, recommendE'd the bill t.o thPir collcagur,; HH ·'[l]egi::;la.tion mreting
the con~1itut.ional stand:urls "PI· out in iSuprenH' Court] dE'ci:sion><, and
granting law rnforcement. officrrs the authority to tap tE'lrphone wire~ and
instHll electronie surveillancP devict'i:l in the itJve::;tigation of major crimes."
S. Rep. No. 1097, S'U]Jm. n. 7, at 75 ; R>t' ·id., at 74. Indeed, the Senate
Report on TitlE' III unequivocally stated that "[t]he major purpose of
Title III i,.; to comb:tt organized crime." I d., :t t 70. The rapid developments in t.rchuology availabl't' to the eriminal undrnvorld malw it, all tho
more impPrativP thnt tlw GovNnment not·, ' ' d~·ny to it~elf the prudent a.nd
lawful employmenL of tho::;e vrry trchnique::; which are employed against
thr GovemmE'nt. and it;.; Jaw-abiding citizen:;." United States v. United
States District C'ourt. supra, at. 312.
11 Tho:;e fE'w available devicP~ thnt interl'ept convrr::;ation~ from outside
of a building in many ra:;;e~ are impractical, either becawse of ('o~t, relilLbility, or the eonfiguration of the ar(•a being monitorE'd . See U. S.
Natio11al Corruni~~ion for Revi,ew of Fedrral and State Law::; Ilela.ting to

•'
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In sum, we couclude that Congress clearly understood that

it was conferring power upon the courts to authorize covert
entries ancillary to their responsibility to review and approve
surveillance applications UJH.ler the statute. To read the statute otherwise would be to cle11y the "respect for the policy of
Congress [thafl must save us from imputing to it a selfdefeating, if not disingpnuous purpose." Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (193~l).'1 "

IV
Petitioner's final contention is that, if covert en tries are to
be authorized undpr Titl<' UI, the authorizing court must
explicitly set forth .its approval of such en tries before the fact.
In this case, as is customary. the court's on.ler constituted the
sole written authorization of the surveillance of petitioner's
office. As it did not statP in terms that the surveillance was
to .includP a covrrt entry, petitioner insists that the entry
violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Accord,
Un·ited States v. Ford,- U. A. App. D. C.-, 553 F. 2d146,
170 (1977); Application of United "States, 563 F. 2d 637, 644
(CA4 1977).H)
WirE:'tappiug Lllld Elrrtronie , urveillam'C', Conuni,;.~ion Studie~ 168--183
(107G) ; SPC', e. g.. l '11itnl .".totes \". Pord . ..JJ.J. F. Supp. ~7H, 8~1 (DC
1976) , ntf'd, - U. R. Ap11. D. C'. ·-,55:~ F. 2d 14(\ (1977) .
Ju A~ W(' bav(' ronclndC'd that Titll' Ill authorizes <'ourt~ to approve
eovrrt <·ntnrs to in"iall PIPl'i ronie snrvrillanr<' Pqnipmc•nt, W<' do not
ronsidrr wb<'ihN sul'h authorit~· abo i.- eonfPnwl h.'· othc·r fedrral E:'nactl!l('llt~ , ~ueh a~ F<'d. Hule C'rim . J'rue . 41 or the All Writ,; Aet , 28 U. S. C.
§ 1()51.
111 Tht>l'<' i~ no r<'quin'm<•nl i'n Ttil(' Ill that rxplil'it nuihoriz;dion of
covert rntrie" be spt. forth in thP C'Ourt',.; order. Thr ;-;tatutor.'· rrquiremrnt. tlmt. thP .-urv<'illmH·o ' ·~hould r<'main uudf'r tlw l'Ontrol ami ,;upervi~ion of tlw authoriztng court " 1':2 Stat. 211. § 801 (d) (Hl68), merPly
cmplw,;ize8 that C'ourt~ netiug under 1/:l LT. S. C. § :2518 ;.;hould utilizP thE:'ir
powt>r und(•f § 2518 (6) to t·pquir<' prriodie progrr;-;s rPport:s after the·
installation of thP \\'1!'('(11[1 or bug. [f iiWI'C j,.: H l'Pqllil'f'lfif'Jlt of PXplicit
judicial authorizatwn for rov<'t:t. entry, thPrefore, it mu~t romP from. theFm~~:rt.h Amemltuc·nt ; dOll<'.
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The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be
issued only "upon probable ca.use. supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Finding these words
to be "precise and clear." Sta11jord v. 'l'exas, 379 U.S. 476. 481
(1965), this Court has interpreted them to require only three
things. First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistmtes. Ree. e. g., Connally v. Georgia,, 429 U. S.
245. 250-251 ( 1977) (per cu.riarn); Shadwick v. City of 'l'ampa,
407 U. S. 345. 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New Harnpshire,
403 U. S. 443, 459-460 (1971). Second. those seeking the
warraut must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable
cause to believe that "the evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or convictio11" for a particular offense.
Wardeu v. Hayden, 387 U. s·. 294. 307 (1967). Finally,
"warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized,'"
as well as the place to be searched. Bta,nford v. Texas, supra,
at 485.
In the present case, the April 5th court order authorizing
the interception of oral conversations occurring within petitioner's office was a warrant issued in full compliance with
these traditional Fourth Ame11dment requirements. It was
based upo11 a neutral magistrate's independent finding of
probable cause to believe that petitioner had been and was
committing specifically enumerated federal crimes. that petitioner's office was being used "in connection with the commission of lthese] offenses, '' and that bugging the office would
result in the interception of "oral communications concerning
these offenses." App. 6a-7a. Moreover. the exact location
and dimensions of petitioner's office were set forth, see supra,
at - , and the extent of the search was restricted to the
"[i ]ntercept[ion of] oral communications of Larry Dalia and
others as yet unknown. concerning the above-described offenses
at the business office of Larry Dalia . ... " App. 8a.17
17
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Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that the April 5th order
was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment for its failure
to specify that it would be executed by means of a covert
entry of his office. Nothing in the language of the Constitution
or in this Court's decisions interpreting that language suggests
that, in addition to the three requirements discussed above,
search warrants also must include a specification of the precise
manner in which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it
is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to
determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by warrant •H-s ubject of
warrant nrcr::;i'arily are prP8Pni whmrvpr an ordrr undPr Titlr III i:; issued.
Accord, United States v . Scafidi, 5H4 F. 2d 633. 644 (CA2 1977) (Gurfein,
J., con enning). lnde(>d, it was CongrrH,;' rxprr::;,; dt·~ign to ert•at{• under
Title III a mechanism by which :<rarch warrants valid under thr Fourth
Arnrmlnwnt wm1ld be i:<"11ed for electromc :<11rveillancr. See S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong. , 2d Sf'~~., 105 ( 1968); Coni rolling Crime Through More
Elfretiw Law Enforcement: HParing,; on S. :mo, etc. before the Subeonuniltt>e on Cnminal Law,; and ProePdurt'"' of thf' SrnatP Committee on
t.he Judiciar~·, 90th Cong., 1:<t. Se;.;,;., 17(i, 570, 919 (1967); HParings on
H . R. 50:37. Pte. lwforp SuhcommitteP ?\o. 5 of thr House Committ<t>e on
the Jti<.liciar~ ·. 90th Cong., l,;t Sec;::<., 917 H34 (Hl(i7) . No le:;s would be
requirPd for the eomt. authorization of rketronic surw.illanee under Title
III to be ('Onstit.utional, aH rlectronic :;urveillauce undt>niabl~· i::< a. Fourth
Amt>ndmt'nt, intruswn I'PCJ1Iiring a warrant. SE>e, e. g., Katz v. United
States. :389 U. S. :~47, :352-;)5:~, :35H-:~57 (19(i7) . And we have explicitly
rt>cognizPd thr nrcp,.;::;it~ · of a warrant in casp,; of electronic ::;urvrillance.
See l'nited ,States ,., United State8 District Court, 407 U. S. 297, :n6-320
(1972) .
1 8 .For ('Xamplr, comt::; have uphPld tlw use of forceful breaking nllCI
entering whrrr JW<:P::>~ar~ · to d'rect. a warranted ,;earch, <·vrn though the
warrant, gav<t> no indication that forcr had b<>en coniemplat<·'d. See, e. g.,
United States v. Gervatu. 47-l F. 2d 40, 41 (CA:3), crrt. denied , 414 U.S.
864 (HJ7:3) . To bP ,.;un'. ofirn it i~ impo,;siblr to anticipate wheu thr;,;e
actwns will be nece::<o~ar~· . S<•e Notp, Covert Entry in Elrctronic Survt'ilIance: Tht> Fourth Anwndnwni HPquin•mrnt,.;, 47 .Fordham L. HeY. 203.
214 (1978). ~othing 111 the deci,.;ion~ of th1:; Court, howPvt'l', indicate;;
that olfir<•r,.; l'l'(lUPStmg a, wa rr:tnt. would he ron~i itutionally r<t>quirrd to set
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course to the general Fourth Amendment protection "against
unreasonable searches and SC'izur!:'s."
Recognizing that the specificity requirPd by thP }..,ourth
Amendnwn t, docs not generally extend to the m!:'ans by which
warrants are executed. petitiouer further argues that warrants
for electronic survPillancP are unique because often they
impinge upon two different Fourth Amendment iuterests:
The surveillaucC' itself interfpres only with the right to hold
private conversations. whereas the Pntry subjects the suspect's
property to possible damage and pPrsonal effects to unauthorized examination. This view of the warrant clause parses too
finely the interests protPcted by thP Fourth AmellC!ment.
Often in executing a warrant thP police may find it necessary
to interfere with privacy rights not explicitly considered by
the judge who issued thP warrant. }i or example, police executing an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter
the suspect's home in onler to take him in to custody, and they
thereby impingP on both privacy and the frePclom of movemeut. See. e. y., United Stales v. Cravero, 545 F. 2d 406, 421
( C'A5 1976) (on petition for rehearing). Similarly, officers
executing search warrants on occasion n1ust damage property
ln order to perform their duty. i-i<'C. e. y., United States v.
Gervato, 474 F . 2cl 40, 41 (CA3) , cert. denied, 414 U. S. 864
(1973) .
It would Pxtend the warrant clause to thP extrPmP to require
that, wherrPvN it is reasonably likPly that Fourth Amendment
rights may br affect('d in morp than one way. the court must
sPt forth precisPly th<' procedures to be followed by the
executing officers. Ruch an interprf.'tatiou is unnecessary. as
we havP held-and tlw Government concPdes-that the manner in ~-hich a warr·ant is executed is subject to later judicial
rPview as to its reasonablPness. ~ec• Zurcher v. Stanford Da1:ly,
forth thP nnftcipafPd ntPall:< for PX<'<:llfiOn C'\"t'll Ill tho,;e r·a:<P:< where thc·y
kllo\\' )j('for<•hand that llll:liiiiOIIII!•('d 0\' l'orc·c•d Pntry !ikPI,Y wii,J hl' llt'C'('Ii""ll")' ,
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436 U. S. 547, 559-560 (1978). 10 More important, we would
promote empty formalism were we to require magistrates to
make explicit what unquestionably is implicit in bugging
authorizations: that a covert entry. with its attendant interference with Fourth Amendment interests. may be necessary
for the installation of the surveillance equipment. See United
States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556. 560 (Md. 1976). We
conclude. therefore, that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that a Title III electronic surveillance order include a
specific authorization to enter covertly the premises described
in the order.to
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

1 " Petitionn doP~ not <"hallengr t ht> Di~t rirt Court ';:; finding that cov<>rt
entry iu the pre~<>nt cas<' wm• reasonahl<>. ThP officer~ entered petitioner's
office on!,,· twice : oJH·e to in::; tall tlH' bug and once to remove it. Thrre is
no indi<'ation that. their intru~ion went bc·yoml what was nece"~ary to
install and remove t hr rquipment. Sec 11. 8, sup1'a..
tu AI though explicit authorization of t h<> l'nt r~· i~ uot con,;ti tutionally
r<'qnired, we. do agrt>e with tho Comt of Apprab that. tlw "pref<>rable
approarh" would bP for Government agPnt" in the future to ma.kP l'xplicit
to thr authorizing court their {'X])('rt<ttion that ;;ome form of ,.;urrPptitious
entr~· will be r<>quirt>d to CHIT~· out thr ::;urv<>illan<·t•. Indet'<.l, the Solicitor
Gmwral ha~ informed 11,; that the Dc·partment of Ju;;til'c ha" adopted a
polirr re()uiring it.~ offieer1«
' 'to inelurlr I in application~ for Title HI orders] H request that the order
providing for thr int<'rcrption ~JK•rifi<"aJly authoriw ~urrPptitiou~ t>nli~' for
the JHirposP of ill:4aLling and removi11~ any ('!Pdronir intercrption devicPs
to be utilizrd in ac<·ompli~hing thl' oral intt•rrrption .'' Se<• Brief .fo.r ihe
United StHtc::;, al fili.
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[March - , 1979]
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
At midnight 011 the night of April 5-6, 1973, three persons
pried open a window to petitioner's business office and secretly
entered the premises. During the next three hours they
moved freely about the building. eventually implanting a listening device in the ceiling. Several weeks later, they again
broke into the office at mght and removed the device.
Arguably, two considerations may legitimate these "otherwise tortious and possibly criminal'' invasions of petitioner's
private property. 1 The perpetrators of the break-ins were
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. and a federal
JUdge had entered an order authorizing them to use electronic
Pquipment to intercept oral communications at petitioner's
office. The order. however. did not describe the kind of equipment to be used and made no reference to an entry, covert or
otherwise, into private property. Nor does any statute
expressly permit such activity or even authorize a federal
.i udge to enter orders granting federal agents a license to comnut criminal trespass. The mitial question this case raises,
tlwrefore, is whether this kind of power should be read into
a ~tatute that does not expressly grant it.
ln my opinion there are three reasons, each sufficient by
1t::;Plf, for refusing to do so. First, until Congress has stated
otherwise, our duty to protect the rights of the individual
should hold sway over the mterest in more effective law
1

1'.

T<~ylor ,

Two 8tmhe:-; in Constituboual Jnh•rpretation 110 (Hl69),
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enforcement. Second, the structural detail of this statute
precludes a reading that converts silence into thunder. Third,
the legislative history affirmatively demonstrates that Congress never contemplated the situation now before the Court.

I
"Congress, like this Court, has an obligation to obey the
manda.te of the Fourth Amendment." Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 D. S. 307, 334 (Sn:vENS, J., dissenting). But Congress is better equipped than the Judiciary to make the empirical judgment that a previously unauthorized investigative
techniquf' represents a "reasonable" accommodatio11 between
tiH' privacy mterests protf'ctf'd by the Fourth Amendment and
effective law enforcement. 2 Throughout our history, therefore, it has been Congress that has taken the lead in granting
3
llCW authority to invade the citizen's privacy.
It is appropriate to accord special df'ference to Congress whenever it has
('Xpressly balanced the need for a new i11vestigatory technique
against the u11desirable consequences of any intrusion on con~ Cf. C:. llf . Leasill!f Corp. , . l'nited States, 429 F. S. 33g, :353; United
,'itates v. Bisil'ell, 40H n. S. :311, C'olonade Catering Corp . v. Umted States,

397 (T.

s. n, 76

··Brginning with the Acto[ July 31, 17gg, 1 Stat. 20, 4a, and concluding
with thr Omnibuti Crime Control and Safe StrrE'ts Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
1!17, 2HI, 23F., Congrr,.::-; ha;; Punctrd a sr ne~ of ovrr :35 diffrrrnt sta tutes
granting f{'drral judg<'::o the powPr to i:<.-;tH' ~rarch warrant.~ of one fonn or
auothrr. Th<'~P statutr:; have onr ehamctrri~tJc in common: thr~· are
"Jl<'<"ific in thrir grant,.; of authority and in thrir inrlm;ion of limitations on
<·itlwr tlw place::; to he SPnrchrd, thr object:; of thP search, or tlw rrquirelll<'ni,.; for the i::;"unnce of a warrant ." L'nited States v. New York· Tele]!lwlle Co ., 434 U. S 159, 179-180 (STJ.<:VENH, .T., (h~entmg) (footnote
onu1trd).
\fr . Ju~tic r Frankfurter gatlwn·d the pre-1945 statutrs in hi:; disi'enting
uptnion 111 Davzs v. L'mted States, :32~ U. S. 582, 616-()2:3. Hr commrntE'd
lh<1t .. lwlhat •~ ;;tgmficant about thi,.; i<'gJ;;lntwn 1s thr rrrognition by ConJ!:n·~" of tlw m·cr~~n~· for ::;pecifie Congrrssional authorizatiOn rven for the
~<·<lrch of ve~:;rl,.; and oth<'r moving V<'lnclc" nncl the Hrizure of good::; tech~
llkiillv contraband.' lrt , :1! til6, 11. "'.
'

1
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f)titutional'y protected interes~s in privacy. See id., at
334-339.
But no comparable deference should be given federal intrusions 011 privacy that are not expressly authorized by Congress.4 In my view, a proper respect for Congress' important
role in this area as well as our tradition of interpreting statutes
to avoid constitutional issues,r. compel this conclusion.
The Court does not share this view. For this is the third
time in as many years that it has condoned a serious intrusion
011 privacy that was not explicitly authorized by statute and
that admittedly raised a substantial constitutional question.
Jn United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, the Court upheld
an Executive regulation authorizing postal inspectors to open
privatR letters without probable cause to believe they contained contraband. 6 In United States v. New York Telephone
Co .. 434 U. S. 159, the Court upheld orders authorizing the
4 I rrahze that :>ince M app v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 64:3, tlw Court has a.pplied.
tlw ::;amr Fourth Amrndment prmciplrJS to state and federal law enforcemmt. officer:; alikr. Nonethrles,.;, I purpo:srly limit my discu";;ion here to
t hf' fpderal coni rxt. For pu rpo~r,.; of discu~smg the nf'ce::;sity of statutory
<1111 bority, it ,.;rrms uo;rful to mr to trrat the Fourth Amrndmrnt concept
of rrasormblenr;;H as lkxrblr rnough to recogmze differrnce;; bet,wcen ;;tate
and fedrral <"OUrt::l and polirr forrr,.:. Thus, becaul:'e the powf'r of the
.Ft'dPral Govrrnmrnt to combat rnme, like the juri:sdichon of it:s conrt~, is
morr limrtrd than th~' romparablr power and juri::;diction inhering in the
~1 ates, it is logrcal Ill tho federal context to a:;:;umr that governmental
authority is larking unlrss expreJSJSl)· mandatrd by legi,.,lation. Ser, e. g.,
l'alrnore v. United States. 411 U. S. :389, 396; Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS,
:m:z U. S. 20fi; United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441.
'' See McCulloch v Sociedad N acwnal de M arineros de H ond'Uras, 372
l' 8. 10; lnternutwnal Association uf Machinists v. Street, 3()( 0. S. 740;
/lannah v. Larche, 36:3 C S. 420, 4:30; The Channin(J Betsy, 2 Crunch
(li f'. S .) 64
"It. found authonty for tho~(· S('archrs 111 the Po:stitl Srrvice',; recent
l'PJlltrrpretation of an awkwardly drawn 1866 statute that authonzed
t<·r·tain bordrr ~earcheo; of " vr~><eh<" but tJun could not rea~onably be read
I o authorize erther thr marl openmg" t hem,wlve~ or the regulation allowing
tlu·m . !\lorrovrr, it!' :1doption of that interpretation left it no rhoirr but
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urreptitious pen register surveillance of an individual and
directing a private company to lend its assistance ·in that
endeavor. Again, no explicit statutory authority existed for
either order, despite Congress' otherwise comprehensive treatment of wire surveillance in Title III of the Omnibus Criirie
Control and ~afe Streets Act of 1968 (Title Ill) .7
Today the Court has gone even further iri finding an implicit grant of Executive power in Title rn: l Title "does
not refer explicitly to covert entry" of !'Ll1Y kind, much less to
entries that are tortious or criminal. Opinion of the Court,
a11te, at 10. ~evertheless, the Court holds that Congress, with.::o
out having said so explicitly, has authori?;eq !h~ agents of !1
national police force in carrying out a surevillance order to
break into private premisc>s' in violation of state law ~ Moreover, the Court finds m the silent s~atute an open-endeg
authorizatio11 to effect such illegal entries without ~n explicit
judicial cletermiuatiou that they are necessary. In my judgment, it is most unrealistic to assume that Congress granted
such broad and controversial authority to the Executive without making its intentiOn to do so uomistakably plain. This i
t,he paradigm case in which "the exacting words of the statute
provide the surest guide to determining Congress' intent." 0 I
to rr:>o!vfl a t roub!P~omr con,.;fttutwnnJ que~tion without any ron,:idered
gmdanr<~ from Congre::;s. SPe 4;31 lJ. S., at 616-632 (STEVt.:N::;, J .,
dis:sen t.ing) .
7 Sre 4:31 U.S., at 171->--190 (Sn:YENK, J., dis.~enting in part).
Although tins ca.~e invoin'" an office, -ulC invasion of a home would
rai~r preei:;ely tlw ~amr "tatutor~· ~~~lH'.
9 ''C'ougrr~:-; draftNI [Title Ill] with exacting prrciswn.
A;; it::; principal
:lpon~or, Senator J\lc{.'Jellnn, put 11:
'I A] b11l a:-5 cout.roV('r~tnl n,.; thi,.; .. f('quires rlo"C attention to the
dottmg of ewry ''i" and the c·ro:;~wg of rver· ''t'' . . . . lll-! Cong. Rec.
l..J-7.'5L]
•· (' mlc'r thE'~<' rirrum~t a nee~. t IH' rxarting word:-; of the statute• pro dele the
Slll'<':4 guide to drtermining C'ongrp~~· intrnt, aud wr would do well t.O
corlfine Olll'8rlve;:; to that. arra .'' l'nite(/ ,')tates V J)(mm >a./1, 429 L1 S . ...f:l;)l
4-H (Brw:m, (' J di~~PJltmu: 1.

Tho:\-
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would not enlarge the coverage of the statute beyond its plain
meaning.
II
The Court's conclusjon that the statute implicitly authorizes
breaking and entering is especially anomalous because the
statutory scheme in all other respects is exhaustive and explicit.10 "It simply does not make se11se" u to conclude that
Congress, having minutely detailed (1) the process that
" [ t] he Attorney General. or any Assistant Attorney General
specially drsignatf'd by the Attorney General" must follow in
authorizing fcdf'ral police officers to seek an electronic surveillance order,'~ ( 2) the limited number of suspected offenses
See opinion of the Court , ante, at 10; nn. 12-18, infra, and text
arrompanying.
11 A;; .Jud!(r .:\lrrritt, writinl!: for the• Sixth Circuit, cogE-nt]~· obsPrved:
"It :<imp]~· dors noL makr ,.;rns<' to imp!~· Congrr;:;,.;ional authority for
official br<:'ak-ins when not :t ;:;inglE> lin<:' or word of thr statutE> C:'YC:'n
nwntiond llw possibility, mn<'h lr~H limits or defines the scope of the power
or cir~rribPs I hr CJrenmst:uJre~ undPr which ::;urh rondurt, normally unlawful, may take plare. A,; the di:<~Pnt:-: of Holmes and Brandei::; in Olmstead
I v. United States, 27i U. S . ..j.;~~q ~uggE>:-:t, this is a ::;eriou:;, if not a 'dirty,'
bnsine~~; and we do not. belirw we :should imply the power to break in
nndPr the st.atute, a:< the govrrnment argue::;, when Congress has not
confronted and drbatrd the is~ll<' and expre::;srd such an intention clearly.
10

cirruiru:tancE>~ , the in:;i:dlation of an el<'ctronic bug rna~· not be
without a forcible brraking and rntering of the ~usp<:'ct'~; premi::;e::;,
but that. doC:'s uot imp]~· that the power to br<:'ak and enter i::; subsumed in
the warrant. to ~eiz<' the word~ . Tlw br<:'aking and <:'ntering a.ggra.vat~s the
J'earrh, and it intrnd<'~ upon propPrty and privacy intere::;ts not weighed
in the statutor~ · H<'h<•mp, intE>re::-i~ which have independent social value
unrrlatrd to con.fidrntial speeeh. W<> arc not inclined to give thf' gov<'rnm<:'ut. tlw right. by implieation to intrude upon th<:'SC:' interests b~· conducting oflirial bn•ak-in~ . p:;p<:'rially whrn thr purpose iti secret!~· to monitor
a.ncl record priYat<' <'onvPr::-atwns, a dangPl'ou;: powPr otherwi::;e carefully
limited and d<:'finf'cl by :statute." Unite<l States v. Finazzo, 58:3 F. 2d 837,
841-842 (CA6 Hl7R) . See abo l' n£ted State.s v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 453,
456--466 (CA9 1978)

"In :;ome

po~,;iblr

1~

lR F. S. ( ' ~ 25Hi (1).
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that will justify such an order/ 8 (3) the showing that must be
made to "a Federal judge" before he issues the order/ 1 ( 4) the
standard the judge must apply in approving, and the format
he must follow in prepariug, the order/" (5) the time frame
1a18 U.S. C. § 25111 (a)-(g) .
"Each application for au order antlwrizing or approving the intcrcrption of a wirr or oral rommunica t ion fo(hall br made in writing upon
on,th or affirmation to a judgP of rompet~nt juriHdiction and shall state the
npplicnnt':s authorit~· !o makr i<IICh application. Each application ::;hall
include the following information :
"(a) the i<iPntity of thr iu\·<'~tigative 01 law enforcement offieer making
the appliration, and thr offierr aut horizmg the uppliention;
"(b) a full and complrtr :statrmpn[, of thr fact::; and rircum~tanrr:-! rrlied
upon by tlw applicant, to JH~tit\ hi" lwlirf that. an ordrr Hhould bt' iHHUPd ,
inelucling (i) dPtail~ a~ to tbr parttrtliar offrnsr that hal:! brrn, i:> bring, or
i.· about. to hr committed, (il) a parlteular description of the· natmr and
location of the fncilittr" from wh1ch or the plaee when• the eommtmieation
i~ to he interrepted, (ni) a particular de~cription of thr type of communi('ittiom; sought to br intrrc<>ptrd, (iv) the tdrntity of thr JX'I'i<On, if known,
(·umnutting the offpn~r a11d who~(· rommunicfltionH arc to br intercepted;
" (r) 11 full and complrto ~tat(•rnpnt as to whether or not othrr invr~tiga
tJve proct-dun·s havP hcE>n trwd and fmled or why thrr rra~unably appear
lo be unhkrly to Rucrc•('(} 1f tJwd or to be too dangerou~;
•· (d) 11 i<tatrmPnt of the prriod of time for whieh the intercrption is
n•quired to bf' nwintainrd . If thr nature of the invrstigation i;,; :-;uch that
tlw nuthorizatton for wtrrct>pt10n ~hould not automatirally terminate when
lhP de:scribed t~·J)(' of rommuniration ha.~ bern fir~t obtainrd, a particular
de~eription of fartK P~tabh~hing probable cnu~r to believe thal additional
coumnmicatiuns of the Hamp t~· 11r will occur therraftrr.
'' (r) tL full and complete ~tatrm<>nt of the fact::; concrrning all previous
:tpplicatwns known to the individual authorizing and making the applicatwn, madr to nny judge for authorization to interc('j)t, or for approval of
intercrption~ of, wirr or ornl rommnniriltion;,~ in\'Oiving any of the same
prr~on;.; , farilitir~ or plarr~ ,.;pec1fied in lhe application, and the act.ion taken
b~· t hr judge on each ~urh applic·ation : and
' t f) wher(" thr nppheatwn i~ for thr Pxlrn~ion of an Qrder, n R1 ntrment
<t'tting forth thP mwlt~ tltu~ far obtainPd from thr intercPption, or a
n•a,;onable rxplanatwn of the failure to obtain ::;urh mmlts." 18 U. S. C.
l4

~

'2.'ilk (1) .

rt"

,,-, .. (:~) l1 pon ;.;uch aJlplication tbr judge may rntrr an rx parft> ordrr,
l'<'CiUCI'trd or a.-. modified, antlwnziug or :q>11roving mterccption of wire
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of execution and the manner of execution with respect to
minimizing the interception of communications not likely to
involve criminal activity/" and even having more recently
or oral commuuirationo: within tho lrrrilorinl jurisdiction of tho court in
which the judgr i~ ,-itting, if thr Judgr dPtermine::; on the basis of the facts
submittro by the npplicant that" (a) there i:< probable cau:::e for lwlirf that. an individual is committing,
has rommitted, or i,; about to conunit. a particular offense enumerated in
sE-ction 2516 of thi~ rhaptE'r ;
"(b) t hPre i~ probablP cmt,;l' fur bdiPf that particular communications
concE>rning that offeu~c will lw obtained through such interceptiOn;
•· (c) normal mvP,;til!:ativt' proeedmw have bPPn tried and havP failed or
rew<Oll<Lbly appl•ar to be unlike!~· to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
"(d) llwre 1~ probable rau::;r Jur belief that the facilities from which, or
the place whrrE', the wm• or oral communicatious are to be intercepted are
bein~ us<'C!, or are about to br ll"<'d, in connection with the commission of
sueh offense, or arc lea~ed to, h;;lt'd in tlw name of, or commonly used by
::>urh per;;on.
" (4) E~tch order authorizing or npproving the interception of m1y wire
or oral communication ~hall sprcJfy,, (a) thl' Identity of the pPr::;on, if known, whose communication~ are to
be interceptrd,
"(b) the nnture and locatwn of the communication;; facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to mtercept is granted;
" ( r) a pitrtirui;Lr dPscriplwn of the type of communica.tion sought to be
intrrcrptPd, and a :statemE-nt of the particular offrnse to which it rf'lates;
"(d) the idPntity of the agency authorized to intE-rcept the communications, and of t.hP pl'r~ml authorizing the application; nnd
" ( l') thr periOd of tnne dming which such inerception is nuthorized,
inrluding a ~;tatrment a:s to whPthPr or not the interception shall automntically terminate when thE' dr~cribrd communication has been fir&-t
obtwnrd . . . ." 18 U. S. C.§ 2.51R (;~). (4).
1.n '·No ordrr entered under thi;; ~<rction may authorize or approve the
interception of any w1rt:~ or oral communication for any perwd longer than
i~ tJrcrKsary to achtl'VC' the obJPchvr of the :wthorization, nor in any event
lougPr than thirty day:-<. Extrn"tons of an order may be grantrd, but only
upon application for an extl'nswn made in accordance with subf'ection (1)
of thi~ Sl'ction and thr rourt makmg the finding~ required by sub::;Prtion (3)
of tim; section. Thr prnorl of rxtPnsion ;;hall be no longer than the
authorizin11: jud!!;e drem,; nt'rl':s:sary to achiPve the purpo.-;es for which it
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specified (6) certain "unobtrusivef]" means by which those
orders-if so authorized by the judge-might be carried out
without the awareness of the susp~ct, 17 was thereafter content
to leave national policE' officers with unbounded authority to
carry out the resulting orders in any unspecified and obtrusive
fashion they chose "subject of course to constitutional limita,.
tions." Opinion of the Court, ante, at 11,1 8
wa~

grnntrd and in no evrnt for longrr tha.n thirty days. Every order
and extrnsion tll<'n•o[ ,;hall contain a provision that thr authorization to
in1 ('f<:ept ~hall lw ('xeeuh•tl a" ~oon a~ pract,Icable, :;lwll be conductrd in
~ueh ~t wa:v a~ to mumruze tlw mtereeptwn of conununiea.tion~ not otlterWl~<' ~ubjrct to mtere<·ption undPr thi~ ehapter, and mu:;t termiunte upon
ai i ammeut of the authonzcd objPctJvc, or in any event in thirty d~ty:;."
b IT. 8. C . § 2518 (5) .
The :st:l t uto al8o df'ta tl~ prort•durr;: for tlw stornge and protectivt• cu"1 <xly
of the re,;ulting tape~ , 18 U. R C. 2518 (X) (a )-(c), authorized diselo~ure~:~
and usc:-< of tlw tap<'t- both 111 and out of court, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2517,
'2511-- (!l), ami for af1er-thr-fa et noti('r to prr:;on:-: who::;c conwr:sation::; were
onrheard. lR F. S.C. § 251S (.'\}(d) .
J7 Thr followmg provision wa,.. add~d to Title III in 1970 :
'-\n order authorizmg tho mtererption of a wire or oral eommunicnt.ion
-.hall. npon rrquest of thr appli('ant , dirret that. a communication l'Ommon
<·aiTJPr, lancllord, eu ~ todian or othN per,;on~ ~hall fumi::ih the npplieant
forthwith all mformatwn, faeihtu·;-,, :tnt! technical a:;si::itance n<·ce;:;.•;ary to
:H·<·ompli,;h the intrrcPption unobtru,.:iwl~ · and with a minimum of interfen·nre with thr ~t'I'\"H' <':< that ~lteh carrier, landlord, custodia11 , or per:son
1" ;I("('Ording ilw prr;:on who;-,e c·ommunication::~ nrc to be intercepted. Any
<·omnmnieatwn conmwn earrirr, landlord, euHtodian or othc•r person
fumi,..hing Rll('h farilitirH or technical aHsi;:tanep :-<hall be eOlllJX'n~atE.>d
tlwrPfor by tho applirant :H tlw pn•vailing rat<•s.'' 18 U. S. C.§ 2511) (4).
1
' The Court analyze~ thi. a,; ,;impl~· one of judicial authority undrr the
:-tatult·. Ante , at 11 , and 11 . 10. EvPn if I could agrre that Title III
·dTord<·d judp;e" '' broad " and unronfinc•d authority with resprct to breHk-ins,
I would Htill he lrft \nth the prohlrm, nevrr nwntwnrd by the Court, of
I hP l~'.t·c· t · utiu e's nuthonty to hrC'ak and enter at 1nll tnthout any judicial
:111l hon~at wn
.lndet·d, l am not at all t'Prtmu that thr Court pnts an~· ro11fine:; on
1·ttlwr judirtal or <'X<'cnltYe authortt~· 111 tin,: :tl"(':l, dP."']litr tlw lip ,.:<·n·i("l' i~
p:, ,y~ I( • · con~t11111HJII : d lmnt :ltion.· '' For, hnYtll)! ~tat<'d that ··Jn·Pakiug

*
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In my view, it is the opposite conclusion that is true to the
~tatutory structure. For "oue simply cam10t assume that
Congress," see opinion of the Court, ante, at 13, wished to
erect various procedural barriers against poor judgment on the
part of the Attorney Ge11eral and his subordinates in seeking,
and on the part of Federal District Judges in issuing, eavesdropping orders only to commit their execution, even through
illegal mea11s, eutirely to "the judgment and moderation of
officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in
the search." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 182
(Jackson, J .. dissenting). Especially in view of the timing
and minimization restrictious on the executing officer, see
n. 17, sur>ra, as well as the 1970 amendment to Title III concerning "unobtrusive" execution, see n. 18 supra, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress withheld authority to trespass on private property except through the limited means
expressly dealt with in the statute.1.o

III
Only one relevant conclusion can be drawn from a review of
the entire legislative history of Title III. The legislators
never even considered the possibility that they were passing
and pntprmg" in rxeeution of a ,.;pn rch warmnt i,.; ronstitnti01wlly per"whrn' thfl entry i" tlw only tnPUllH by which the warrant effectin,ly rna)' bC' rxC'cntf'd," a11te, a(, 8 (Pmpha.,;i::< added), tlw Court then
equate:; a ,;urvrillance ord<?r wit.h n. senrch warrant, but. see T. Taylor,
8Upm. at. 84-85, and a.llowH n brrak-in undrr thP fonnPr upon a ,:howing
merely that tlw bn·nk-iu was "the safP~t. nnd mo~t effective," rather than
the " on!~ ·, " method of in~talling tlw Jevice. 426 F . Supp. 862, 866.
u, A Uongre:<:< that, wa~ carf'fnl to limit the temporal rxtPnt of p}ectronic
:<llrv!'illancf\ and the opportunity for it to infringP on protPCted (i. e.,
noncriminal) <·ouver,.;ations, a11d ono so quick to amend tho :::ta.tute to
provide for '' uuobtru~ive " entr)· through the aid of privatP pPrt:ioll/S (i. e.,
" cu~todinn~ " and "landlord:<" ) who already have a dPgrrc of accPSs to the
propprty, HurPly cannot havP eondoned unlimited and unauthorizPd brea.king and PlltNmg b~· police ofi'ir<'r,; with tlw aid of nothing but <t burglar's
Lool».
llli,.,~ibl<l
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a statute that would authorize federal agents to break into
private premises without any finding of necessity by a neutral
and detached magistrate.
A

The meagre legislative remarks that are said to demonstrate
that Title Ill 's supporters implicitly endorsed breaking a11d
entering in order to install listening devices actually provide
no support for that conclusion. For example, the reference to
"judicial warrants authorizing [police] to hide bugs in the
premises of criminal suspects.'' see opinion of the Court. ante,
at 12 n. 12, was a comment by an opponent of the bill on
investigative techniques that he believed this Court had ruled
tlleyal in B erger v. ·/1/ew V vrk, 388 U. S. 41. 20 Since neither
he, nor any supporter of the bill. suggested that those techniques would be authorized by Title III. his comment is hardly
indicative of a legislative endorsement of such practices.
Moreover, there is a marked difference between the judidally warranted "hid [ ing of j bugs in the premises of criminal
suspects'' and a forcible entry into private property that has
11ot been expressly authorized by any judge. The difference·
lwtween subterfuge and forcible trespass should not be ignored.
That difference explains why the Court's reliance on two·
sLateme11ts by proponents of Title III that emphasize the·
technological limitations on "bugs" and "taps" is misplaced.
1'he proponents believed these limitations would discourage
the frequent usc and abuse of electronic surveillance. Thus,
ln full, thr paragraph c•xerrpted by tlw Court i~ as follow~ :
'' ln Bergrr against thr Stat!' of Xew York, drcided on .lttn<' 12, 1967, the
majorit~· of the Court, ;;peaking through ..\lr. Ju::;tice Clark, thrrw out the
"NPW York Stnte c·ourt-approvf'd P<tvf'sdropping ~ tatute, drclarmg it. to beuneonstituiional. The Xrw York statute prrmitted thl' police to ootain
.iudiC'ial wa rrnnt;; a.ut horiz111g t lwm to lmlr bug::; m t hr prrmh;r::; of criminaf
~ Li ti JWCt i:l. The C'ourt '~> maJorit~· opimon outlawrd thi,.; bugging :>ta.tutc
hrcausl', ti. ~md, tlw [H'orc·clurr~ did not. contain HIWcific safrguards against
vwlation~ of the fourth fllll('lldmrnt, whl('h limitrcl policr ~earchrs." lH
Coug. n('(' 1-l i'O~-> (:-i('Jl. Lon ~ of \ll ~~o un) ,
20
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in answer to repeated charges that passage of Title III would
recreate Hitler's Germany or anticipate Orwell's 1981,., Senator
Tydings, in a passage partially quoted by the Court, ante, at
12-13, argued :
"Contrary to what we have heard, electronic surveillance is not a lazy way to conduct an investigation. It
will not be used wholesale as a substitute for physical
investigation.
"The reason [s] for such sparing use are simple. First,
electronic surveillauce is really useful only in conspiratorial activities. . , .
"Second , surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape
must be installed on telephones and wires strung. Bugs
are difficult to install since surreptitious entry is often
impossible. Often more than one entry is necessary to
adjust equipment . . . .
"Third. monitoring this equipment requires the expenditure of a great amount of law enforcement's
time .. . .'' 114 C'o ng. Rec. 12988-12989 (emphasis
added).n
Read in context, this and like commentary is .inconsistent
with, rather than au endorsement of, unauthorized break-ins.
For although it is of course true that surreptitious entry is
often "impossible'' when it must be accomplished without
violating the law , surreptitious entry is by no means impossible (indeed, it is hardly "difficult") so long as it may be
effected by whatever means the police-unhampered by the
provisions of the criminal law- can bring to their disposal.
Despite the Court's understanding of it, I read Senator
Tydings' remark as only one of many expressions by Title III's
~~ Sefl also Anti-Crime Program~: Hearings on H. 503i, etc. before
Subcomnnttre No. 5 of thr Hou~e Committrr. on the Judic•ia.r:v, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess ., 10:31 (1967). eitC'd ante, u.1 12.

-,
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supporters of their belief that ~uthorized elec~roni~ S!lrV@il:
lance would be "carefully circumscribed," 114 Cong. Rec.
13203 (Sen. Scott), and "rigidly controlled," id., ;1t 1't71§
(Sen. Tydings) , not only by technology but also by "strict
pourt supervision," id., at 13200 (Sen, Scott), the "strictest
guidelines,'' id., at 16076 (Rep. Harsha), and "an elaborate
::;ystem of checks and safeguards." !d., at 13204 (Sen.
Scott). 22 Yet, havmg expressly attempted to specify in the
Act "every possible constitutional safeguard for the right~ of
individual privacy,'' id., at 14469 (Sen. McClellan)/a those
,:upporters are now chargt.•d by the Court with having im..
plicitly intended to leave' national police officers free to enforce
!!~ '' [Tit!<' Ill] ,;('j~ forth in tno~t t·htuoral<' and prrcise drtail the ~afe
g-uard,; HUrrO\llHiin~r t llC' applwa t 1011 to n eou rt of rompet!'nt juri~-<diction
Jor authority to makr a win·tap I am ;o;ati:;fird that it i~ fl!lly designed
to guard agam~t any llllWarrantPd lllYa>'ion of tllP preciou~ right of priY<I<'~· .'' 114 Cong. Hr<' . Hi27H (RE'p. :\lrGregor) . S!'t' also id ., at l-!7tia
(&·tt h•rry) , ill., at 1629(-i (Hep. Boland) ; S. RPp. 1\o. 1097, 90th Cong.1
!2d ~<'SS ., at. 66.
On at lPa~t two orc•:t.~ion~ tlw Court ha;; commented on the circumspection with whieh Titlr Ill wa:-< drafted :
'" I Title III [ ;;et;; forth tlw rleta iiPd and partirllbtrizrd applir11tion nerC'SSary
lo obtain :-:urh an ordPr as well a., the carefully tircumscribed conditions
for tts usP. Tlw Art n'JH'P~c·nt,.; a (·omprrhrn~ive attempt hy Congre:-;s to
promote more rffcctivr roJ1trol of erime while protecting the privney of
1ndividunl thought. and expn•,.:,;wn." l.)nited States v. United States
District Court. 407 U. S. 2H7, 802 ( l'll1!lh:t~i~ added) . See al::;o Gelbm·d v.
L 111ted States, 40b r . 8. 41, 4H. Sre al,.:o n. 8, supra.
"~ Thr dimru,.;ion~ of tlw con,.;titutioual protection of privacy weN' crri ainly not underp;:;tirn:Ltcd by the supporter,.; of Title Ill. SPnator
Lau~rlH', for example, had thi,.; to :;aY about the mteut of the Framer:; of
the Fourth Anwnclmen t.;
.. [T]hey al~o knPW that tlw ittnoc·c•nt indivichwl would be protrrtrcl in
Ill, home ; that no Oil<' ,.;hall rutPr.
Evc•n though ·it iK a home, to him it i~
Ill~ palarc
So thry wrotr mto tlw Constitution, regard]p~,.; of how poor
one\ homn may br , that 1t ,;hall not hr rnterrd by the goverumPnt withont
llw law-C:'uforrrmpnr official having firs(. ohtainPcl a wMrant for ~C'Hr<'h and
<<·1zun• iH;;u!'d on th(• ha"i" of ('\'Jd<'Jl{'{' ri:it.abliHhinp: probal>h' eau,.;e.'' 114
( onir Hf'(' J-t';"'2!J
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the Act through physical incursions against privacy anq
property.
Even the opponents of Title III, in parading before Con.gress the various invasions of privacy that they felt would
accompany the passage of the statute, never once referred to
breaking and entering privak property. E. g., 114 Cong. Rec.
14711 (Sen. Cooper); id., at 14733 (Sen. Yarborough); id.,
at 16066 (Rep. C'eller). That they omitted such references
while decrying far less aggravated invasions is strong evidence
that they, at least, never thought about the issue that this
case rais('s.2 '
In sum, as far as my rest:>arch reveals, during the debates on
Title III neither the proponents nor the opponents of the bill
directly or indirectly expressed the view that the statute would
-authorize uninvited forcible trespasses by police officers as a
means of implauting a listening device.

B
Because the drafters of Title III made "indiscriminate reference . .. to the types of surveillance this Court reviewed" in
prior cases. ante, at 12, the Court draws the conclusion that
Congress meant to authorize all "types of surveillance" discussed in those cases The premise does not support, the
conclusion.
Many of those cases, including the two specificaily cited
by the Court/" held that the police conduct involved was
21 Had Con~re~:; PXJH'<'~~Iy ron><idr.rrcT thr is~ur, I am confidrnt that it
wotrld not, havr grantrd th<> Exreutivr the broad authority to break and
Pnt<•r that, is eonfrrrwl b~· thr Court. in toclay's deci~ion. Illn~trative of its
probable reartwn to F>urh invrst1ga1 ive (.echmqup:; arr thr ret;pon~e,; of
:-<ome :V[emlwr~ to thr ofticiaJiy ~anct.JonPcl brrak-111 committ!'d agaim;t the
offire of Danid F:ll:;brrg ':-< p~ychw t ri:;t, a ncl to the po~::;ibilit~· of official
partJ('ipatwn Ill tlw WatPrgatr hrrak-in . E. g. , 11\J Cong. Rrr. 14607HGOR (S<'n . Edwards) : ul .. ar. 15:n2 (Ht•p. Snra~m) .
~"Katz v. ['uited States. :3.s9 P. S. :~-ti; BeTgel' v. New Yo!'k. :3gx U.S.
41 Srr al:so Silverman v. U11iled States , :3o& 11 .. S. 505; ITvine " · Call·
fomia, ;Hr lT_ R 1~
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unlawful. There is no reason to assume that Congress in·
tended to endorse all of the techniques discussed in those
cases. Instead, it was quite clC'arly trying to avoid the incidents of unconstitutionality discussed in those cases.~u Moreover, in drafting Title III, the Senate Judiciary Committee
went even further than the mere isolation and exclusion from
the bill of the illegal elf'ments of the police activity involved
in those cases. Thus, the Chairman of the Committee, in
answer to a colleague's question whether Title III was drafted
in conformity with the Fourth Amendment, stated:
" Completf'ly so , let tn(' say to my friend. Completely
so, and it is even more restrictive. \\·e have gone to every
length which is proper, Wt' thillk, to protect people's
privacy." 114 Coug. Rec. 14470.

It is of greater importance. however, that although Congress was concerned with the ''types of surveillance" involved
iu our prior cases. none of the congressional references to those
cases discussed the type of entry made to effectuate the survrillance. Iudeed. not a word in any of those pre-1968 opinions. save one, described an illegal entry or even implied that
such an entry had occurrrd . Those opinions instead described
situations in which a listening device had been surreptitiously
placed against an office wall in order to hear conversations in
the next office, Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129; on
thC' person of a federal agent who recorded a conversation in
the defendant's laundry, cabaret, and law office, On Lee v.
United States, 343 U. S. 347; Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S.
427; Osborn Y. U n·ited States, 385 U. S. 223; against a spike
inserted under a party wall. Silver·man Y. United States, 365
F. S. 505; on the outside of a public telephone booth. Katz v.
Cmled States, 389 r. N. 347; and inside a private office,
Beryer v. l\·ew York, 388 P. ~. 41. It is, of course, true that
the conduct 111 each Cited case was surreptitious, but there is
J fl ' (>(•

R H<'p,

()

1097, SU]II'Il , at Gu, 75, 101.
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a vast difference between detective work that is merely clandestine and work that involves breaking and entering into
private property. Before the decisions in Katz and Berger,
the former technique was considered to be lawful, warrant or
no warrant/' whereas the latter was considered unlawfuVs
Although those decisions quite properly recognized that the
former might also involve an invasion of privacy despite the
absence of a trespass. I am not persuaded that the members
of the lawmaking branch of the Government perceived no
significant difference betwPf'll conduct deemed lawful and that
made unlawful by the criminal laws of the various States.
Only in Irvine Y. California, 347 U. S. 128, did the Court
actually confront the implantation of an electronic listening
device by way of a "trespass. and probably a burglary, for
which any unofficial person should be, and probably would be,.
severely punished." !d. , at 132.~
The plurality of four,
speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson had this to say about
the police conduct in that case:
"That officers of the law would break and enter a home,
secrete such a device even in a bedroom, and listen to the
0

~• E g.. On Lee v. Unitl'd States, 343 U. S. 7-!7; Goldman v. United
States. 316 U. S. 12P , Olmstead\'. U11-ited Statl's, 277 U.S. 4:3R.
~-E. y., Silverman Y. "Lnitl'd States, 365 U. S. 505, Irviue v. Cahfomia,
347 U.S. 12&

:\Ir. Justice Jark,;on descnbed the entry a~ followK :
''On DE>ccmbcr 1, W51, wlulr Irvinr and hi:; wifE' were ab~ent from thE'ir
home, an ofiicpr arrang('(l to ltavr :1 lock:;mit.h go therE' and makr a door
kry. Two clays Iuter, agaiu in thr ab:;eBcr of occupant~. officer:; and a
trchnirian madr Pntry into thr honw b~· thP u::;r of this key and installed
a concPaiPcl tmcrophonP 111 tlw hall. A hole wa~ bored in thr roof of the
housr and wire,; wrn' ,;trung to tran~mit to a 11PJghboring garage whatrvpr
,.;ound~ thP microphone might. p1ck up. Officer::; wPrP po~;tPcl in tlw garagr
to lit-~tPn. On DrrPmber 1', polire again made HurrPptitiou:; rntry and
moved thE' microphorw, thi~ tiHH' hrding it in thr bedroom. Tweuty clay::;
latPr, thPy ngam l'JJtrrPcl and placed thP microphoue m a clos<>1, whrrr thr
clrvier rPmrunPd until 1t~ purpo~P of rnabling the officer" to ov<>rhear
inenminating 4at <·nH·nt' wa,; n<·rompli:-:hE'cl '' 347 TT S., at 1::30-l:n .
20
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conversations of the occupants for over a month would
be incredible if it were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly,
deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental
principle declared by the Fourth Amendment .... " Ib·id.
No Member of the Court disagreed with this assessment, although a majority refused to overturn the conviction because
the exclusionary rule did not then apply to the States. While
it is true, as the Court points out, ante, at 8, that four Memhers of the Irvi·ne Court adverted to the lack of a "search warrant or other process" to support the entry, 347 U. S., at 132
(while the other three Members who discussed the issue fount!
the policP activity "offensiven and ~<revolting'' without relying
on the lack o ·a warrant"" it is also true that llo Justice condoned a break-in absent some court order explicitly contemplating physical entry on the premises. Under any reading of
the case, it cannot be taken as condoning official trespass and
burglary absent specific authorization, nor can its mere citation by Congress 14 years later be understood as implicitly
authorizing such questionable behavior by police officers.

IV
The text of the statute and the scraps of relevant legislative
history are plainly insufficient to support the conclusion that
Congress deliberately authorized the sort of police conduct
that this case involves.'11 I therefore fear that the Court's
:Jo :{+7 F . S., at. 145 (Fmnkfurh'r, .T., ch~~rnting joincu by Burton, J.);
id., nt 150 (Douglns, .J., dis~<l'n1iug).
:u 'Th{' Court argur,; that Congre,;,.:' goal>l in enacting the >;tatute would
l>r frustrat<'d if Tit!P Jll wcrr not read to includ(' thr authorit~· Pxerri>i('cl
j,,,. thr. GovrmmPni iu this ra"<'· A.ute, at Ia-1+. Of com:<e, if Congr·r~s
tllil'tHi{'d to «a netion " PYPn tlw mo~t l'<'prrhpnsiblr mPan,.: for s{'C'llring a.
<·OllYJdion, " lrvut<'. supra, :Hi ll . 8., at 141) (Frankfuiif>r . .f., rli,.:sf>nting),
tho~P mran~ would indPC'd frust.ratr thP lPgisbuvo purpo~e . But tlwn' is no n•;J:<OII to imputr ~urh an int<'nt to Congr!'ss
or to ignon~ it~ rotlHCiPntiou:< attrlltlOII to tlw importaner of ,;afPgwudiug

t IH'II withholrling :--onw of

r

~

A
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holding may reflect an unarticulated presumption that national police officers have the power to carry out a surveillance
order by whatever means may be necessary unless explicitly
prohibited by the statute or by the Constitution.
But surely the presumption should run the other way.
Congressional silence should Hot be construed to authorize the
Executive to violate state criminal laws or to encroach upon
constitutionally protected privacy interests. Before confronting the serious constitutional issues raised by the Court's reading of Title nv~ we should insist upou an unambiguous statement by Congress that this sort of police conduct may be
authorized by a court ami ou some specification of the showing
that must precede any such authorization. Without a legislative mandate that is both explicit and specific, I would presume that the citizen's privacy is protected against this flagrant invasion. Cf. United States v. l\·ew York Telephone
the rights of individual privacr. See 114 Cong. Hec. 14469-14470 (Sen.
McClrllan); HPe supra, at 11-12, 14.
CongrPSt> quit(1 clrarly rxprct.rd f'Xtrrior wiretaps io provide the most
efft>ctive mran~ of t>lectronic ~urveillance authorized by Title III. The
unavnila.bilit~· of certain interior "bugs"-i. e., tho:<e imphmtffi b~· mran::;
of forcible trespass-can hardly br ~PI'll as fru~trating thr entire Jaw
enforcrmrnt, scheme. E . g., S. Hrp. ~o . 1097, supra. at 72; 114 Cong.
Rrc. 12988 (Sen. T~·dings); id .. at. 1:3206 (Sen. Scott); id., at 14481 (Sen.
McUellan); id., at 14715 (Sen. :Vfurphy).
Congress' prrdiction proved corrPct :
"Telrphone taps apparent!~· account for most. in~tance:" of rlectronic
t;urveillance, a.nd this can br accomplished in m0<:1t circumstance" by
placing a tap on the line outsidr the prt>mi~es of the ~u~pect.. According
to the final report. of tht> K:~tional Commi~:;;;ion for Hrvit>w of Federal and
StatE~ Laws Rt>lating to Wiretapping and ElPctronic Survei!Lancr, only 26
out, of some 1,220 t>lectronie :smwiJlHJlCP orders executed bt>tween 1968
and 1973 mvolved a trp;;pru;sory intru;;ion. National Wiretap Commission,
Electronic Surveillance 15 ( 19o7) .. . .'' United States v. Finazzo, ~rupra,
583 F. 2d. at 841 n 1 :~ .
M~ Com part> opinion of tlw Court, ante, at 7-9, 15-19, with opinion of

MR . .JuwricE BRENNAN , ante. at - .
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Co., supra, 434 U. S., at 178-179 (STEVENS, J., dissenting);
United States v. Ramsey, supra, 431 U. S., at 632 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting) .33
I respectfully dissent.

33 In :tclclition to Titlo TIT, tTw Gov<'rnmrnt c-Tajm:; authorit~· for tile
brPak-in:; HlldN the fpcJpra] "no-knock" ::>t<ltutr, 18 U. s. C. § a109, and
undc•r Rul!l 41 of thl· Federal Hule..,. of Criminal Proredun·. :&'eatL"P I
beliPvc that. Title III ha:< prP-empted thr firld of p]ertronic :;urvrillant:l', iL
is concln~ivc for me that it. nowht>n• authorize,; thP ent.rip:; involvcrl in ti1iS'
ca:<c as a mra.n~ of rxrcuting an Pavp,.:dropping order. Even if Congr0il
lwei nt>vrr rnacted Tit]p III, howf'ver, 1 would uonethe]e, coneludr tha.t
thf'>ifl other a,.;,.:rrted ju~tifica.tions for officia.l brraking and cntPrin~ arc
unavailing in this ra,.r. Roth provi:;ion>' refPr to "warrants" i,.:"uN! by a
magi,.:tratr with the <l\\·areiH'>'S that their rxecntion would probabl~· rpquir<'
the police to find i'Oin<' othNwi"e illrgal mran;.: of entering thr premi,.;t•,.:,
l\o such awarcJH'~" was cvidenrrcl by thP District Court when it authorizrd
cketronic ,;nrvrillanre in this case. ~cr gpncrally United State.s v. /l'iiWzz·o,
s~pra, 583 F. 2d, at 845-848.
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. Jus'riCE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
At midnight on the night of April 5-6, 1973, three persons
pried open a window to petitioner's business office and secretly
entered the premises. During the next three hours they
moved freely about the building, eventually implanting a listening device in the ceiling. Several weeks later, they again
broke into the office at night and removed the device.
The perpetrators of these break-ins were agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Their office, however, car~'7"1~~~1\l4l~~
· no general warrant to trespass on private property.
ithout legislative or judicial sanction, the conduct of these
M'7~1JC.~IIII!!rgents was unquestionably "unreasonable" and therefore prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 1 Moreover, that conduct
vio~ the Criminal Codf) of the State of New Jersey unless
C...,;j..,.....,..,.~,...~..,._·i't. w
uly authorized.2
~The only consideration that arguably might legitimate these

-

s~t.._ ~::~~~d ,~i2t;•
.

: nvasions of peti-

-n-;-_

1
See United State/5 v. United States District Co·urt, 407 U. S. 297. The
Fourth AmPndment provides :
J,..l.._. ~ • ~
"The right of the peoplE' to b!:' ::;ecure in their persons, houses, papers,
~ ,. - - - - ;
and . effects, agai~st unrPasonable ::;earches and seizures, shall not be viot~t/d.. and}!JII )V~rr~nt.s shall Issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
~ or m ~nd particularly describing thE' place to be searched,
and thP per~ons or thing~ to be seized." U S. Const., Amend . IY. ~
~ 1
~ - ~ J . Stat Ann §§2A .94-I , 2A -. 94-.'L
Vc l\.~ ~ (·~ U

~
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tioner's private property/ is the fact that a federal judge had
entered an order authorizing the agents to use electronic equipment to intercept oral communic&tions at petitioner's office.
The order, however, did not described the kind of equipment
to be used and made no reference to an entry, covert or
otherwise, into private property. Nor does any statute
expressly permit such activity or even authorize a federal
judge to enter orders granting federal agents a license to commit criminal trespass. The initial question this case raises,
therefore, is whether this kind of power should be read into
a statute that does not expressly grant it.
In my opinion there are three re&sons, each sufficient by
itself, for refusing to do so. F..it§t, until Congress has stated
otherwise, our duty to protect the rights of the individual
sh~uld hold sway over the interest in more effective law
enforcement. Second, the structural detail of this statute
precludes a reading that converts silence into thunder. Third,
the legislative history affirmativeTv demonstw~p that 't'X>ngress never contemplated the situation now before the Court.
I

-

I
"Congress, like this Court, has an obligation to obey the
mandate of the Fourth Amendment." Mqrshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 334 (S'I'EVENS, J., dissenting). But Congress is better equipped than the Judiciary to make the empirical judgment that a previously unauthorized investig&tive·
technique represents a "reasonable" accommodation between
the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and
effective law enforcement. 4 Throughout our history, therefore, it has been Congress that has taken the lead in granting
~
1

T . Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 110 (1969),
Cf. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353; United

States v. Biswell, 406 'U. S. 3.11 ;: Qolonade Catering Corp . v. United States,.
397

u. s. 7~, 7.6.
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uew authority to invade the citizen's privacy. 5 It is appropriate to accord special deference to Congress whenever it has
expressly balanced the need for a new investigaii9ry technique
agj:l.inst the undesirable consequences of any intrusion on constitutionally protected interests in priv~oy . See id., at
334-339.
But no comparable deference should be given .federal intrusions on privacy that are not expres~ly authorized by Congress.6 In my view, a proper respect for Congress' important
''Beginning with the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, and concluding
with the Omnibu~:> Crime Control and Safe Street!~ Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
197, 219, 238, Congress has enacted a series of over 35 different statutes
granting f·edera.l judges the power to issue search warrants of one fonp. or
another. These statutes have one characteristic in common: they are
speCific In their gra.pts of authority and in their inch.Jsion of limitations on
either the places to be searched, the objects of the search, or the requirements for the issuance of a warrant." United States v. New York Telephone Co ., 434 U. S. 159, 179-180 (S·rEVENS, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted) .
Mr. Justice Frankfurter gathered the pre-1945 statutes in his dissenting
opinion in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 616-623. He commented
that " [ w] hat is ~ignificant about this legislation is the recognition by Congress of the necessity for specific Congre.ssional authorization even for the
search of vessels and other 1noving vehicles and the seizure of goods technically contraband." ld., at 616, n. *.
HI realize that since Mapp v. Ohw. 367 U.S. 643, the Court has applied
the same Fourth Alllendment principles t.o state and federal law enforcement officers alike. Nonetheless, I purposely limit my discussion here to
the federal conte~t. For purposes of discussing the necessity of statutory
authority, it seems useful to me to treat the Fourth Amendment concept
pf rea~onableness as flexible enough to recognize differences between state
and federal courts and police forces. Thus, because the power of the
Federal Government to combat crime, like the jurisdiction of its courts, is
more limited than the comparable power and jurisdiction inhering in the
States, it is logical m the federal context to assume that governmental
authority is lacking unless expressly mandated by legislation. See, e. g.,
Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 396; Cheng [?an Kwok v. INS,
392 U, S . 206 ; United States v Five Gambling Devices, 346 U. S. 441.
5
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role in this area as well as our tradition of interpreting statutes
to avoid constitutional issues/ compels this conclusion.
The Court does not sh~re this view. For this is the .1.!ll.!;P
time in as many ears that it has condoned a serious intrusion
Q!! 2nvapy at was not explicitly au onzed y statute and
t:J1'at admittedly faised, a substantial constitutional question.
Irr'United States v. RaJrt:WY, 431 U. S. 606, the Court upheld
an Executive regulation authorizing postal inspectors to open
private letters without_Jlrobable cause to pelieve they con~
Mined co~1traband. 8 In"United States v. New York Telephone
Co ., 434 U. S. 159, the Court upheld orders authorizing the
surreptitious pen register surveillance of an individual and
directing a private company to lend its assistance in that
endeavor. Again, no explicit statutory authority existed for
either order, despite Congress' otherwise comprehensive trea~
ment of wire surveillance in Title III of the
Omnibus Crime
I
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) .9
Today the Court has gone even further in finding an im~
plicit grant of Executive power in Title III. That Title "does
not refer explicitly to covert eqtry" of any kind, much less to
entries tpat are tortious or criminal. Opinion of the Court,
a;nte, at 10. Nevertheless, the Court holds that Congress, with..
out having said so explicitly, has authorized the agents of a
national police force in carrying out a surevillance order to
See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Mariner·os de Honduras, 372
U. S. 10 ; Inter-national Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. 8. 740;
Hannah v. Lqrche, 363 U. S. 420, 430; The Charming Befsy, 2 Cranch
(6 u. 8'.) 64.
8 It found authority for tho:;e searchers in the Po~tal Service's recent
reint!3rp'retation of an awkwardly drawn 1866 statute that authorized
certain borcler searches of "vessels" but. t.llat. could not reasonably be read
to ~:tuthorize ·either the nudl openings themselves or the regulation allowing
them. Moreover, its adoptwn of that interpretation left. it no choice but
to resolve a t roublesome constitutional question without any considered
guidance from Congress. See 431 U. 8., at, 616-632 (STEVE:Ns, Jl.)
-dissenting) .
9 See 431 U. S., at 178-190 (S·rl';vENs, J ., di,ssenting in part).,.
7
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break into private premises 10 in violation of stttte law. Moreover, the Court finds in the silent statut~ ~n open-ended
auth,orization to efi'ect such illegal entries without an expl!oit
judicial det~mjnM;ion that ,.!·here is probable 2ause to b elieve
) ro riat"e-:-4n my judgment,
they are n~t:'Or eve
it is mos unrea IStiC to assume t at ongress granted such
broad and controversial authority to the Executive without makir)g its intention to do so unmistakably plain. This is
the paradigm case in which "the extteting words of the statute
provide the surest guide to determining Congres~' intent." 11 I
would not enlarge the coverage of the statute beyond its plain
meaning,
II
The Court's conclusion that the statute implicitly authorizes·
breaking and entering is especially anomalous because the
statutory scheme in all other respects is exhaustive and explicit.12 . "It simply does not make sense" 13 to conclude that
10

I

Although this ca:;e invofveH an office, the invasion of a horne would
raise precisely the same statutory issue.
11 "Congress drafted [Titlr III I w1th exacting precision.
As its principal
sponsor, SenatA>r McClellan, put 1t:
' [A] bill as controvennal as this ... reqqires close attention to the
dotting of every "i'' and the cro~:;ing of every "t" . . . . [114 Cong. Rec.
14751.]
" Under the:;e circumstances, the exacting words of the statute provide the
surest guide to determining Congre~' intent, and we would do well t.o
confine ourselves to that area.." United States v. Donovan, 429 U. S. 413;
441 (BURGER, C. J ., dissentmg) .
12 Sec opinion of the Court, ante, at 10; nn . 12-18, infra, and text
aecompanying .
18 A;, Judge Merritt , writmg for the Sixth Circuit, cogently observed :
" It simply does not 11111h :;en,.;e to imply Congressional authority for
offiewl bre11k-ins when not a, single line or word of the statute even
ment.ions tlw possibility, much letiS limit.; or defines the scope of the power
or dt>,scribes the circumstances under which such conduct, normally unlawful, may take place. A:s the di:"sent::: of Holmes and Brandeif:: in Olrnstea<I'
l v. United Statel!., 271 U~ S 4381 sugge:;t,, this is a se.r:ious, if not a 'd1rty,"
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Congress-having minutely detailed (I) the process that
"[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General
specially designated by the Attorney General" must follow in
authorizing federal police officers to seek an electronic surveillance order,t' (2) the limited number of suspected offenses
that will justify such an order, 15 (3) the showing that must be
made to "a Federal judge" before he issues the order/ 6 ( 4) the
business; and we do not believe we should imply the power to break in
under the statute, as the government argues, when Congress has not
confronted and debatt'd the issue and expressed such an intention clearly.
" In some circumstances, the installation of an el~tronic bug may not be
possible without a forCible breakmg and entering of the suspect's premises,
but that does not imply that the power to break and enter is subsumed in
the warrant to smze the words. The breaking and entering aggravates the
search, and it intrudes upon property and privacy interests not weighed
in the statutory scheme, interests which have independent social value
unrelated to confidential speech. We are not inclined to give the government the right by Implication to intrude upon these interests by conducting official break-ins, e.;;pecially when the purpose is secretly to monitor
and record private convPrsations, a dangerous power otherwi:;e carefull.y
limited and defined by statutP." United States v. Pi:nazzo, 583 F. 2d 837,
841-842 (CA6 1978) . See also United States v. Santora, 583 F . 2d 453,
456-466 (CA9 1978)
1 ' ts n. s. c. §2516 (1) .
1~ 18 U.S. C §2516 (a)- (g ).
16 '' Each applicatJOn for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral commumcation shall be IIIJlde in writing upon
oath or affinnation to a judge of competent jurii:idiction and shall state the
applicant's authority to make t~uch application. Each application shall
inc:lude the following information :
" (a) the Identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application ;
"(b) a full and complete statement. of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that. an order should be issued,
including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, i:; being, or
is about to be committed, (i1) a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilitie:; from which or t.he place where the communication
is to be intercepted, (iii) a parheular description of the type of communication~ sought to be intercepted, (Iv) the 1dent1ty of the person, if known,

II

I
I

II

77-1722-DISSENT
DALIA v. UNITED STATES

standard the judge must apply in approving, and the format
he must follow in preparing, the order, 11 (5) the time frame
of execution and the manner of execution with respect to
committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted;
"(c) a full and complete st~tement. as to whether or not other investigative prooodures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too d!!-ngerous;
" (d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is
required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that
the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when
the described typP of communication has been first obtained, a particular
description of facts estublishing probable cause to believe that additional
communicatiOns of the ~arne type will occur thereafter.
" (e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the applica~
tion, q~.ade to any judge for authorization to intercept., or for approval of
interceptiOns of, wire or oral communications involving any of the same
persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action t~tken
by the judge on each such application; and
" (f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement
setting forth t.he results thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results." 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (1) .
17 "(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
a::; requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire
or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in
whiCh the judge IS sitting, if the JUdge determines on the basis of the facts
submitted by the applicant that" (a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter ;
" (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications
concerning that offense will be obtained through such ip.terception;
•i (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasqnably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tned or to be too dangerous;
''(d) there iii probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or
the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted are
being used, or are about to be use-d, m connectwn With the commission of
such offense, or are leased to, li~ted in the name of, o~ commo11lY used by
uch jlerson,
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mm1m1zmg the interception of communications not likely to
involve criminal activity. 18 and even having more recently
specifled (6) certain uunobtrusive[]" me;ms by which those
orders might be carried out without the awareness of the
" ( 4) Ea:ch order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communica.t.ion Rhall specify" (a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to
be intercepted;
"(b) t.he nature and locaHon of the communications facilities as to
which, or the place where, author·ity to intercept is granted;
" (c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a stntement of the particular offense to which it relates;
" (d) the identity of the agency :nrthorized to intercept the communication-'1, and of t.he person authorizing the a.pplication; :tnd
" (e) tJ1e period of time during which such inerception is authorized,
including a statemPnt as to whethPr or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first
obt·ained . . . . " 18 U . S. C.§ 2518 (3), (4).
18 ''No order t•ntered under this section may authorize or approve the
interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than.
is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in a.ny event
longer than thirty days. Exten~ions of an order may be granted, but only
upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (1)
of this section and the court making the finding:> required by subsection (a)
of this section. The period of extension shall be :qo longer than the
authorizing judge deP;m;; nece;;;;ary to achieve the purposes for wi1ich it
was granted a.nd in no event for longer than thirty days. Every order
a.nd extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to
intercept shall be executed as soon as pra.ct<icable, shall be conducted in
such a way as to n!inimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon
tttta.inmPnt of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days."
18 U.S. C.§ 2518 (5) .
The statute also details proeedures for the storage ancj protective cuf>iody
of the restllting tapes, 18 U.S. C. § 2518 (8) (a)-( c), authorized disclosures
and uses of the tapes both in and out of court, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2517,
2518 (9), aJ1d for after-the-fact notice to persons whose conversations were
overhe:ud. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d).

~

{T -
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suspect 11'-was content to ]eave na:@J}al police o!!lcers "Yith
unbounded authority to carry out the resulting orders in any
unsp"'e'ci"'red""'and obtrusive fashion they chose "subject of course
to constitutional limitations." Opinion of the Court, ante,
at 1V0
In my view, it is the opposite conclusion that is true to the
statutory structure. For "one simply cannot assume' that
Congress," see opinion of the Court, ante, at 13, wished to
erect various procedural barriers against poor judgm~nt on the
part of the Attorney General and his subord~nates in seeking,
apd on the part of Fedetal District Judges in issuing, eaves~
dropping orders only to commit their execution, even through
1 9 The following provh;ion was added to Title III in 1970:
"Ap order authonzing the interception of a wire or oral communication
shjlll, uvon request of the applicant., direct. that a communicatioQ common
carrier, landlord, custodian or other persons shall furnish the applicant
forthwith all informat.ion, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the interception t~nobtrusively and with a minimum of illterfprrnce with the servicE's that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or person
i. according the pen>on whose communications are to be intercepted. Any
conununicatwn common canif'r, landlord, custodian or other person
furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated
therefor by the applicant at the prevailing rates." 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ( 4).
20 The Court analyzf'~ this problem, as simply one of judicial authority
under the statutr. Ante, at 11, and n. 10. Even if I could agree that
Title III afforded judges "broad" and unconfined authority with respect
to break-in!!, I would still be left with the problem, never mentioned by the
Court, of the Executive's authority to break and eQter at will without any
judiCilll authorization .
Indeed, I am not at all certain t~1at t.lle Court puts aJIY confines on
eitlter judicial or executive authority iu this area, despite the lip service it
pays to "constitutional lim1t.ations." for, having stat-ed that "breal)ing
and entering" in e)feeutJon of a. search warra.nt is constitutionally permissible "wl~ere the entry is the only means by which the w~trrant effectively may be executed," ante, at 8 (emphasis added), the Court then
equates a surveillance order with a ~earch warrant, but see T. Taylor,
sup1·a, a.t 84--85, and allows a. break-m under the former upon a showing
merely that the break-in was "the safest and most effective," rather than
the "only1" method of i11stalling the device. 426 F . Supp. 862, 866.

I
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illegal means, entirely tel "the judgment ap.cJ moderation of
officers whose own interests and recorcls i\re often at stake in
the search." fJrinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 182
(Jackson, J... dissenting). The detailed timing and minimizf;Vtian restrictions on the executing officer, see n. 17, supra, as
well ~s the 1970 amendment to Title III concerning <~unobtru
sive" execution, see n. 18, supra, lead inescapably to the conclusion that Congress withheld authority to trespass on private
property e;x:cept through the limite~ mea.ns expressly dealt
with in the statute.21

J

III
Only one relevant conclusion cfl,n be drawn from a review of
the en'tir le isl;nXehi"stQry :ot=ptfe lit. 'The TegislatOrs
nmr,.!vt%n.,.sor eered t ; pos~ty a hey were passing
a sta~ute that woulcJ authorize federal agents to break into
privaye premises without any finding of necessity by a neutral
,
and detached :rpagi~trate .
A
The meagre legislative remarks that are said to demonstrate
that Title III's supporters implicitly enqorsed breaking and
entering in order to install listening devices act11ally provide
no support for that conclt.lsion.
- The reference fo "j ud1cifi,I warrant!') authorizing [police] to
hide bugs in the premises of qrimin11I suspects,'' see opinion of
the Court, ante, at 12 n. 12, was a comment by an opponent
of the bill on investigative techniques that he believed this
~1

A Congresil that was careful to limit the temporal extent of electronic
,;urveillance and , the opportunity for it to infringe on protected (i. e.,
noncriminal) conversations, and one so quick to amend the statute to
provide for "unobtrusi.Je" entry through the aid of private perilons (i. e.,
" cu~todians" and "landlords") who already have a degree of access to the
property, surely cannot have condoned unlimited and unauthorized breaking and entering by poli ce officer$ with the aid of nothihg but a burglar's

tools,

?

77-1722-DISSENT

DALIA v. UNITED STATES

11

Court had ruled illegal in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41. 2 ~
Since neither he, nor any supporter of the bill, suggested that
those techniqu~s would be authorized by Title III, his corn~
ment is hardly indicative of a legisla.tive endorsement of such
practices. Moreover, there is a marked difference between
the judicially warranted "hid [ ing of] bugs in the premises of
criminal suspects" and a forcible e11try that has not b~en
expressly authorized by a11y judge. The difference petween
subterfuge and forcible trespass should not be ignored.
That difference explains wqy the Court's reliance on two
statem~nts by proponents of Title III that ~rnphasize the
technological limitations on "bugs" and "taps" is misplaced.
The proponents believ~d these limitations would d iscourage
the frequent use and apuse of electronic surveillance. Thus,
in answer to repeated charges that passage of Title III would
recreate Hitler's Germany or anticipa.te Orwell's 1984, Senator
Tydings, in a passage part~ally quoted by the Court, ante, at
12-13, argued :
"Contrary to what we have heard, electronic surveil~
lance is not a lazy way to conduct an i~vestiga.tion. It
will not be used wholesale as a substitute for physical
·in vestig ationo
"The reason[s] for such sparing use are simple. First,
electronic surveillllnce is really useful only in conspira~
torial activities,
o

,

o

In full, the paragraph excerpted by the Court is as follows:
"In Berger against the State of New York, decided on June 12, 1967, the
maj~rity of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cla4, threw out the
New York State court~approved eavesdropping statute, declaring it to be
unconstitutional. The New York statute permitted the police to obtain
judicial warrants authorizing them to hide bugs in the premises of criminal
suspects. The Cot1rt.'s majority opinion outla\Ved this bugging statute
because, it said, the procedures did not. contain speoific safeguards against
violati011iil of the fourth amendment, which limit,ed police searches." 114
Cong. 'Rec. 14708 (Sen . Long of Missouri) .
22

J At- ~ .. ,.c... 1
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" Second, surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape
must be installed on telephones and wires strung. Bugs
are difficult to install since surreptitious entry is often
impossible. Often more than one entry is necessary to
adjust eqUipment ... ,
" Third, monitormg this equipment requires the e~
penditure of a great amount of l~w enforcement's
time . . . ." 114 Cong. Rec. 12988-12989 (emphasis
added) ,23
Read in context, this and like commentary is inconsistent
with, rather than an endorsement of, unauthorized brea.k-ins.
For although it is of course true that surreptitious entry is
often "impossible" when it must be accomplished without
violating the law, surreptitious entry is by no means impossible ( mdeed, 1t IS hardly a difficult") if It may be effected by
whatever means the police-unhampered by the provisions
of the criminal law-can bnng to their disposal. Despite the·
Court's understanding of it, I read Senator Tydings' remark
as only one of many expresswns by Title III's supporters of
their behef that authonzed electronic surveillance would be
'carefully circumscribed,'' 114 Coug. Rec. 13203 (Sen. Scott),
and "rigidly controlled.'' id., at 14715 (Sen. Tydings), not only
by technology but also by "strict court supervision," id., at
13200 (Sen. Scott), the 11 strictest guidelines," id., at 16076
(Rep. Harsha), and "an elaborate system of checks and safeguards.'' ld., at 13204 (Sen Scott) .2 '
.,~ S(>e al~o Anti-Crime ProgramH. Heanng~ on H . 5037, etc. before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1031 (1967), CJt~d ante, at 12.
' 1 •· [Title III 1 <lets forth m rno~t elaborate and precise detail the safeguards surroundmg the applicatiOn to a court of competent JUrisdictiOn
for authority to make a wirrtnp. I am :<atisfied that. It is fully designed
to guard aga1nst any unwarranted mva.;;IOn of the precious right of privacy' 114 C',ong. Rec . 1627.6 (Rep McGregor) .. See also id., at 14763;
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Even the opponents of Title III, in parading before Congress the various invasions of privacy that they felt would
accompany the passage of the statute, never once referred to
breaking and entering private property. E. (J., 114 Cong. Rec.
14711 (Sen. Cooper); id., at 14733 (Sen. Yarborough); id.,
at 16066 (Rep. Celler). That they omitted such references
while decrying far less aggravated invasions is strong evidence
that they, at least, never thought about the issue that this
case raises.~~ And since the sponsors of the legislation expressly stated that they had specified "every possible constitutipnal safeguard for the rights of individual privacy,'' id., at
14469 (Sen. McClellan) / 6 their omission of any significant

~

~~

~~
,.,. .. t.tt

(Sen. Percy) ; id., at 16296 (Rep. Boland); S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
t.~~
2d Sess., at 66
On at least two occasions the. Court. has commented on t.he circumspection w1th which Title III was drafted :
J~- \
"[Title III] sets forth the detailed and p~.j.rticuiarized application necessary
f""M6o1
~- •
to obtain such an order as well as the carefully circumscribed conditions
for fts ·use. The Act. represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to
4......,:(-~
promote more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy of
individual thought and expres~ion . " United States v. United State8
District Court, 407 U . S. 297, 302 (emphasis added). See also Gelbard v.
United States., 408 U. S. 41, 48. See al;,:o n. 8, S'upra.
2
" Had Congress expressly con:::idered the Issue, I am confident that it
/
~cA --~
would not ha.ve granted tbe ExerutJve the broad authority to break and (, •
J
enter th.at is conferred by the Court. in today's decision. Illustrative of its
~)
probable reaction to such investigative techniques are the 11esponses of
some Members to the officwlly sanctioned break-in committed aga.inst the
~ ~
office of Dame! Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and to the possibility of official
r ~ ~ C:::...
participation in the Watergate break-in. E. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 1460714(308 (Sen. Edwards); id., at 15332 (Rep. Sarasin) .
26 .T he dimem;ions of the conHtitutional protection of privacy w~re certamly not under£>st.unated by the supporters of Title III. Senator·
Lauschc, for example, had this to Hay about the mtent of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment..
" rTJhey also knew that the mnocent individual would be prot£>cted m
hi:, home, t.hat no one shall enter. Even though 1t is a home, to him it IS
hi:; palace. So they wrot·e into the Constitution, regardless of how poor
·one's homt~ may be, t.hat it shall not be entered by the govetnment without

~ ..... kJ.,~
c..

e;,c
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reference to these aggravated intrusions surely demonstrates \
that they did not consider this issue either.
In sum, as far as my research reveals, during the debates on
Title III neither the proponents nor the opponents of the bill
directly or indirectly expressed the yiew that the st11tute would
authorize uninvited forcible trespasses by police officers ~s a
·means of implanting a listening device.

B
Because the drafters of Title III made "indiscriminate reference . . . to the types of surveillance this Court reviewed" in
prior cases, ante, at 12, the Court draws the conclusion that
Congress meant to authorize all "types of surveillance" discussed in those cases. ·The premise does not support the
conclusion.
Many of those cases, including the two specifically cited
by the Court/ 7 held that the police conduct involved was
unlawful. Rather than endorsing all of the techniques discussed in those cases, Congress was quite clearly trying to
a.vmd the incidents of unconstitutionality those cases had
identified. ~ Moreover, in drafting Title III, the Senate Judiciary Committee did more than merely isolate and exclude
from the bill the illegal elements of the police activity involved in those cases. Thus, the Chairman of the Committee, in answer to a colleague's question whether Title III was
drafted in conformity with the Fourth Amendment, stated :
"Completely so, let me sa.y to my friend. Completely
so, and it is even more restrictive. We have gone to every
2

the bw-enforcement official having firtit obtained a warrant for search and
seizure issued on the bas1s of evidence establishing probable ca.use." 114
Copg. H.ec. 14720.
I
27 Katz v. United States, :38H U. S. :347; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41. See also Silverman v. Umted States, 365 U. S. 505 ; Jrvine v. California, 347 U. S. l:L8.
~ 8 See S Rep. No. 1097, supra, at 66 , 75, 101.

'

.

77-1722-DISSENT
DALIA v. UNITED STATES

15

length which is proper, we think, to protect people's
privacy." 114 Cong. Rec. 14470.
It is of greater importance, however, that although Congress was concerned with the "types of surveillance" involved
in our prior cases, none of the congressional references to those
cases discussed the type of entry made to effectuate the surveillance. Not a word in any of those pre-1968 opinions,
save one, described an illegal entry or even implied that
such an entry had occurred. Those opinions instead described
situations in which a listening device had been surreptitiously
placed: agaiust an office wall in order to hear conversations in
the next office, Goldma:n v. United States, 316 U. S. 129; on
the person of a federal agent who recorded a conversation in
the defendant's laundry, On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S.
347; cabaret, Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427; and law
office, Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 223; against a spike
inserted under a party wall, Silverman v. United States, 365
U. S. 505; on the 011tside of a public telephone booth, Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347; and inside a private office,
Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41. It is, of course, true that
the conduct in each cited case was surreptitious, but there is
a vast difference between detective work that is merely clandestine and work that involves breaking and entering into
private property. Before the decisions in Katz and Berger,
the former technique was considered to be lawful, warrant or
uo warrant, 20 whereas the latter was considered unlawfuJ.'! 1'
The fact that Congress was prepared to enact a sta.tute authorizing practices previously thought to be lawful surely does not
justify the conclusion that it was equally prepared to authorize conduct that had always been made unlawful by the crimiuallaws of the vanous States.
E. g., On Lee \' . Umt ed States, 343 U. S. 747; Goldman v. United
States, 316 U. S. 129 ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438.
30 E. g .. Silv erman v. Um1ed States. 365 l 1 . S. 505, !1'vine ' . California.
347 U. S, 128,
20
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Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, was the only pre-1968
case in which this Court had actually confronted the implantation of an electronic listening device by way of a "trespass,
and probably a burglary, for which any unofficial person
should be, and probably would be, severely punished." /d.,
at 132. 31 The plurality of four, speaking through Mr. Justice
Jackson had this to say about the police conduct in that case:

"That officers of the law would break and enter a home,
secrete such a device even in a bedroom, and listen to the
conversations of the occupants for over a month would
be incredible if it were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly,
deliberately, and persistently vi~lated the fundamental
principle qeclared by the Fourth Amendment .... " Ibid.
No Member of the Court disagreed with this assessment, although a majority refused to overturn the conviction because
the exclusionary rule did not then apply to the States. While
it is true, as the Court points out, ante, at 8, that four Members of the Irvine Court adverted to the lack of a "search warrant or other process" to support the entry, 347 U. S., at 132,
(while the other three Members who discussed the issue found
the police activity "offensive" and "revolttng'' without relying
l\'Ir ..Justice Jackson described the entry as follows :
''On December 1, 1951, while Irvine and his wife were absent from their
home, an officer arranged to have a locksmith go there and make a door
key. Two days later, again ·in tJ1e absence of occupants, officers and a
technician made entry into the home by the use of this key and installed
a concealed microphone in the hall. A hole was bored in the roof of the
house and wires were strung to transmit t.o a neighboring gara.ge whatever
sounds the microphone might pick up. Officers were posted in the garage
to listen. On December 8, police agam made surreptitious entry and
moved the microphone, this time hiding it in the bedroom. Twenty days
latE'r, t.hey again entered and placed the microphone in a closet, where the
' device remainE'd until its purpose of enabling the officer::; to overhear
incriminating statement~:~ was accomplishE>d." 347 U. S., itt 130-131.
31
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on the la.ck of a. warrant "2 ) it is also true that no Justice condoned a break-in absent some court order explicitly contemplating physical entry on the premises. Under any rea.ding of
the case, it cannot be taken as condoning official trespass and
burglary absent specific authorization.
More importantly, the fact that Congress cited Irvine, without comment or explanation, when it was considering Title III
cannot fairly be interpreted as an endorsement of the questionable police behavior that had been condemned so thunderously by Mr. Justice Jackson 14 years earlier. My respect
for the lawmaking process forecloses the inference that Congress authorized buglarious conduct by such stealthy legislative history.

IV
Because it is not supported by either the text of the statute {
or the scraps of relevant legislative history/ 3 I fear that the
"

2

347 U. S., at 145 (Frankfurter, .J., dis!:lenting joined by Burton, .J.);

td., at. 150 (Douglao, J., di;;senting).
33 The Court argues that Congress' goals in enactirg the statute would
be frustrated if Title III were not read to include the authority exercised
by the Government in this case. Ante, at 13-14. Of course, if Congress
intended to sanction "even the most reprehensible means for securing a
ronviction," Irvine, supra, 347 U. S., at 146 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting),
then withholding some of those means would indeed frustrate the legislative purpose. But there is no reason to impute such an intent to Congress
or to ignore its conscientious attention to the importance of safeguarding
the rights of individual privacy. See 114 Cong. Rec. 14469-14470 (Sen.
McClellan); see supra, at 11-12, 14.
Congress quite clearly expected exterior wiretaps to provide the most
effective means of electronic surYei!lance authorized by Title III. The
unavailability of certam interior "bugs"-i. e., those implanted by means
of forcible trespass-can hardly be seen as frustrating the entire law
enforcement scheme. E. g., S. Hep. No. 1097, supra, at 72; 114 Cong.
Rec. 12988 (Sen. Tydings); id., at 13206 (Sen. Scott); id., at 14481 (Sen.
McClellan) ; td., at 14715 (Sen. Murphy) .
Congress' prediction proved correct :

"Telephone ta.ps apparently account for most i.t1stances of E>lectronie
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Court's holding may reflect an unarticulated presumption that
national police officers have the power fio carry out a surveill~nce order by whatever means rnay be necessary unless explicitly prohibited by the statute or by the ' C~nstitutiou.
But surely the presumption should run the other way.
Congressional silence should not be construed to authorize the
Ex~cutive to violate state criminal laws or to encroach upon
constitutionally protected privacy interests. Before confronting the serious constitutional issues raised by the Court's reading of Title,n~ we should insist upon an unambiguous statement by Congress that this sort of police conduct may be
authorized by a court and that a specific showing of necessity, \
or at least probable cause. must precede such an a4thorization.
Without a legislative manda.te that is both explicit and
specific, I would presume that this flagrant invasion of the
citizen's privacy is prohibited. Cf. United States v. New York
Telephone Co., supra, 434 U. S., at 178-179 (STEVENS, J., dis. senting); United States v. Ramsey, supra, 431 U. S., at 632
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). 3 "
surveillance, and this can be accomplished in most circumstances by
placmg a tap on the line out;;ide the premises of the suspect.. According
to the final report. of thl:' National Commission for Review of Federal and
State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, only 26
out. of some 1,220 elect.ronic surveillance orders executed between 1968
and 1973 involved a trespassory intrusion. Nati01Ull Wiretap Commission,
Electronic Surveillance 15 (1967) . . .." United States v. Finazzo, supra,
583 F. 2d, at 841 n . 13.
:H Compare opinion of the Court, ante, at 7-9, 15-19, with opinion of
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, ante, a t -.
~~In addition to Title III, the Government claims authority for the
break-ins under the federal "no-knock" statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3109, and
under Rule 41 of the Federal Rulr..s of Criminal Procedure. Be~ause I
believe that, Title III has pre-empted the field of electronic surveillance, it
is conclusive for m(~ that. it nowhere authorizes the entries involved in this
case as a means of executing an eavesdropping order. Even if Congress
had never enacted Title III, however, I would nonetheless conclude that
· theso other assertffi justifications for officia.l. ·breaking and entering are
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l respectfully dissent.

unavailing in this case. Both provisions refer to "warrants" issued by a
magistrate with the awareness that t)leir execution wotdd vrobably require
the police to find some otherwisE:' illegal meaps of entering tl)e premises.
No such awareness was evidenced by the District Court w)leit it authorized
electronic surveillance in this case. See genera.lly United States v. Finazzp,
·supra, 583 F. 2d, at 845-848.
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[March -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520 (Title III),
permits courts to authorize electronic surveillance 1 by Government officers in specified situations. We took this case
by writ of certiorari to resolve two questions concerning the ·
tAll types of electronic surveillance have the same purpose and effect : ·
the secret. interception of communications. As the Court set forth in
Berger v New York, 388 U. S. 41, 45-47 ( 1967), however, this surveillance ·
is performed in two quite different ways. Some surveillance is performed
by "wiretapping," which IS confined to the interception of conununication ·
by telephone and telegraph and· generally ma.y be performed from outside·
the premises to be monitored . For a detailed description, see Note,
Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch
Remedies, 26 St.an. L. Rev. 1411, 1414 n. 18 (1974). At issue in the
present case is the form of surveillance commonly known as "bugging,"
whiCh mcludes the mt•erreption of all oral communication jn a given
location. Unlike wiretapping, this interception typically is accomplished
by mstallation of a small microphone in the room to be bugged and
transmission to some nearby receiver. See McNamara, The Problem of
Surrept.itious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You
Procerd after the Court Says 'Yes' ?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1977) ;
Blakey, Aspects of the Ev1dcnre Gathering Process in Organized Crime
Cases . A Prelimmary Analysi::,, reprinted in the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report :
Orgamzed Cnme, App. C, at 92, 97 (1967) Both wiretapping and
bugging are regulated under Tit.le III See 18 U. S. C. § 2510 (1) and (2) ~
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implementation of Title III surveillance orders. First, may
courts authorize electronic surveillance that requires covert
entry 2 into private premises for installation of the necessary
equipment? Second. must authori~ation for such surveillance
include a specific statement by the court that it approves of
the covert entry? 3
I
On March 14, 1973, Justice Depttrtment officials applied to
the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, seeking authorization under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 to intercept telephone conversations on two telephones in petitioner's
business office. After examining the affidavits submitted in
support of the Government's request, the District Court au~
thorized the wiretap for a periocJ of 20 days or until the
purpose of the interception was achieved, whichever came first.
The court found probable cause to believe that petitioner was
a member of a conspiracy the purpose of which was to steal
goods being shipped in interstate commerce in violation of 18
U. S. C. ~ 659. Moreover, the court found reason to believe
that petitioner's business telephones were being used to further
this conspiracy and that means of investigating the conspiracy
other than electronic surveillance would be unlikely to succeed
"Every electronic surveill:mce necessarily is "covert!' in the sense that

it must be "hidden; secret; disguised" to be effective. Webster's New
International Dictionary 612 (2d Ed. 1944). As used here, "covert entry"
refers to the physical entr) by a law enforcement officer into private
premises without the owner's permission or knowledge in order to .install
bugging eqmprnent. Generally such an entry will require a breaking and
entering. See discussion in/m, a t -.
a The Ft>deral Courts of Appeals have given conflicting answers to
these questions. See Umted States v . .'f!'i1U1zzo, 583 F. 2d 837 (CA6
1978) ; United States v. Santom, 583 F. 2d 453 (CA9 1978); United
State11 v. Scafidi, 564 F . 2d 633 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903
(1978) ; United States v. Fo1'd, U. S. App. D. C. - , 553 F. 2d 14tl
(1977) ; United States v. Agmsa, 541 F. 2d 690 (CA8 1976), cert. denied,.
·429 U, S. l045 (1977 ),~
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and would be dangerous. The wiretap order carefully enumerated the telephones to be affected and the types of conversations to be intercepted. Finally, the court ordered the
officials in charge of the interceptions to take all reasonable
precautions "to minimize the interception of communications
not otherwise subject to interception," and required the officials to make periodic progress reports.
At the end of the 20-day period covered by the March 14
court order, the Government requested an extension of the
wiretap authorization. In addition, the Government for the
first time asked the court to allow it to intercept all oral
conversations taking place in petitioner's office, including those
not involving the telephone. On April &, 1973, the court
granted the Government's second request. Its order concerning the wir~tap of petitioner's telephones closely tracked the
March 14 order. Finding reasonable cause to believe that
petitioner's office was being used by petitioner and others in
connection with the alleged conspiracy, the court also authorized, for a maximum period of 20 days, the interception of all
oral communications concerning the conspiracy "at the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room,
approximately fifteen (15) by eighteen (18) feet in dimension,
and situated in the northwesterly corner of a one-story building housing Wrap-0-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and
Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George
Avenue, Linden, New Jersey." The order included protective
provisions similar to those in the March 14th wiretapping
order.4 The electronic surveillance order of April was extended by court. order on April27, 1973.
4

Tn relevant part, the Title III order of April5 provided :
". . . the Court finds :
''(a.) There is probable cause to believe that Larry Dalia and others as
yet unknown, have committed nnd are committing off·enses involving theft
from interstate shipments, in violation of Title 18, Unitt>d States Code,
Sect.ion 659; sale or rect>1pt of ~tolen goods, in viOlation of Title 18, United
State:s Code, Section 2;H5; and interference with commerce by threats or
vlolcnce, Ill vJO);J.tJon of Tttll:' 18, United S1ates Code, SectiOn 1951 ; and

'.
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On November 6, 1975, petitioner was indicted in a fivecount indictment. charging that he had been involved in a
are consp1ring to coxmmt such offenses in violation of Section 371 of T1tle
18, United State:; Code
"(b) There 1:s probable cause to believe that, particular wire and oral
commumcations concermng the~e offenses will be obtained through these
interceptiOns, authorization for which is herewith applied. In particular,
these wire and oral rommumcations will concern the t.heft or robbery of
goods moving m intrr><tate commerce, and the transportatwn, sale, receipt,
~torage, or distributwn of these ~tolen goods, nnd the participants in the
comm1s:sJon of smd oftcn~rs
'' (e) Normal invest1ga!Jve procedures reasonably appear to be unhkely
to :;uc•cpecl and are too dangerou~ w be used
(e) There ~~ probable cau:;e to believe that the busmess office of
Larry Daha, consJ:;tmg of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15) by
P1ghteeu (18) feet, m d1men~wn, and situated in the northwesterly comer
of a om'-story bmldmg hout>mg Wrap-0-MatH· Machmery Company, Ltd,
and PrecJ::>r Packagmg, and located at 1105 We:;t St. George Avenue,
Lmdcn, New Jrr~;ey, ha:; bren uscci, and is being u:;ecl by Lnrry Dalia and
other~ as yet unknown m connection with the commission of the aboverlesenbed offen~e~
'WHEREFORE, 1t IS lwreby ordered that
'Specwl Agents of the Federal Bureau of lnve::stigatiou, United States
Department of .Ju~tJct•, arr authorized
. to ·

(b) Intercept oral !'ommumcations of Larry Dalia, and others as yet
unknown, concrrnmg the above-described offenses at the business office of
Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15)
by e1ghteen (18) f('!.'t in dimenHion, and situated in the northwesterly
!'Orner of a one-story builclmg housing Wrap-0-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packagmg, and located at ll05 We~t St. George
AvenuP, Lmden, N rw J Pr:>ey.
(c) ~uch mterreptions shall not. automatiCally termmate when the type
of eommunieahon de::;cribed above 111 paragraphs (a) and (b) have first
been obtamed, but shall continue until communications are intercepted
whJCh rev!:'nl thr mannrr in which Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown
participate m thl'ft from inter:state :shipments; :sale or receipt of stolen
goods, and interference w1t.h commerce by threats or violence; and whiCh
revral tlw idrntit1e,; of his ronfedcratrs, their places of operation, and the-·
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conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric.~ At
trial, the Government introduced evidence showing that petitioner had been approached in March of 1973 and asked to
store in his New Jersey warehouse "a load ,-of merchandise."
Although petitioner declined the request, he directed the
requesting party to Higgins, an associate, with whom he
agreed to share the $1,500 storage fee that was offered. The
merchandise stored under this contract proved to be a tractortrailer full of fabric worth $250,000 that three men stole on
April 3, 1973, and transported to Higgins' warehouse. Two
days after the theft, FBI agents arrested Higgins and the
individuals involved in the robbery.
The Government introduced into evidence at petitioner1s
trial various conversations intercepted pursuant to the court
orders of March 14, April 5, and April 27, 1973. Intercepted
telephone conversations showed that petitioner had arranged
na.turr of tlw conspiracy mvolvrd therein, or for a period of twenty (20)
days from the date of thi" Order, whichever i~ earlif'r.
·'PROVIDING THAT, this nnthorizat.ion to intercept oral and w1re
commumcationH ~hall be exrcnted as soon as practicablf' after signing of
this Ordrr and shall bl' eonducted in such a way as to minimize the
mterception of communiratwns not othrrwise subject to interception under
Chapt!'r 119 of Title IS of the United States Code, tmd mu:st terminate
upon attamment of the authorized objective, or in any event, at the end
of twenty (20) days from tlw date of this Order.
"PROVIDING ALSO, that Special Attorney ,lames M. Deichert shall
provide the Court with a report on the fifth, tenth, and fifteenth day
followmg the date of this Order showing what progress has been made
toward the achievemPnt of the authorized objective and the need for
\'Oiltinued intereeption ''
5 Count one charged petitioner and others w1th conspiring to tra.nsport,
rert•Jve, :.wd possess stolen goods in v1olation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2, 2314,
2LJ5, and 659. Count two charged petitioner and others with conspiring
to obHtuet mtPrstate <'ommerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1951 (b) ( 1) .
Count thrre charged that petitiOner had transported stolen goods; count
four charged that he had received stolPn goods, and count five charged
petitiOner · w1th pos8PS~1on of stolen goons

..
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for the storage at Higgins' warehouse and had helped nego~
tiate the terms for that storage. One telephone conversation
that took place after Higgins' arrest made clear that petitioner
had given ailvice to others involved in the robbery to "sit
tight" and not to use the telephone. Finally, the Government
introduced transcripts of conversations intercepted from petitioner's office under the April 5th bugging order. In these
conversations, petitioner had discussed with various participants in the robbery how best to proceed after their confederates had been arrested. ·The unmistakable inference to
be drawn from petitioner's statements in these conversations
is that he was an active participant in the scheme to steal the
truckload of fabnc.
Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained
through the interception of conversations by means of the
device mstalled in his office. The District Court denied the
suppression motion, without prejudice to its being renewed
following trial. After petitioner was convicted on two counts, 6
he renewed his motion and the court held an evidentiary
hearing concerning the method by which the electronic device·
had been mstallcd. At this hearing it was shown that, although the April 5 court order did not explicitly authorize
entry of petitioner's business, the FBI agents assigned the
task of implementing the order had entered petitioner's office
secretly at midnight on April 5 and had spent three hours in
the building installing an electronic bug in the ceiling. All
electronic surveillance of petitioner ended on May 16, 1973. at
which time the agents re-entered petitioner's office and
removed the bug.
In denying a second t1me petitioner's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the bug, the trial court ruled that
under Title III a covert entry to install electronic eavesdrop·
"PetitiOner wa~ convicted of rPoeiving stolen good~ and conspiring ttl
recetve, ;md po~se:;:; stolen goods. See n 5, supra

tran~p.ort.
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ping equipment is not unlawful merely because the court
approving the surveillance did not affirmatively authorize
such an entry. 426 F. Supp. 862 (1977) . Indeed, in the
court's view, "implicit in the court's order [authorizing electronic surveillance] is concomitant authorization for agents
to covertly enter the premises in question and install th·e
necessary equipment." !d., at 866. As the court concluded
that, the FBI agents who had installed the electronic device
were executing a lawful wa.rrant issued by the court, the sole
question was whether the method they chose for execution
was reasonable. Under the circumstances. the court found
the covert entry of petitioner's office to have been "the safest
and most successful method of accomplishing the instailation."
I bid. Indeed, noting that petitioner himself had indicated
that such a device could only have been installed through
such an entry, the court observed that "[ij n most cases the only
form of installing such devices is through breaking and entering. The nature of the act is such that entry must be surreptitious and must not arouse suspicion, and the installation
must be done without the knowledge of the residents or
occupants.'' I bzd.
~rhe Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 575 F. 2d 1344 (1978). Agreeing with
the District Court, it rejected petitioner's contention that
separate court authorization was necessary for the covert entry
of petitioner's office, although it noted that "the more prudent
or preferable approach for government agents would be to
include a statement regarding the need ofa surreptitious entry
in a request for the interception of oral communications whet\
a break-in is contemplated." /d., at 134&-1347,

II
Petitioner first contends that the Fourth Amendment pro~
hibits covert entry of private premises in all cases, irrespective
of the rea,sonab1eness of the entry or the approval of a court.
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He contends that Title III is unconstitution~l insofar as it
enables courts to authorize covert entries for the installation
of electronic bugging devices.
In several cases this Court has implied that in some circumstances covert entry to install electronic bugging devices
would be constitutiOnally acceptable ~f done pursuant to a
search warrant. Thus, for example, in Irvine v. Califorma,
347 1T. ~. 128 ( 1954) , the plurality stated that in conducting
electronic surveillance. state police officers had "flagrantly,
deliberately, and persistPntly violated tht> fundanwntal prinCiple declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction ou
tht> Federal Government.' ' ld., at 132. It emphasized that
the bugging equipment was installed through a covert entry
of the defendant's home "without a search warrant or other
process." ld. (emphasis added). Similarly. in Silverman\
l'utted States, 365 l.! . S. 505. 511- 51:2 (1961). the Court
noted that, "[t]hrs Court has never held that a federal officer
may without warrant and without consent physically entrench
mto a man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen,
and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was
seen or heard.'' (Emphasis added.) Implicit m decisiOns
such as Silverman and Irvine has been the Court's view that
covert entries are constitutional in some circumstances, at
least if they are made pursuant to warrant,
Moreover. we find no basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all covert entries. It is well established that law
officers constitutionally may break arid enter to execute a
search warrant where such entry is the only means by which
the warrant effectively may be executed. See, e. g., Payne v ..
United States, 508 F. 2d 1391, 1394 (CA5 1975); cf. Ker v.
' Califorma, 374 U. S. 23, 28, 38 (1963); 18 U. S. C. §'3109..
Petttwner nonetheless argues that covert entries are unconstitutional for their lack of notice. This argument is frivolous,
as was indicated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355
11.. 16 ( 1967) , where the Court stated that "officers need not..
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announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly]
authorized search if such art announcement would provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." 1
In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n. 19 (1977),
we held that Title III provided a constitutionally adequate
substitute for advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must
cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.
See 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8)(d). There is no reason why the
same notice is not equally sufficient with respect to electronic
surveillances requiring covert entry. We make explicit, therefore, what has long been implicit in our decisions dealing with
this subject: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se
a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.8
1

One authority has said that the constitutional validity of covert. entries
to install bugs "is plainly the consequence of [the] reasoning" of Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) . T . Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 114 (1969) .
8 Petitioner argues that., even if a covert entry would be constitutional
in some cases, it was not in the present case, as there was no need for such
entry. The District Court, however, specifically found that the "safest
and most successful method of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through breaking and entering [the office.] " 426 F .
Supp. 866 (1977) . Moreover, in issuing the Title III order, the court
found that "[n]ormal investigative procedures reasonably appear to be
unlilwly to succeed or are too dangerous to be used." And in his opinion
denying petitioner's subsequent suppression motion, the same judge stated:
1
'The affidavits which ~:>upported the application for the warrant in question indicated that resort to electronic surveillance, to overhear meetings
at Dalia's office and conversations on Dalia's t€"lephones, was required to
ident1fy the sources of Dalia's stolen goods, those working with h1m to
transport and store stolen property, and the :;cope of the consp1racy. Oral
evidence of th1s cnminal enterprise wa.s only available ins1de Dalia's
business premises." lb1;d.
The District Court, therefore, concluded that the circumstances required
lhe approach u::;rd by the officers, and nothing 111 the record brings . this
conclusion into queRt.\Otl .

77-1722-0PINION
10

DALIA v. UNITED STATES

III
Petitioner's second contention is that Congress has not
given the courts statutory authority to approve covert entries
for the purpose of installing electronic surveillance equipment,
even if constitutionally it could have done so. Petitioner
emphasizes that although Title III sets forth with meticulous
care the circumstances in which electronic surveillance is
permitted, there is no comparable indication in the statute
that covert entry ever may be ordered. Accord, United States
v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 453, 457-458 (CA9 1978).
Title III does not refer explicitly to covert entry. The
language, structure, and history of the statute, however, demonstrate that Congress meant to authorize courts-in certain
specified circumstances--to approve electronic surveillance
without limitatioil on the means necessary to its accomplishment, so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances.
Title III provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation
of electronic surveillance, prohibiting all secret mterception of'
communications except as authorized by certain state and·
federal judges in response to applica.tions from specified federal and state law enforcement officials. See 18 U. S. C.
§§ 2511, 2515, and 2518; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 301-302 (1972). Although Congress·
was fully aware of the distinction between bugging and wiretapping, see S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (1967),
Title III by its terms deals with each form of surveillance in
essentially the same manner. See 18 U. S. C. § 2510 (1) and·
(2) ; n. 1. supra. Orders authorizing interceptions of either·
wire or oral communications may be entered only after the·
court has made specific determinations concerning the likehhood that the interception will disclose evidence of criminal'
conduct. See 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (3). Moreover, with respect
to both wiretappmg and bugging, an authorizing court must
specify the exact scope of the surveillance undertaken, enutnetating the partie& whose communications are to be over-

77-1722-0PINION
DALIA v. UNITED STATES

11

heard (if they are known), the place to be monitored, and
the agency that will do the monitoring. See 18 U. S. C.
§2518(4).
The plain effect of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to
guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there
is a genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is
needed. 9 Once this need has been demonstrated in accord
with the requirements of§ 2518, the courts have broad authority to "approv[e] interception of wire or oral communications," 18 U.S. C. § 2516 (1), (2). subject of course to constitutional limitations. See Part II, supra. 10 Nowhere in Title
III is there any indication that the authority of courts under
§ 2518 is to be limited to approving those methods of interception that do not require covert entry for installation of the
'intercepting equipment. 11
The legislative history of Title III underscores Congress1
9 It is clear that Title III serves a substantial public interest.
See n. 13,
infra. Congress and this Court have recognized, however, that. electronic
surveillance can be a threat to the "cherished privacy of law abiding
citizens" unless It is subjected to the careful supervision prescribed by
Tit.le III. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U S.
297, 312 (1972) .
1° Congress explicitly confirmed the breadth of the power it had conrerred ou courts acting under Title III when it amended the Act in 1970.
Pub. L. 91-358, Title II, §211 (b), July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 654. Section
2518 (4) now empowers a court authorizing electronic surveillance to
" direct that a . . landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively . ..." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, it appears that Congre~s anticipated that landlords and
custodians may be enlisted to aid law enforcement officiah; covertly to
enter and place the necessary equipment m private areas.
11 Thr only limitatwn Title III places on tlw manner in which the::;e
eourt orders are to be executed i::; in it~ requirements that no order extend
beyond 30 days, and that every order mutit. include provi~ions that it is to
be executed as ~oou as practicable and in a manner that will mmimizP the
mterception of commumcations not within the purview of the order See.
h tT
§251 (5 ).

s c.
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understanding that courts would authorize electronic surveillance in situations where covert entry of private premises was
necessary. Indeed, a close examination of that history reveals
that Congress did not explicitly address the question of covert
entries in the Act only because it did not perceive surveillance
requiriug such entries to differ in any important way from
that performed without entry. Testimony before subcommittees considering Title III and related bills indicated that
covert entries were a necessary part of most electronic bugging
operations. See, e. g., Anti-Crime Program: Hearings on H .
5037, etc. before Subcommittee No.5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1031 (1967). Moreover, throughout the Senate report on Title III indiscriminate
reference is made to the types of surveillance this Court
reviewed in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). See, e. g., 81
Rep. No. 1097, supra, at 74-75, 97, 101-102, 105. Apparently
committee members did not find it significant that Berger
involved a covert entry, whereas Katz did not. Compare
Berger v. New York, supra, at 45, with Katz v. United States,
.~'Upra, at 348. 12
It is understandable, therefore, that by the time Title III
was discussed ou the floor of Congress, those Members who
referred to covert entries indicated their understanding that
Indeed, the nature of electronic surveillance involved in Berger v . New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), was mentioned on the floor of the Senate, when
12

Senator Long observed that under the New York law, police could "obtain
judicial warrants authorizing them to hide bugs in the premises of crimina!
suspPrh ." 114 Cong. Hrc. 1470S (19(iS). To br ~urr, in !11~ commrnt;;
Spnator Long did not rxpliritl~· ~uggr~t that TitlP III would authorize
;;urh eovPrt pntrir~. 8PP post. at - . Hi:; ~taternrnt confirmrd, howrver,.
what had been strongly indirated prior tu tlw bill '~ con:;1drration by thl''
full CongreH~ : :\frmb!'f~ of Congrc·:;~ ~imply saw no di"tinction bt>twren
!'lPrlrunir survt•illancP wh1rh rPquired rovrrt entry and that wh1ch reqmred'
<'UVl'r1 tapping of OIH' ·~ trlrphorw. The invn,;wu of thr pnvac · of <'UUver~ntion 1~ th<' samP Ill both ,.;itmLtious
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euch entries would necessarily be a part of bugging authorized
under Title III. Thus, for example, in voicing his support
for Title III Senator Tydings emphasized the difficulties
attendant upon installing necessa.ry equipment .
". . . surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape [sic]
must be installed on telephones, and wires strung. Bugs
are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious
entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is
necessary to adjust the equipment." . 114 Cong. Rec.
12989 (1968) (emphasis added) .
In the face of this record, one simply cannot assume that
Congress, aware that most bugging requires covert entry,
nonetheless wished . to except surveillance requiring such en~
tries from the broad authorization of Title III, and that it
resolved to do so by remaining silent on the subject. On the
contrary, the language and history of Title III convey quite
a different explanation for Congress' failure to distinguish
between surveillance that requires covert entry and that
which does not : Those considering the surveillance legislation
understood that, by authorizing electronic interception of ora.l
communications in addition to wire communications, they
were necessarily authoriziug surreptitious entries.
Finally, Congress' purpose in enacting the statute would be
largely thwarted if we were to accept petitioner's invitation
to read into Title III a limitation on the courts' authority
under § 2518. Congress permitted limited electronic surveil~
lance under Title III because it concluded that both wiretapping and bugging were necessary to enable law enforcement
authorities to combat successfully certain forms of crime/ 8
tJ 18 U. S. C. § 2516 ~pecifie~ that authorizatiOn for electronic surveillance may be sought only with respect to certajn enumerated crimes.
These include espionage, sabotage, treason , kidnapping, robbery, extortion , murder, v1mous corrupt practices, and counterfeiting. According .to
the Senate Report concerning Title III, "['e]ach offense has been chosen
either' becau:oe tt is intrin~ically serwus or becau~e it is characteristic of
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Absent covert entry, however, almost all electronic bugging
would be impossible.u . See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp.
879, 882 (DC 1976), aff'd,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 553 F. 2d
146 (1977); McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry
to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed
the operationt. of organired crime." S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, n. 7, at 97
The need for use of electronic surveillance against. organized crime had
been thoroughly con::;idercd and documented shortly before Congress began
considering Title III by a special organized-crime task force of a Presidential Commission charged with considering crime in the United States. The
Prestdrnt's Commis::;ion on Law EnforcE-ment and Administration of ,Justice, Ta~k Force Report: Organized Crime 91-104 (1967) ; see United
States v. United States District Court, supra, at 310 n. 9. A summa.ry of
the Task Force's conclusions appeared in the Commission's report, which
was repeatedly referred to during consideration of Title III. See The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
.Justice, 'fhP Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 200-203 (1967) . In
Congrpss, proponents of Title III, after hearing numerous witne:;ses te:;tify
roncen1ing the importance of electronic surveillance in fighting organized
crime, recommended· the bill to their colleagues as "[l]egislation meeting
t he constitutional stmidards ::;et ciut in [Supreme Court] decision;:;, and
gmntmg law enforcement officers tlte authority to tap telephone wirec:; and
install electronic :;u rveillance devices in the inve:;tigation of major crime::;'!'
. Rep. No. 1097, supra, n. · 7, aC75; see id., at 74. Indeed , the Senate
Report on. Title III unequivocally :stated that "[t]he major purpose of
'fitle III ts to combat organized rrime." /d., at·7o. · The rapid developments in technology availa.ble to the criminahmderworld make it all t.he
more 1mperative that the Government not "deny to itself the prudent and
· lawful employment of tho:;e very techniques which are employed against
the Government and its law-abiding citizens." United States· v. United
States District Court, supra, at 312.
rt Although lw <'itP~ no authorit~·, ;'VIH .•Jl' ~'l'WE STE\'ENI:\ apparrntly belit•w,.; that a practicabh' altE-rnative to covrrt entr~· would be in~tallatwn of
buggmg devtc·ps through ,.;ubterfugr. SrP post. at - . ~owhere m thf'
legi,.;ln tivP lu,.;t or~· of Tit lc Til 1,.; there any mdica t ton that Congm,;~; wi:slwd
to limit tt~ authorizatiOII to bug;; in~talled through ~ubtcrfugP . Moreovct·,
Jt 1~ difficult to prrretvt• why OJH' mean~ of g:unmg ent r~· would b(' IP,.;.
intrws1ve than anotlu•r. S('e, e. {/., Cnited Statl:'s \. Ponl. 414 F. Supp.
'79 (DC 19iU). 11ff'd, l' S. App D (' - , 55;{ F 2d l4ti (197i)
\Oomh ~wan• ru"l') .
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After the Court Says "Yes"'?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1977).
A~ recently as 1976 a congressional commission established to
study and evaluate the effectiveness of Title III concluded
that in most cases electronic surveillance cannot be performed
without covert entry into the premises being monitored. See
U . S. National Commission for Review of Federal and State
Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance,
Electronic Surveillance 15, 43, and n. 19, 86 (1976). The
same conclusion was reached by the American Bar Association
committee charged with formulating standards governing use
of electronic surveillance. See ABA Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance 65 n.
175, 149 (1971) .1 "
In sum, we conclude that Congress clearly understood that
it was conferring power upon the courts to authorize covert
entries ancillary to their responsibility to review and approve
suryeillance applications under the statute. To read the statute otherwise would be to deny the "respect for the policy of
Congress [that] must save us from imputing to it a selfdefeating, if not disingenuous purpose." Nardone v. United
Sta tes, 308 l ' S. 338, 341 (Hl39) .JB

IV
Petitioner's final contention is that, if covert entries are to
be authorized under Title III, the authorizing court must
Tho:-:<' fpw avnilahlo devH·P~ tlwt. intrrrt>pl convPrsatiun~ from uutsidr
of a building in many ca~es are impractical, either because of cost, reliability, or the configuration of the area being monitored . See U. S.
National Commission for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to
Wiretapping and El ~:>ctronic Surveillance, Commission Studies 168--183
(1976) ; see, e. g., United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879, 881 (DC
1970 ), aff'd, U. S. App. D . C. - , 553 F . 2d 146 (1977)
" A~ W<' hav<· <"onrluded that T1tlP Ill authonzt'S rourt ~ to approvl'
t•overt. entnes to in~tall electronic surveillanc~:> equipment, we do not
comnder whether such authority also 1::; conferr~:>d by oth~:>r f~:>deral enactments, such as Fe<l. Rul e Crim . Proe. 41 or the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C.
§ 16/l) .
1 ''
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explicitly set forth its approval of such entries before the fa-ct.
In this case, as is customary, the court's order constituted the
sole written authorization of the surveillance of petitioner's
office. As it did not state in terms that the surveillance was
to include a covert ·entry, petitioner insists that the entry
violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Accord,
Un·ited States v. Ford,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 553 .f. 2d 146,
170 (1977); Application of United States, 563 F . 2d 637, 644
(CA4 1977). 17
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be
issued only "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Finding these words
to be ''precise and clear," Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S.-476, 481
(1965), this Court has interpreted them to require only three
things. First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates. See, e. g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S.
245.250-251 (1977) (per curiam); Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U. S. 345, 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 459-460 (1971). Second, those seeking the
warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable
cause to believe that uthe evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction" for a particular offense.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 307 (1967). Finally,
" warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized/,,.
as well as the place to be searched. Stanford v. Texas, supra,
at 485.
11 Thrrp i,- 110 rN.juin·ment i11 TJtll' III that t•xplirit authonzatiou of
covert t>ntries be ::;et, forth in the court's order. The statutory require-.
ment that the surveillance "should remuin undt>r the control and supervi.;ion of the authorizmg court" · 82 Stat. 211, § 801 (d) (1968), merely·
empha::;izes that comts acting under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 ::;hould utilize their
power under § 2518 (6) to require periodic progress reports after themstallation of the wiretap or bug. If there i;; a requirement of explicit
judicial authonzation for covert entry, therefore, it must come from the}'Qurfh Amendment t\loue,
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In the present case, the April 5th court order a'!lthorizing
the interception of oral conversations occurring within petitioner's office was a warrant issued in full compliance with
these traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. It was
based upon a neutral magistrate's independent finding of
probable cause to believe that petitioner had been and was
committing specifically enumerated federal crimes, tha.t petitioner's office was being used "in connection with the commission of [these] offenses," and that bugging the office would
result in the interception of "oral communications concerning
these offenses." App. 6a-7a. Moreover, the exact location
and dimensions of petitioner's office were set forth, see supra,
at - , and the extent of the search was restricted to the
"[i] ntercept[ion of] oral communications of Larry Dalia and
others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses
at the business office of Larry Dalia.... " App. Sa.'g
Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that the April 5th order
was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment for its failure
~ Brcau,;r of thP ~triet re<.juirements of Title III, all of the indicia of a
warrant necessarily are present whenever an order under Title III is issued.
Accord, United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633, 644 (CA2 1977) (Gurfein,
J., concu rring) . Indeed, it was Congress' express design to create under
Title III a mechanism by which search warrants valid under the Fourth
Amendment would be issued for electronic surveillance. See S. Rep . No .
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968); Controlling Crime Through More
Effective Law Enforcement: Heal'ings on S. 300, etc. before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and .Procedures of the Senate Committee on
the .Judiciary, 90th Con g., 1st Sess., 176, 570, 919 ( 1967) ; Hearings on
H. R 5037, etc. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 917 934 (1967). No less would be
reqmred for the court authorization of electronic surveillance under Title
III to be constitutional, as electronic surveillance undeniably is a Fourth
Amendment intrusion requiring a warrant. See, e. g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 352-353, 356-357 (1967) . And we have explicitly
recognized the necessity of a warmnt in cases of electronic surveillance.
See United States v . United States District ·Court, 407 U. S. 29.7, 316-32()
(191'J).
1
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to specify that it would be executed by means of a covert
entry of his office. Nothing in the language of the Constitution
or in this Court's decisions interpreting that language suggests
that, in addition to the three requirements discussed above,
search warrants also must include a specification of the precise
manner in which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it
is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to
determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authori;~,ed by warrant 11'-subject of
course to the general Fourth Amendment protection "against
unreasonable searches and seizures."
Recognizing that the specificity required by the Fourth
Amendment does not generally extend to the means by which
warrants are executed, petitioner further argues that warrants
for electronic surveillance are unique because often -they
impinge upon two different Fourth . Amendment interests :
The surveillance itself interferes only with the right ·to hold
private conversations, whereas the entry subjects the suspect's
property to possible damage and personal effects to unauthorized examination. This view of the warrant clause parses too
finely the interests proteoted by the Fourth Amendment.
Often in executing a warrant the police may find it necessary
to interfere with privacy rights not explicitly considered by
the judge who issued the warrant. For example, police exe-·
•H For example, courts have upheld the use of forceful breaking and
entering where necessary to ·effect a· warr;mted search, even though the·
warrant gaV<e no indication that force· had been contemplated. See, e. g.,.
Un:ited States v. Ge1·vato, 474 F. 2d 40, 41 (CA3), ccrt. denied, 414 U.S.
864 (1973). To be sure, often it' is imp.o~>Sible to anticipate when these·
actions will be necessary. See Note, Covert Entry in Electronic Surveil-·
lance: The Fourth Amendment Requirements, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 203,.
214 (1978) . Nothing in the deci::;ions of this Court, however, indicates·
that officers requesting a warrant would be constitutionally required to setforth the anticipated means for execution even in t.hose cases where they
'know beforehand that unannounced or forced entry likely will be nere:;sary _ )
Se(' 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizurl' 140 0978) .
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cuting an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter
the suspect's home in order to take him into custody, and they
thereby impinge on both privacy and the freedom of movement. See, e. g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F. 2d 406, 421
(CA5 1976) (on petition for rehearing). Similarly, officers
executing search warrants on occasion must damage property
in order to perform their duty. See, e. g., United States v.\
Brown, 556 F. 2d 304, 305 (CA5 1977); United States v.
Gervato, 474 F. 2d 40, 41 (CA3), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 864
( 1973).
It would extend the warrant clause to the extreme to require
that, whenever it is reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment
rights may be affected in more than one way, the court must
set forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the
executing officers. Such an interpretation is unnecessary, as
we have held-and the Government concedes-that the manner in which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial
review as to its reasonableness. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U. S. 547. 559-560 (1978). 2 " More important, we would
promote empty forma.Iism were we to require magistrates to
make explicit what unquestionably is implicit in bugging
authorizations: 21 that a covert entry, with its attendant interference with Fourth Amendment interests, may be necessary
for the installation of the surveillance equipment. See United
States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (Md. 1976). We
conclude, therefore, that the Fourth Amendment does not
~o Petitioner does not chnllengr the Dbtrict Court';; finding that covert
entry in the present case was reasonable. The officers entered petitioner's
office only twice: once to install the bug and once to remove it. There is
no indication that their intrusion went beyond what was necessary to
install and remove the equipment. See n. 8, supra.
21
In the pre;;ent case, the Di;;trict Court :;pecifically noted that its order'
Hnphcitly had aurhorized coverr c•ntry. See p. -,supra. Thus, contrary
to ihr snggesrion of the dis:st'nt, Hee post, at n. 20, there is no question
in this case "of the Executive's authority to break and enter at will
without any ,judicial authorization ."
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require that a Title III electronic surveillance order include a
specific authorization to enter covertly the premises described
in the order!"
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

.Affirmed.

""Although expli<'it authorization of thP t•ntr~· i ~ not constitutionally
required, we do agree with the ' Court of Appeals that the "preferableapp roach" would be for Government ngents in the future to make explicit
to thr ·authorizing court their ·expectation that some form of Emrreptitious
, entry will be required to carry · out the surveillance. Indeed, the Solicitor·
General has informed us that the Department of .Justice has · adopted a
policy requiring its officers
" to include [in applications for Title III orders] a request that the order
providing for the interception specifically authorize surreptitious entry for
the purpose of installing and removing any electronic interception devicesto be utilized in accomplishing the oral interception ." See Brief for the, United States, at 56.
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I

Lawrence Dalia, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of ApUnited States.
peals for the Third Circuit.
[March -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520 (Title III) ,
permits courts to authorize electronic surveillance 1 by Government officers in specified situations. We took this case
by writ of certiorari to resolve two questions concerning the
1 All types of electronic surveillance have the same purpose and effect :
the secret interception of communications. As the Court set forth in
Berger v. New York , 388 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1967), however, this surveillance
is performed in two quite different ways. Some surveillance is performed
by "wiretapping," which is confined to the interception of communication
by telephone and telegraph and generally may be performed from outside
the premises to be monitored. For a detailed description , see Note,
Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch
Remedies, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1414 n. 18 (1974). At issue in the
present case is the form of surveillance commonly known as "bugging,"
which includes the int€rception of all oral communication in a given
location. Unlike wiretapping, this interception typically is accomplished
by installation of a small microphone in the rocm to be bugged and
transmission to some nearby receiver. See McNamara., The Problem of
Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You
Prececd after the Court Says 'Yes' ?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev . 1, 2 (1977) ;
Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime
·Cases: A Preliminary Analysis, reprinted in the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, T ask Force Report :
Organized Crime, App. C, at 92, 97 (1967) . Both wiretapping and
bugging are reg\Uated under Title IlL See 18 U. S. C.§ 2510 (1) and (2) .
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implementation of Title III surveillance orders. First, may
courts authorize electronic surveillance that requires covert
entry 2 into private premises for installation of the necessary
equipment? Second, must authorization for such surveillance
include a specific statement by the court that it approves of
the covert entry? 8
I
On March 14, 1973, Justice Department officials applied to
the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, seeking authorization under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 to intercept telephone conversations on two telephones in petitioner's
business office. After examining the affidavits submitted in
support of the Government's request, the District Court authorized the wiretap for a period of 20 days or until the
purpose of the interception was achieved, whichever came first.
The court fourid probable cause to believe that petitioner was
a member of a conspiracy the purpose of which was to steal
goods being shipped in interstate commerce in violation of 18
U. S. C. § 659. Moreover, the court found reason to believe
that petitioner's business telephones were being used to further
this conspiracy arid that means of investigating -the conspiracy
other than electronic surveillance would be unlikely to succeed
Every electronic surveillance necessarily is "covert" in the sense -that
it must be "hidden; secret; disguised" to be effective. Webster's New
International Dictionary 612 (2d Ed. 1~44) . As used here, "covert entry"
refers to the ·physical ,entry by a law enforcement officer into private
premises without the owner's permission or knowledge in order to install
bugging equipment. · Generally such an entry will require a breaking and
entering. See discussion infm, at - .
3 The Federal Courts of Appeals have given conflicting answers to
these questions. See United States v: .Finazzo, 583 F . 2d 837 (CA6
1978) ; United States v. Santora, 583 F . 2d 453 (CA9 1978); United
States v. Scafidi, 564 F . 2d 633 (CA2 1977) , cert. denied, 436 U. S. 903
(1978) ; United States v. Ford, U. S. App . D. C. - , 553 F . 2d 146
(1977); United States v: Agrusa; 541 F : 2d 690 (CA8 1976), cert: deni~d,
~9 u.s. 1045 (wn) .
2
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On November 6, 1975, petitioner was indicted in a fivecount indictment charging that he had been involved m a
are conspiring to commit such offenses in violation of Section 371 of Title
18, United States Code.
"(b) There is probable cause to believe tha.t particular wire and oral
communications concerning these offenses will be obtained through these
interceptions, authorization for which is herewith applied. In particular,
these wire and oral communications will concern the theft or robbery of
goods moving in interstate commerce, and the transportation, sale, receipt,
storage, or distribution of these stolen goods, and the participants in the
commission of said offenses.
"(c) Normal investigative procedures reasonably appear to be unlikely
to succeed and are too dangerous to 'be used.
" (e) There is probable cause to believe that the business office of
Larry Dalia, consisting of an ·enclosed room, approx-imately fifteen (15) by
eighteen ( 18) feet in dimension, and situated in the northwesterly corner
of a one-story building housing Wrap-0-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd.,
and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George Avenue,
Linden, New Jersey, has· been used, and is being -used by Larry Dalia and
others as yet unknown in connection with the commission of the abovedescribed offenses.
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that :
"Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of ·Investigation, ·United StateS'
Department of Justice, are authorized . . . to :
"(b) Intercept oral communications of Larry Dalia, and others as yet
unknown, concerning the above-described offenses at the business office of
Larry Dalia, consisting of an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15)
by eighteen (18) feet in dimension, and situated in the northwesterly
corner of a one-story building housing Wrap-0-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. ' George
Avenue, Linden, New Jersey.
"(c) such interceptions shall not automatically termina.t e when the type
of communication described above in paragraphs (a) and {b) have first
been obtained, but shall continue until communications are intercepted
which reveal the manner in which Larry Dalia and others as yet unknown
participate in theft from interstate shipments ; sale or· receipt of stolen
goods; and interference wit.h commerce by threats or violence; and which
reveal the identities of his confederates, their places of operation, and the
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conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of fabric. 5 At
trial, the Government introduced evidence showing that peti·
tioner had been approached in March of 1973 and asked to
store in his New Jersey warehouse "a load of merchandise."
Although petitioner declined the request, he directed the
requesting party to Higgins, an associate, with whom he
agreed to share the $1,500 storage fee that was offered. The
merchandise stored under this contract proved to be a tractor·
trailer full of fabric worth $250,000 that three men stole on
April 3, 1973, and transported to Higgins' warehouse. Two
days after the theft, FBI agents arrested Higgins and the
individuals involved in the robbery.
The Government introduced into evidence at petitioner's
trial various conversations intercepted pursuant to the court
orders of March 14, April 5, and April 27, 1973. Intercepted
telephone conversations showed that petitioner had arranged
nature of the conspiracy involved therein, or for a period of twenty (20)
days from the date of this Order, whichever is earlier.
"PROVIDING THAT, this authorization to intercept oral and wire
communications shall be executed as soon as practicable after signing of
this Order and shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and must terminate
upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event, at the end
of twenty (20) days from the date of this Order.
"PROVIDING ALSO, that Special Attorney James M. Deichert shall
provide the Court with a report on the fifth, tenth, and fifteenth day
following the date of this Order showing what progress has been made
toward the achievement of the authorized objective and the need for
continued interception."
5 Count one charged petitioner and others with conspiring to transport,
receive, ard possess stolen goods in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2, 2314,
2115, and 659. Count two charged petitioner and others with conspiring
to obstruct interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1951 (b) (1). \
Count three charged that petitioner had transported stolen goods; count
four charged that he had received stolen goods; and count five charged
petitioner with possession of stolen goods.
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for the storage at Higgins' warehouse and had helped negotiate the terms for that stora.ge. One telephone conversation
that took place after Higgins' arrest made clear that petitioner
had given advice to others involved in the robbery to "sit
tight" and not to use the telephone. Finally, the Government
introduced transcripts of conversations intercepted from petitioner's office under the April 5th bugging order. In these
·conversations, petitioner had discussed with various participants in the robbery how best to proceed after their confederates had been arrested. The unmista:ka:ble inference to
'be drawn from petitioner's statements in these conversations
is that he was an active participant in the scheme to steal the
truckload of fabric.
Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained
through the interception of conversations by means of the
device installed in his office. The District Court denied the
suppression motion, without prejudice to its being renewed
following trial. After petitioner was convicted on two counts,6
he renewed his motion and the court held an evidentiary
hearing concerning the method by which the electronic device
had been installed. At this hearing it was shown that, although the April 5 court order did not explicitly authorize
entry of petitioner's business, the FBI agents assigned the
task of implementing the order had entered petitioner's office
secretly at midnight on April 5 and had spent three hours in
the building installing an electronic bug in the ceiling. All
electronic surveillance of petitioner ended on May 16, 1973, at
which time the agents re-entered petitioner's office and
removed the bug.
In denying a second time petitioner's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the bug, the trial court ruled
that under Title III a covert entry to install electronic
6 Petitioner was convicted of receiving stolen goods and conspiring. to
-transport, receive, and possess stolen goods. See n. 5, supra,
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equipment is not unlawful merely because the
court approving the surveillance did not explicitly authorize \
such an entry. 426 F. Supp. 862 (1977). Indeed, in the
court's view, "implicit in the court's order [authorizing electronic surveillance] is concomitant authorization for agents
to covertly enter the premises in question and install the
necessary equipment." !d., at 866. As the court concluded
that the FBI agents who had installed the electronic device
were executing a lawful warrant issued by the court, the sole
·question was whether the method they chose for execution
was reasonable. Under the circumstances, the court found
the covert entry of petitioner's office to have been "the safest
and most successful method of accomplishing the installation~;,
Ibid. Indeed, noting that petitioner himself had indicated
'that such a device could only have been installed through
such an entry, the court observed that "[i]n most cases the only
'form of installing such devices is through breaking and entering. The na.ture of the act is such that entry must be sur'reptitious and must not arouse suspicion, and the installation
must be done without the knowledge of the residents or
·occupants." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed peti•tioner's conviction. 575 F. 2d 1344 (1978). Agreeing with
the District Court, it rejected petitioner's contention that
separate court authorization was necessary for the covert entry
of petitioner's office, although it noted that "the more prudent
or preferable approach for government agents would be to
include a statement regarding the need of a surreptitious entry
in a request for the interception of oral communications when
a break-in is contemplated." Id., at 1346-1347.

I

II
Petitioner first contends that the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry of private premises in all cases, irrespective
of the reasonableness of the entry or .the approval of a court.

'·
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He contends that Title III is unconstitutional insofar as it
enables courts to authorize covert entries for the installation
of electronic bugging devices.
In several cases this Court has implied that in some circumstances covert entry to insta.ll electronic bugging 'devices
would be constitutionally acceptable if done pursuant to a
search warrant. Thus, for example, in ' Irvine v. California)
347 U. S. 128 (1954), the plurality stated that in conducting
electronic surveillance, state police officers had "flagrantly!
deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on
the Federal Government." !d., at 132. It emphasized that
the bugging equipment was installed through a covert entry
of the defendant's home "without a search warrant or other
process." !d. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511- 512 (1961), it was noted
that, " [ t l his Court has never held that a federal officer
' may without warrant and without consent physically entrench
into a man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen,
and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was
seen or heard." (Emphasis added.) Implicit in decisions
such as Silverman and Irvine has been the Court>s view that
covert entries are constitutional in some circumstances, at
least if they are made pursuant to warrant.
Moreover, we find no basis for a constitutional rule proscribing all covert entries. It is well established that law
· officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a
search warrant where such entry is the only means by which
'the warrant effectively may be executed. See, e. g., Payne v,
United States, 508 F. 2d 1391, 1394 (CAS 1975); cf. Ker v.
·california, 374 U. S. 23, 28, 38 (1963); 18 U. S. C. § 3109.
Petitioner nonetheless argues that covert entries are unconsti"tutional for their lack of notice. This a.r gument is frivolous,
·as was indicated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 355
h. 16 ( 1967), where the Court stated that "officers need nQt

I
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announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly]
authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." 7
In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n. 19 (1977),
we held that Title III provided a constitutionally adequate
substitute for advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must
cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.
See 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d). There is no reason why the
same notice is not equally sufficient with respect to electronic
surveillances requiring covert entry. We make explicit, therefore, what has long been implicit in our decisions dealing with
this subject: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se
a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment. 8
One authority has said that the constitutional validity of covert entries
to install bugs "is plainly the consequence of [the] reasoning" of Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). T . Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 114 (1969) .
8 Petitioner argues that, even if a covert entry would be constitutional
in some cases, it was not in the present case, as there was no need for such
entry. The District Court, however, specifically found that the "safest
and most successful method of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through breaking and entering [the office.]" 426 F.
Supp. 866 ( 1977). Moreover, in issuing the Title III order, the court
found that "[n]ormal investigative procedures reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed or are too dangerous to be used." And in his opinion
denying petitioner's subsequent suppression motion, the same judge stated:
"The affidavits which supported the application for the warrant in question indicated that resort to electronic surveillance, to overhear meetings
at Dalia's office and conversations on Dalia's telephones, was required to
identify the sources of Dalia's stolen goods, those working with him to
transport and store stolen property, and the scope of the conspiracy. Oral
evidence of this criminal enterprise was only available inside Dalia's
business premises." Ibid .
The District Court, therefore, concluded that the circumstances required
the approach used by the officers, and nothing in the record brings this
conclusion into question.
7
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III
Petitioner's second contention is that Congress has not
given the courts statutory authority to approve covert entries
for the purpose of installing electronic surveillance equipment,
even if constitutionally it could have done so. Petitioner
emphasizes that although Title III sets forth with meticulous
care the circumstances in which electronic surveillance is
permitted, there is no comparable indication in the statute
that covert entry ever may be ordered. Accord, United States
v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 453, 457-458 (CA9 1978).
Title III does not refer explicitly to covert entry. The
'language, structure, and history of the statute, however, dem·
onstrate that Congress meant to authorize courts-in certain
specified circumstance&-to approve electronic surveillance
without limitation on the means necessary to its accomplish·
ment, so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances.
'Title III provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation
of electronic surveillance, prohibiting all secret interception of
communications except as authorized ·by certain state and
federal judges in response to applica.tions from specified federal and state law enforcement officials. See 18 U. S. C.
§§ 2511, 2515, and 2518; 'United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, "301-302 (1972). Although Congress
was fully aware of the distinction between bugging and wiretapping, seeS. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 68 (1961),
· Title III by its terms deals with each form of surveillance in
essentially the same manner. See 18 U. S. C. § 2510 (1) and
(2); n. 1, supra. Orders authorizing interceptions of either
wire or oral communications may be entered only after the
court has made specific determinations concerning the likelihood that the interception will disclose evidence of criminal
conduct. See 18 U.S. C. § 2518 (3). Moreover, with respect
· to both wiretapping and bugging, an authorizing court must
specify the exact scope of the surveillance undertaken, enulTierating the parties whose comrnunic.a.tions are to 'be over-
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heard (if they are known), the place to be monitored, and
the agency that will do the monitoring. See 18 U. S. C.
§ 2518 (4).
The plain effect of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to
guarantee 't hat wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there
is a genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is
needed. 0 Once this need has been demonstrated in accord
with the requirements of § 2518, the courts have broad authority to "approv[e] interception of wire or oral communications," 18 U. S. C. § 2516 (1), (2), subject of course to constitutional limitations. See Part II; supra. 10 Nowhere in Title
III is there any indication that the authority of courts under
§ 2518 is to be limited to approving those methods of interception that do not require covert entry for installation of the
intercepting equipment. 11
The legislative history of Title III underscores Congress'
9

It is clear that Title III serves a substantial public interest.

See n. 13,

infra. Congress and this Court have recognized, however, that electronic
surveillance can be a threat to the "cherished privacy of law abiding
citizens" unless it is subjected to the careful supervision prescribed by
Title III. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297, 312 (1972).
1 ° Congress explicitly confirmed the breadth of the power it had conferred on courts acting under Title III when it amended the Act in 1970.
Pub. L. 91-358, Title II, § 211 (b), July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 654. Section
2518 ( 4) now empowers a court authorizing electronic surveillance to
"direct that a ... landlord, custodian or other person shall furni sh the
applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively . ... " (Emphasis
added.) Thus, it appears that Congress anticipated that landlords and
custodians may be enlisted to a.id law enforcement officials covertly to
enter and place the ·necessary equipment in private areas.
11 The only limitation Title III places on the manner in which these
court orders are to be executed is in its requirements that no order extend
beyond 30 days, and that every order must include provisions that it is to
be executed as soon as practicable and in a manner that will minimize the
interception of communications not within the purview of the order. See
18 u.s. c . .§ 2518 (5).
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understanding that courts would authorize electronic surveillance in situations where covert entry of private premises was
necessary. Indeed, a close examination of that history reveals
that Congress did not explicitly address the question of covert
entries in the Act only because it did not perceive surveillance
requiring such entries to differ in any important way from
that performed without entry. Testimony before subcommittees considering Title III and related bills indicated that
covert entries were a necessary part of most electronic bugging
operations. See, e. g., Anti-Crime Program: Hearings on H.
5037, etc. before Subcommittee No.5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1031 (1967). Moreover, throughout the Senate report on Title III indiscriminate
reference is made to the types of surveillance this Court
reviewed in Berger v. ·New · York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). See, e. g., s~
Rep. No. 1097, supra, at 74-75, 97, 101-102, 105. ·Apparently
· committee members did not · find it significant that Berger
· involved a covert entry, whereas Katz· did not. Compare
Berger v. New York, supra, at 45, with Katz v: United States,
supra, at 348. 12
It is understandable, therefore, · that by· the time Title III
was discussed on the floor of Congress, those Members who
referred to covert entries indicated their understanding · that
12 Indeed, the nature of electronic surveillance involved in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), was mentioned on the floor of the Senate, when
Senator Long observed that tinder the New York law, police could "obtain
judicial warrants authorizing them to hide bugs in the premises of criminal
suspects." 114 Cong. Rec. 14708 (1968). To be sure, in his comments
Sena.tor Long did not explicitly suggest that Title III would authorize
such covert entries. See post, at - . His statement confirmed, however,
what had been strongly indicated prior to the bill's consideration by .the
full Congress: Members of Congre~~ simply saw no distinction between
electronic surveillance which required covert entry and that which required
covert tapping of one's telephone. The invasiQn of the privacy of con~
versatio~1 is the same in both situations,
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such entries would necessarily be a part of bugging authorized
under Title III. Thus, for example, in voicing his support
for Title III Senator Tydings emphasized the difficulties
attendant upon installing necessary equipment:
". . . surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape [sic]
must be installed on telephones, and wires strung. Bugs
are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious
entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is
necessary to adjust the equipment." 114 Cong. Rec.
12989 (1968) (emphasis added).
In the face of this record, one simply cannot assume that
Congress, aware that most bugging requires covert entry,
nonetheless wished to except surveillance requiring such entries from the broad authorization of Title III, and that it
resolved to do so by remaining silent on the subject. On the
contrary, the language and history of Title III convey quite
a different explanation for Congress' failure to distinguish
between surveillance that requires covert entry and that
which does not: Those considering the surveillance legislation
understood that, by authorizing electronic interception of oral
"Communications in addition to wire communications, they
were necessarily authorizing surreptitious entries.
Finally, Congress' purpose in enacting the statute would be
largely thwarted if we were to accept petitioner's invitation
to read into Title III a limitation on the courts' authority
under § 2518. Congress permitted limited electronic surveillance under Title III because it concluded that both wiretapping and bugging were necessary to enable law enforcement
authorities to combat successfully certain forms of crime. 13
18 18 U. S. C. § 2516 specifies that authorization for electronic surveillance may be sought only with respect to certain enumerat,ed crimes.
These include espionage, sabotage, treason, kiclnapping, robbery, extortion, murder, various corrupt practices, and counterfeiting. According to
the Senate Report concerning Title III, "[e]ach offense has been chosen
'either because it is intrinsicaUy serious or because it js characteristic of

.,
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Absent covert entry, however, almost all electronic bugging
would be impossible. 14 See United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp.
879, 882 (DC 1976), aff'd,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 553 F. Zd
146 (1977); McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry
to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed
the operations of organi~ed crime." S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, n. 7, at 97.
The need for use of electronic surveillance against organized crime had
been thoroughly considered and documented shortly before Congress began
considering Title III by a special organized-crime task force of a Presidential Commission charged with considering crime in the United States. The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime 91-104 (1967); see United
States v. United States District Court, supra, at 310 n. 9. A summary of
the Task Force's conclusions appeared in the Commission's report, which
was repeatedly referred to during consideration of Title III. See The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 200-203 (1967). In
'Congress, proponents of Title III, after hearing numerous witnesses testify
concerning the importance of electronic surveillance in fighting organized
crime, recommended the bill to their colleagues as "[l]egislation meeting
the constitutional standards set out in [Supreme Court] decisions, and
·granting law enforcement officers the authority to tap telephone wires and
install electronic surveillance devices in the investigation of major crimes~'
S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, n. ·7, at -75; see id., at -74. Indeed, the Senate
Report on Title III unequivocally stated that " [ t] he major purpose of
·Title III is to combat organized crime." /d., at 70. ·The rapid developments in technology availabl·e to the criminal underworld make it all the
more imperative that the Gov·ernment not "deny to itself the prudent and
lawful employment of those very techniques which are employed against
· the Government and its law-abiding citizens." United States v. United
: States District Court, supra, at 312.
14 Although he cites no authority, MR. JusTICE STEVENS apparently believes that a practicable alternative to covert entry would be installation of
bugging devices through subterfuge. See post, at - . Nowhere in the
legislative history of Title III is there any indication that Congress wished
to limit its authorization to bugs installed through subterfuge. Moreover,
it is difficult to perceive why one means of gaining entry would be less
intrusive than another. See, e. g., United States v. Ford, 414 F . Supp.
879 (DC 1976), aff'd, U. S. App. D. C. - , 553 F. 2d 146 (1~77)
{bomb scare ruse).
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After the Court Says "Yes"?, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1977).
As recently as 1976 a congressional commission established to
'Study and evaluate the effectiveness of Title III concluded
that in most cases electronic surveillance cannot be performed
without covert entry into the premises being monitored. See
U. S. National Commission for Review of Federal and State
Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance,
Electronic Surveillance 15, 43, and n. 19, 86 (1976). The
same conclusion was reached by the American Bar Association
committee charged with formulating standards governing use
of electronic surveillance. See ABA Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance 65 n.
175, 149 (1971). 1 5
In sum, we conclude that Congress clearly understood that
it was conferring power upon the courts to authorize covert
entries ancillary to their responsibility to review and approve
surveillance applications under the statute. To read the statute otherwise would be to deny the "respect for the policy of
Congress [that] must save us from imputing to it a selfdefeating, if not disingenuous purpose." Nardone v. United
States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 16

IV
Petitioner's final contention is that, if covert entries are to
be authorized under Title III, the authorizing court must
1 5 Tho~e

few available device,; that. intercept conver:;ations from out,;ide
of a building in many cases are impractical, either beca use of cost, reliability, or the configuration of the area being monitored. See U. S.
National Commission for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, Commission Studies 168-183
(1976) ; sec, e. g., United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 8'79, 881 (DC
1976), aff'd , - U.S. App . D. C. - , 553 F . 2d 146 (1977).
16 As we have con cluded that Title III authorizfS courts to approve
covert entries to install electronic surveillance equipment, we do not
consider whether such authority also is conferred by other frderal enactment , such as Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 or the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C.

§ 1&51.
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explicitly set forth its approval of such entries before the fact.
In this case, as is customary, the court's order constituted the
sole written authorization of the surveillance of petitioner's
office. As it did not state in terms that the surveillance was
to include a covert entry, petitioner insists that the entry
violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Accord,
United States v. Ford,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 553 F. 2d 146,
170 (1977); Application of United States, 563 F. 2d 637, 644
(CA4 1977).17
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be
·issued only "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Finding these words
to be "precise and clear," Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 481
(1965), this Court has interpreted them to require only three
things. First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates. See, e. g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S.
· 245,250-251 (1977) (per curiam); Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U. S. 345, 350 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 459-460 (1971). Second, those seeking the
warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate · their probable
cause to believe that "the evidence sought will aid in a
particular apprehension or conviction" for a particular offense.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. · 294, 307 (1967). Finally,
"warrants must particularly describe the 1things to be seized,'·"
as well as the place to be searched. Stanford v; Texas, supra,
at 485.
There is no requirement in Title III that explicit authorization of
covert entries be set forth in the court's order. The statutory requirement that the surveillance "should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court" 82 Stat. 211,· § 801 (d) (1968), merely
emphasizes that courts acting under 18 U. S. C. § 2518 should utilize their
power under § 2518 (6) to require periodic progress reports after ·the
installation of the wiretap or bug. If there is a requirement of explicit
judicial authorization for covert entry, therefore, it must come from thll!
fo\\rth A~J:lendm.ent {1.10\l.e,
17
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In the present case, the April 5th court order authorizing
the interception of oral conversations occurring within petitioner's office was a warrant issued in full compliance with
these traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. It was
based upon a neutral magistrate's independent finding of
probable cause to believe that petitioner had been and was
committing specifically enumerated federal crimes, tha.t petitioner's office was being used "in connection with the commission of [these] offenses," and that bugging the office would
result in the interception of "oral communications concerning
these offenses." App. 6a-7a. Moreover, the exact location
and dimensions of petitioner's office were set forth, see supra,
at - , and the extent of the search was restricted to the
"[i]ntercept[ion of] oral communications of Larry Dalia and
others as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses
at the business office of Larry Dalia.... " App. 8a. 18
Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that the April 5th order
was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment for its failure
18 Because of the strict requirements of Title III, all of the indicia of a
warrant necessarily are present whenever an order under Title III is issued.
Accord, United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633, 644 (CA2 1977) (Gurfein,
J., concurring). Indeed, it was Congress' express design to create under
Title III a mechanism by which search warrants valid under the Fourth
Amendment would be issued for electronic surveillance. See S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968); Controlling Crime Through More
Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings on S. 300, etc. before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of t11e Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 176, 570, 919 (1967); Hearings on
H. R. 5037, etc. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committ·ee on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 917 934 (1967). No less would be
required for the court authorization of electronic survelllance under Title
III to be constitutional, as electronic surveillance undenia.bly is a Fourth
Amendment intrusion requiring a warrant. See, e. g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 352-353, 356-357 (1967). And we have explicitly
reco~rnized the necessity of a warrant in cases of electronic surveillance.
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. ·.29.'7, 316-,32()
(1'972).
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to specify that it would be executed by means of a covert
entry of his office. Nothing in the language of the Constitution
or in this Court's decisions interpreting that language suggests
that, in addition to the three requirements discussed above,
search warrants also must include a specification of the precise
manner in which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it
is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers to
determine the details of how best to proceed with ·the performance of a search authorized by warrant 10-subject , of
course to the general Fourth Amendment protection "against
unreasonable searches arid seizures:"
Recognizing that the specificity required · by the · Fourth
Amendment does not generally extend to the means by which
warrants are executed, petitioner further argues that warrants
for electronic surveillance are unique because often . ·they
impinge upon two different Fourth Amendment interests:
The surveillance itself interferes only with the right to hold
private conversations, whereas the entry subjects the suspect's
property to possible damage a11d personal effects to unauthorized examination. · This view of the warrant clause parses too
finely · the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Often in executing a warrant the police may find it necessary
to interfere with privacy tights not explicitly considered by
the judge who issued the warrant. For example, police e;xeFor example, courts have upheld the use of forceful breaking and
entering where necessary to ·effect a warranted search, even though the
warrant gaw no 'indication that force had been contemplated. See, e. g.,
United States v. Gervato, 474 F. 2d 40, 41 (CA3), cert. denied, 414 U. S.
864 (1973). To be sure, often it is impossible to anticipate when these
actions will be necessary. See Note, Covert Entry in Electronic .Surveillance: The Fourth Amendment Requirements, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 203,
214 (1978). Nothing in the decisions of this Court, how,ever, ·indicates
that officers requesting a warrant would be constitutionally required to. set
forth the anticipated means for execution even in those cases where _they
know beforehand that unannounced or forced entry likely will be necessary.
Se~ 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 140 (1978).
19
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cuting an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter
the suspect's home in order to take him into custody, and they
thereby impinge on both privacy and the freedom of movement. See, e. g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F. 2d 406, 421
(CA5 1976) (on petition for rehearing). Similarly, officers
executing search warrants on occasion must dama.ge property
in order to perform their duty. See, e. g., United States v.
Brown, 556 F. 2d 304, 305 (CA5 1977); United States v.
Gervato, 474 F. 2d 40, 41 (CA3), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 864
(1973).
It would extend the warrant clause to the extreme to require
that, whenever it is reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment
rights may be affected in more than one way, the court must
set forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the
executing officers. Such an interpretation is unnecessary, as
we have held-and the Government concedes-that the manner in which a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial
review as to its reasonableness. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U. S. 547, 559-560 (1978). 20 More important, we would
promote empty formalism were we to require magistrates to
make explicit wha.t unquestionably is implicit in bugging
authorizations: 21 that a covert entry, with its attendant interference with Fourth Amendment interests, may be necessary
for the installation of the surveillance equipment. See United
States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556, 560 (Md. 1976). We
conclude, therefore, that the Fourth Amendment does not
The District Court found that covert entry in the pre::;ent case was (
reasonable. The officers entered petitioner's office only twice: once to
install the bug and once to remove it. There is no indication that their
intrusion went beyond what was necessary to install and remove the
equipment. See n. 8, supra.
21
In the present case, the District Court specifically noted that its order
implicitly had authorized covert entry. Seep.-, supra. Thus, contrary
to the suggestion of the dissent, see post, a t - n. 20, there is no question
in this case "of the Executive's authority to break and enter at wilt
without any judicial authorization."
20

77-1722-0PINION
DALIA v. UNITED STATES

20

require that a Title III electronic surveillance order include a
specific authorization to enter covertly the premises described
in the order. 22
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

22

Although explicit authorlllation of the entry is not constitutionally
required, we do agree with the Court of Appeals that the "preferable
approach" would be for Government agents in the future to make explicit
to the authorizing court their ·expectation that some form of surreptitiouft
entry will be required to carry out the surveillance. Indeed, the Solicitor
General has informed us that the Department of Justice has adopted a
policy requiring its officers,
\
"to include [in applications for Title III orders] a request that the order
providing for the interception specifically authorize surreptitious entry for
the purpcse of installing and removing any electronic interception devices
to be utilized in accomplishing the oral interception." See Brief for th~
Vnite<i Stat~;s,_ ~t 5.6,
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Cases held for Dalia v. United States, No . 77-1722
Three cases have been held for Dalia v. United
States: Volpe v. United States, No. 78-3S51 United States v.
F1nazzo, No. 78-1051; and Grant v. United States, No. 781179.
Volpe v. United States , No. 78-385 (Cert to CA2)
Petitioners in Volpe were convicted of various
charges stemming from the1r operation of a gambling
enterprise. Their convictions were based in par.t on evidence
gained from electronic surveillance of the business office of
one of the petitioners. On December 16, 1974, a federal
district court issued an order under 18 u.s.c. ~25 18 for
interception of both telephone and other conversations
emanating from the office. In installing the electronic
equipment necessary for this interception, FBI agents twice
entered an adjoining business--once secretly and once by
ruse.
In this Court, petitioners press four principal
claims. First, they argue that courts are without power
under 18 u.s.c. S2518 to authorize covert entries, and that
such authorization, if it can be given, cannot be inferred
from an eavesdroppinq order. Second, they contend that the
interceptions were unlawful because the adjoining business
was entered even though it was not mentioned in the
eavesdropping order. Third, they claim that the
eavesdropping order was invalid under 18 u.s.c. S2518 (1)( e)
because the officer applying for the order failed to tell the
District Court that the same premises had been the subject of
an eavesdropping order in 1972. Last, petitioners contend

that the District Court erred in issuing a joint order
both wiretapping and bugging without first making a
determination that both were required.
There is no need to consider petitioners' first
argument, as it is precisely the same as that rejected in
Dalia. The court~ below refused to entertain petitioners'
cla1rns with respect to the adjoining business, ruling that
they were withou ~ standing to obj~ct to the entry of a third
party's premises. Petitioners' claim that they have
statutory standing under 18 u.s.c. §2518(10)(a) is refuted by
the legislative history of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act, as this Court recoqnized in Alderman v. United
States, 394 u.s. 165, 175-76 n.9 (1969). As for petit1oners'
th1rd contention, the courts below found that the FBI agent
failed to mention the prior electronic surveillance only
because he did not know of it. In United State s v. Donovan,
429 u.s~ '" 413 (1977), we ruled that not every technical
violation of Title III requires suppression of the evidence
obtained from the eavesdropping. If there was a violation of
§2518(10)(a) in this case, it falls within ~h e class of
violations that do not require suppression. Finally, the
Solicitor General argues persuasively that the District Court
made a finding that both wiretapping and bugging were
necessary before it issued the joint order. I therefore
shall vote to deny certiorari in No. 78-385.
•a

~l~M.

·~· ·v•·~l1~

United States v. Finazzo, No. 78-1051

(Cert to CA6)

:

The facts in this case for our purposes are the same
as those in Dalia. The District Court granted the
respondent's mot1on to suppress evidence obtained from an
authorized electronic bug, ruling that law enforcement agents
may not covertly enter and install court-authorized
electronic surveillance equipment unless explicitly
authorized to do so by the court order approving the
surveillance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that Title
III does not empower courts to authorize covert entry. Judqe
Celebrezze concurred, stating that, although Title III allows
courts to authorize such entries, the authorization must be
explicit.
The only issues in this case are the same as those
ruled upon in Dalia. Accordingly, I shall vote to grant,
vacate, and remand No. 78-1051 in light of the Court's
decision in Dalia v. United States.

,''< !l:i

Grant v. United States, No. 78-1179 (Cert to

.\ti'~<t:
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Petitioners in Grant were involved in the same
criminal enterprises as were the petitioners in Volpe v.
States, No. 78-385 (see supra). They raise the same
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claims as are raised in Volpe. The only difference is that '~;.~,·:~·
none of the petitioners in Grant had any possessory interest ~&
in any of the premises entered by the officers installing the
surveillance equipment. There is a question, therefore,
whether they have standing to assert any obiection to the
covert entries. Accordingly, I will vote to deny certiorari
in No. 78-117().
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States: Volpe v. United States, No. 78-385; United States v.
Finazzo, No. 78-1051; and Grant v. United States, No. 781179.
Volpe v. United States, No. 78-385 (Cert to CA2)
Petitioners in Volpe were convicted of various
charges stemming from the1r operation of a gambling
enterprise. Their convictions were based in part on evidence
gained from electronic surveillance of the business office of
one of the petitioners. On December 16, 1974, a federal
district court issued an order under 18 U.S.C. §2518 for
interception of both telephone and other conversations
emanating from the office.
In installing the electronic
equipment necessary for this interception, FBI agents twice
entered an adjoining business--once secretly and once by
ruse.
In this Court, petitioners press four principal
claims. First, they argue that courts are without power
under 18 U.S.C. §2518 to authorize covert entries, and that
such authorization, if it can be given, cannot be inferred
from an eavesdropping order. Second, they contend that the
interceptions were unlawful because the adjoining business
was entered even though it was not mentioned in the
eavesdropping order. Third, they claim that the
eavesdropping order was invalid under 18 U.S.C. §2518(1)(e)
because the officer applying for the order failed to tell the
District Court that the same premises had been the subject of
an eavesdropping order in 1972. Last, petitioners contend
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that the District Court erred in issuing a joint order for
both wiretapping and bugging without first making a
determination that both were required.
There is no need to consider petitioners' first
argument, as it is precisely the same as that rejected in
Dalia. The courts below refused to entertain petitioners'
claims with respect to the adjoining business, ruling that
they were without standing to object to the entry of a third
party's premises. Petitioners' claim that they have
statutory standing under 18 u.s.c. §2518(10)(a) is refuted by
the legislative history of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act, as this Court recognized in Alderman v. United
States, 394 u.s. 165, 175-76 n.9 (1969). As for petit1oners'
third contention, the courts below found that the FBI agent
failed to mention the prior electronic surveillance only
because he did not know of it.
In United States v. Donovan,
429 U.S. 413 (1977), we ruled that not every technical
violation of Title III requires suppression of the evidence
obtained from the eavesdropping.
If there was a violation of
§2518(10)(a) in this case, it falls within the class of
violations that do not require suppression.
Finally, the
Solicitor General argues persuasively that the District Court
made a finding that both wiretapping and bugging were
necessary before it issued the joint order.
I therefore
shall vote to deny certiorari in No. 78-385.
United States v. Finazzo, No. 78-1051

(Cert to CA6)

The facts in this case for our purposes are the same
as those in Dalia. The District Court granted the
respondent's motion to suppress evidence obtained from an
authorized electronic bug, ruling that law enforcement agents
may not covertly enter and install court-authorized
electronic surveillance equipment unless explicitly
authorized to do so by the court order approving the
surveillance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that Title
III does not empower courts to authorize covert entry. Judge
Celebrezze concurred, stating that, although Title III allows
courts to authorize such entries, the authorization must be
explicit.
The only issues in this case are the same as those
ruled upon in Dalia. Accordingly, I shall vote to grant,
vacate, and remand No. 78-1051 in light of the Court's
decision in Dalia v. United States.
Grant v. United States, No. 78-1179 (Cert to CA2)
Petitioners in Grant were involved in the same
criminal enterprises as were the petitioners in Volpe v.
United States, No. 78-385 (see supra). They raise the same
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claims as are raised in Volpe. The only difference is that
none of the petitioners in Grant had any possessory interest
in any of the premises entered by the officers installing the
surveillance equipment. There is a question, therefore,
whether they have standing to assert any objection to the
covert entries. Accordingly, I will vote to deny certiorari
in No. 78-1179.
I
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Apri 1 3, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1722, Dalia v. United States

Dear Bi 11 ,
I agree with Part II of your dissenting
opinion. At the risk of some awkwardness, perhaps the best way of indicating this would be to
insert the following after your name: "joined
by Mr. Justice Stewart except as to Part I,".
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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